

IMPACT OF REGULATION AND PRIVATE INFORMATION ON LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETS

Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades Doctor oeconomiae publicae
(Dr. oec. publ.)

an der
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

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Jahr: 2015

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Promotionsabschlussberatung:	11. Mai 2016

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