

# **A Primer on Auction Design, Management, and Strategy**

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# Contents

Preface xi

## **1 Introduction 1**

- 1.1 Goals of This Primer 1
- 1.2 What Are Auctions? 4
  - 1.2.1 Why Auctions? 5
  - 1.2.2 Types of Auctions 6
- 1.3 A New Age of Auctions 8
  - 1.3.1 New Types of Auctions 9
  - 1.3.2 Auctions Replacing Regulation 10
  - 1.3.3 Auctions in the Private Sector 12
- 1.4 Why Auction Design (and Management) Matters 13
- 1.5 Outline of This Primer 15

## **2 Game Theory, Auction Design, and Strategy 17**

- 2.1 Game Theory and Auctions 17
- 2.2 Noncooperative Games 18
  - 2.2.1 One-Shot Auctions 18
  - 2.2.2 Normal Form Games 18
  - 2.2.3 Equilibrium in Normal Form Games 20
  - 2.2.4 Mixed Strategy Equilibrium in Spectrum Auctions: Some Examples 21
  - 2.2.5 Equilibrium in Multi-Attribute Auctions 22
- 2.3 Multi-Stage and Sequential Auctions 23
  - 2.3.1 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 23
  - 2.3.2 Signaling Games 24

2.4	Repeated Games	25
2.4.1	Finitely Repeated Games	26
2.4.2	Infinitely Repeated Games	27
2.4.3	Overlapping Generations of Players	27
2.5	Summary	28
<b>3</b>	<b>Revenue Equivalence</b>	<b>29</b>
3.1	Four Basic Auction Types for Single-Object Auctions	29
3.2	Auction Strategy in the Four Basic Auction Types	31
3.3	Strategic Equivalence	32
3.4	Revenue Equivalence of English and Dutch Auctions	34
3.5	Summary	37
<b>4</b>	<b>Optimal and VCG Auctions</b>	<b>41</b>
4.1	Optimal Auctions	41
4.2	Calculating Optimal Bid Functions	42
4.3	Optimal Auctions	43
4.3.1	The Revelation Principle	43
4.3.2	The Revelation Principle and Optimal Auctions	44
4.4	Incentive-Compatible Auctions	47
4.4.1	The Vickrey–Clark–Groves Mechanism	47
4.4.2	Properties of VCG Auctions	48
4.4.3	Multi-Object VCG Auctions	50
4.4.4	VCG-like Mechanisms for Advertising Auctions	52
4.5	Summary	53
<b>5</b>	<b>Imperfect Information and the Winner’s Curse</b>	<b>55</b>
5.1	Common Values and Order Statistics	55
5.2	Bidding Strategy in Common-Value Auctions	57
5.2.1	Bid Strategy in Dutch and First-Price Auctions	57
5.2.2	Bid Strategy in a Second-Price Auction	58
5.2.3	Bid Strategy in English Auctions	58
5.2.4	Comparisons of English, Second-Price, and Dutch Common-Value Auction Outcomes	60

- 5.3 Almost Common-Value Auctions and Informational Asymmetries 61
  - 5.3.1 Auctions with One Informed Bidder 62
  - 5.3.2 Auctions with Both Informed and Uninformed Bidders 63
  - 5.3.3 Other Asymmetries 63
- 5.4 Summary 64
  
- 6 Sequential Auctions of Substitutes 67**
  - 6.1 Multi-Lot Auctions 67
  - 6.2 The Declining-Price Anomaly 68
  - 6.3 Weber's Martingale Theorem 70
  - 6.4 Strategic Allocation Decisions 72
    - 6.4.1 A Simple Two-Auction Example 73
    - 6.4.2 Optimizing the Distribution of Auction Target Volume across Auctions 77
    - 6.4.3 Sequential Auctions and Risk 80
    - 6.4.4 Auction Timing 81
  - 6.5 A Summary of Auction Timing Considerations 82
  
- 7 Sequential Auctions of Complements 85**
  - 7.1 Examples of Complementarities 85
  - 7.2 Renewal Auctions 87
  - 7.3 Sequential Auctions of Complements 90
  - 7.4 Sequential Intellectual Property Rights Auctions 92
  - 7.5 Auctions for Complementary Inputs with Imperfect Competition in Downstream Markets 95
  - 7.6 Summary 96
  
- 8 Single-Product Auctions 99**
  - 8.1 Introduction 99
  - 8.2 Simultaneous versus Sequential Auctions 101
  - 8.3 Clock Auctions 102
    - 8.3.1 Clock Auctions and Sealed-Bid Auctions 103
    - 8.3.2 Clock Auctions, Sealed-Bid Auctions, and Market Power 104
  - 8.4 Supply-Function Auctions 105
  - 8.5 Conclusions and Applications 108

- 9 Simultaneous Auctions 111**
  - 9.1 The SMR Auction 111
  - 9.2 Introduction to the SMR Auction 112
    - 9.2.1 A Brief History of the SMR and Clock Auctions 112
    - 9.2.2 SMR Auction and Its Variants 113
  - 9.3 SMR Auction Properties 115
    - 9.3.1 Straightforward Bidding in SMR Auctions 115
    - 9.3.2 Strategic Withholding in SMR Auctions 117
  - 9.4 SMR Auction Experience 119
  - 9.5 SMR Auction Configuration 124
    - 9.5.1 The Texas Capacity Auctions 124
    - 9.5.2 The Spanish 4G Auction (2011) 125
    - 9.5.3 The Mexican PCS Auction 127
    - 9.5.4 US FCC Auction 66—Advanced Wireless Services 127
    - 9.5.5 Arbitrage in SMR Auctions 130
  - 9.6 Conclusion 133
- 10 Combinatorial auctions 135**
  - 10.1 Introduction 135
  - 10.2 Hierarchical Package Bidding 138
  - 10.3 VCG Auction Properties 139
    - 10.3.1 Revenues in VCG Auctions 140
    - 10.3.2 Fairness in VCG Auctions 141
    - 10.3.3 Budgets in VCG Auctions 142
  - 10.4 Core-Selecting Auctions 143
  - 10.5 Ascending Package Auctions and the Combinatorial Clock Auction 145
    - 10.5.1 Complexity 147
    - 10.5.2 Bidder incentives 148
  - 10.6 Comparing the Performance of the CCA and Other Auctions 150
  - 10.7 The Austrian CCA 151
  - 10.8 Conclusion 154
- 11 Final Remarks 157**
  - 11.1 Introduction 157
  - 11.2 Game Theory and Bidder Incentives 157
  - 11.3 Bidder Incentives and Revenue Equivalence 158

11.4	Single-Object versus Multi-Object Auctions	159
11.5	Sequential Auctions	159
11.6	Bidding Behavior	160
11.7	Optimal Auctions	161
11.8	Auction Design, Management, and Strategy	161
11.9	Participation	161
11.10	Auctions and Markets	162
	Notes	163
	References	173
	Index	179