

Bankers,
Bureaucrats,
and Central Bank Politics

THE MYTH OF NEUTRALITY

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CONTENTS

List of figures	x
List of tables	xiii
List of boxes	xv
Abbreviations	xvii
Acknowledgements	xix
1 Agents, institutions, and the political economy of performance	1
2 Career theories of monetary policy	27
3 Central banker careers and inflation in industrial democracies	70
4 Careers and the monetary policy process: Three mechanism tests	116
5 Careers and inflation in developing countries	143
6 How central bankers use their independence	182
7 Partisan governments, labor unions, and monetary policy	205
8 The politics of central banker appointment	240
9 The politics of central banker tenure	280
10 Conclusion: The dilemma of discretion	304
References and author index	319
Subject index	343
About the type, figures, and data	358