The Economics of Adaptation and Long-term Relationships

Dean Victor Williamson

Independent researcher and formerly Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice, USA
Contents

Preface vii

1. The provenance of an economics of adaptation in long-term relationships 1
   The provenance of efficient adaptation: take one 17
   The provenance of efficient adaptation: take two 31
   The path taken thus far 39
   The path in the future 40

2. The single-entity question in antitrust: ownership, control and delegation in organizations 46
   The single-entity question 49
   Whence the single-entity concept? 57
   Some law and economics of conflict and control in organizations 60
   A two-stage sequence of single-entity tests 63
   Conclusion 72

3. Platform competition, the Apple eBooks case and the meaning of agreement to fix prices 74
   The conspiracy 78
   The economic theory of collusion and the practice of collusion 85
   The united front 105
   Conclusion 112

4. Adaptation in long-term exchange relations: evidence of the complementarity and ancillarity of dimensions of electricity marketing contracts 114
   Models and hypotheses 119
   Data and estimation 139
   Conclusion 155
   Appendices 157

The economics of adaptation and long-term relationships

Historical narratives 170
The data 179
Hypothesis testing 191
Contract selection and probit estimation: Crete 1330–55 208
Conclusion 217

Knowledge spillovers and industrial policy: evidence from the
Advanced Technology Program and the Department of
Defense 221
In the beginning 223
The National Cooperative Research Act and nondisclosure
agreements 226
The Advanced Technology Program 231
Data 234
Results 243
Whence competitiveness? 251
Conclusion 253

References 255
Author index 275
Subject index 279
Case law index 286