The Economics of Credit Rating Agencies

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## Contents

1 Introduction 3

2 The Role of Ratings, Regulatory Reliance and Contracting 11
   2.1 Why ratings? What frictions do they address? 11
   2.2 Information production and scale economies 13
   2.3 Regulatory uses of ratings 16
   2.4 The challenge of regulatory reliance 19
   2.5 Regulatory reliance vs. supervision of rating agencies as substitutes 21
   2.6 Systemic risk: Rating agencies vs. common view 23

3 Alternative Information Providers and the Markets 27
   3.1 Information and the markets 27
   3.2 Liability: Auditors and analysts vs. credit rating agencies 29
   3.3 Proxy-voting advisors 31

4 The Payment Model 37
   4.1 The problem of paying for information 37
   4.2 Paying for credit ratings 39
   4.3 Payment models for alternative business models 41
5 Conflict of Interest and Reputation 45
5.1 Rating agencies’ conflict of interest 45
5.2 Model setup 46
5.3 The limit of reputational concerns 50
5.4 Comparative statics 50
5.5 Fee structure 53
5.6 Double reputation 55
5.7 Competition 56
5.8 Commitment 59
5.9 Analysts and their conflicts 60

6 Feedback Effects 65
6.1 Introduction 65
6.2 Model setup 67
6.3 Equilibrium 68
6.4 Equilibrium without the CRA 70
6.5 Equilibrium with the CRA 71

7 Selection Effects 75
7.1 Rating shopping and selective disclosure 75
7.2 Notching 77
7.3 Solicited vs. unsolicited credit ratings 78
7.4 Alternative mechanisms 82

8 Rating Diverse Products 87

9 The Nature of Competition and Reputation 91
9.1 Evidence on competition and rating quality 91
9.2 The nature of rating agencies’ reputation 93
9.3 Entry and the “NRSRO” framework 94
9.4 Alternatives to the rating model and competition 96

10 Why do Ratings Matter? 99

11 Concluding Comments 105

Appendix 109
Acknowledgements  115
References  117