Rediscovering Economic Policy as a Discipline

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## Contents

*List of Figures*  
page xi

*List of Tables*  
xiii

*Preface*  
xv

*Acknowledgements*  
xix

### Part I Economic Policy As a Discipline  
1

1 Introduction  
3

1.1 The Core of Economic Policy and Its Two Pillars:  
The ‘Logic’ and the ‘Theory’ of Economic Policy  
3

1.2 Overview of the Development of the Discipline  
4

1.3 The ‘Invisible Hand’ and the ‘Night-Watchman’  
State  
8

1.4 The Seeds for the Birth of the Logic of Economic  
Policy  
11

1.5 The Theory of Economic Policy and the Link  
between the Two Pillars  
17

1.6 The Classical Theory of Economic Policy with  
Fixed and Flexible Targets  
24

1.7 Linking the Two Pillars  
33

1.8 Why Did Economic Policy As a Discipline First  
Develop in Scandinavia and the Netherlands –  
And How Did It Develop Elsewhere?  
35

1.9 Economic Policy in Italy since the 1960s  
45

1.10 Conclusions  
48
## Contents

2 Progressive Dismantling and Demise of the Classical Theory of Economic Policy  
  2.1 Why Economic Policy Did Not Pass Over to Other Countries or Survive 55  
  2.2 Preconditions for the Existence of an Economic Discipline: The Core of Economic Policy under Attack 57  
  2.3 Minor Failures: The Identity of Policymakers 60  
  2.4 Vital Failures and the First Pillar: The Impossibility of a Democratic Social Welfare 62  
  2.5 Vital Failures and the Second Pillar: The Ineffectiveness of Policy Action 68  
  2.6 The Need for Rules and Constraints: Independent (and Conservative) Central Banks and Authorities to Limit Discretionary Policy Action 80  
  2.7 Waiting for a Revaluation of Policy Effectiveness 82  

3 Re-establishing the First Pillar and a Silent Revolution for the Effectiveness of Policy Action 83  
  3.1 Possibilities of a Democratic Social-Welfare Ordering: The Need for a 'Theory of Justice' 83  
  3.2 Rip van Winkle and the Rebuttal of the Theoretical Convictions of the 1970s and 1980s on the Ineffectiveness of Economic Policy 90  
  3.3 The Surprise Effect 92  
  3.4 The Non-Vertical Long-Run Phillips Curve 93  
  3.5 The Optimal Inflation Rate 97  
  3.6 Political Independence of Central Banks 102  
  3.7 Conservative Central Banks and Alternative Ways of Governing Inflation 108  
  3.8 The Changing Value of Multipliers and Fiscal Policy 111  
  3.9 An Application of Values of Multipliers: Inconsistency of the EMU Institutions 119  
  3.10 What Have We Learned from the Crisis? 123  

4 Revaluation of the Classical Approach to Economic Policy: Re-establishing the Second Pillar 125  
  4.1 Introduction 125
Contents

4.2 Equivalence of Rational Expectations to a Strategic Game 127
4.3 An Example of Conflicts Rather Than Passive Subordination and the Need for a Theory of Conflicts 133
4.4 Conditions for Controllability in a Static Strategic Setting with Two or Multiple Players 135
4.5 Notions and Conditions of Controllability in a Dynamic Strategic Setting 152
4.6 Summary and Open Issues 164

Part II Economic Policy in the Present Tense 167

5 The Challenges of the Financial Crisis, Rising Inequality, Secular Stagnation and Globalisation: Economic Policy As a Lame Duck? 169
5.1 The 'Bad News': New Economic and Social Issues – The Great Recession 170
5.2 The Crisis As a Pivot: The Limits to Fiscal and Monetary Policy and the Need to Devise New Policy Tools 176
5.3 The 'Good News': New Monetary Policies and Macro-Prudential Instruments for Dealing with Crises 178
5.4 Searching for New Rules of Fiscal Policy 191
5.5 Coordinating Macroeconomic Policies: Down in the Trenches or Clearing Clouds for the Future? 202
5.6 Fighting Inequalities 208
5.7 Dealing with Secular Stagnation 226
5.8 Finding an International Equilibrium in Times of Globalisation and Redesign of International Institutions 235

6 One Step Forward towards Realism in Theories Relevant to Effective and Accountable Policymaking 253
6.1 Searching for the Right Signals in a Market Economy to Prevent Crises and to Manage Them 254
6.2 Signals, Transparency and Forward Guidance 262
6.3 The Issue of Knowledge Sharing of Models and Policy Effectiveness 278
| Contents |
|-------------------|-----------------|
| 6.4 How to Enrich the Classical Conception of Economic Policy As a Discipline | 281 |
| 6.5 Complementing and Refining the Abstract Theory of Policymaking | 293 |
| 7 Why Can Economic Policy Be a Useful Discipline? | 295 |
| 7.1 Institutions As the Ring Connecting the Three Parts of Economic Policy | 295 |
| 7.2 Social Choice and Institutions for Building a Fair Society | 298 |
| 7.3 Conflicts and Coordination in a Democratic Society | 304 |
| 7.4 The Central Role of Education for Democracy | 309 |
| 7.5 Institutions for Building a Well-Functioning Society | 313 |
| 7.6 The Many Reasons Why the Theory of Economic Policy Has an Impact on Institutions | 315 |
| 7.7 For a Democratic, Fair and Efficient Society: A Restatement of the Need for a Unitary Discipline of Economic Policy | 324 |

References 326
Author Index 391
Subject Index 398