

# Who's to Blame for Greece?

## Austerity in Charge of Saving a Broken Economy

Theodore Pelagidis

*NR Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, USA and Professor of Economics,  
University of Piraeus, Greece*

and

Michael Mitsopoulos

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# Contents

<i>List of Figures and Tables</i>	xi
<i>About the Authors</i>	xv
<b>1 Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Part I The “Party Period” before the Crisis</b>	
<b>2 The Costs and Benefits for Joining a Common Currency with Emphasis on Weaker Member States: The Pre-Crisis Debate</b>	<b>7</b>
2.1 Potential sources of conflicts/costs: de-synchronization of business cycles	7
2.2 Demand disturbances and trade	10
2.3 Responses to labor market rigidities	11
2.4 Shortage of money stocks for the peripheral countries	14
2.5 External imbalances	15
2.6 The effect of a monetary union on trade between member states	16
2.7 Ten years of EMU (2000–2009): convergence or divergence prevailed?	18
<b>3 Greece before the Crisis: The Critical Years in Domestic Politics</b>	<b>25</b>
3.1 The discussion in the Greek Parliament ahead of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty	26
3.1.1 References to the strategic advantages of EMU membership and issues that relate to the common currency area and the chances of success of the country in it	28
3.1.2 References to the impact on employment	31
3.1.3 References to the impact on the macro-environment	31
3.1.4 References with regard to institutions, structural reforms and the role of the state in the economy	31
3.1.5 References with regard to tax evasion and tax reforms	34
3.1.6 References with regard to the issue of fiscal consolidation	34

3.2	Various other debates and key speeches in the Greek Parliament during the term of the government that brought the Maastricht Treaty for ratification by the Greek Parliament	35
3.2.1	The role of Greece in Europe and the chances of success	38
3.2.2	Employment and education	40
3.2.3	Growth enhancing structural reforms, privatizations, and infrastructure projects and the role of the state in the economy	40
3.2.4	Fiscal stabilization	45
<b>4</b>	<b>IMF and EU Reports on Greece</b>	<b>56</b>
4.1	IMF reports during the accession period ('90s) and the 2000–2009 “golden years”	56
4.1.1	Assessment of the EMU accession	59
4.1.2	References to labor market policies	60
4.1.3	Recommendations for structural reforms in product markets and professional services and the content of these	62
4.1.4	References with regard to fiscal consolidation and the content of the related initiatives	64
4.1.5	References to the reliability of statistics/extra-budgetary expenditure items	68
4.2	The implementation of the conditionality program: fiscal consolidation and the issue of spending cuts vs revenue increases	68
4.2.1	Research with regard to the policy mix of fiscal adjustments	74
4.2.2	IMF progress reports on the Greek Conditionality Program	77
4.3	European Union bodies' reports and decisions	80
4.3.1	Annual country specific recommendations by the Council, and European Commission recommendations to the Council	81
4.3.2	The decision to admit Greece to the euro area	85
<b>Part II Greece's Free Fall 2010–2013</b>		
<b>5</b>	<b>The Troika Period Reconsidered</b>	<b>93</b>
5.1	The Greek public finances and debt: a brief overview	93

5.2	The run up to the memorandum	101
5.3	What the memorandum initially provided	101
5.4	Implementing the memorandum as of September 2011 and the Medium Term Fiscal Strategy	103
5.5	Incentives and unraveling the impasse	107
	Appendix to Chapter 5: OECD structural indicators in key network industries	110
<b>6</b>	<b>Assessing the Intentions of the Government(s) since the Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty</b>	<b>117</b>
6.1	The 1990–1993 program, design, and implementation	117
6.2	The 2010 program: design, implementation, and comparison with the 1990–1993 approach	118
6.3	The “internal devaluation” fallacy of 2010–2012	123
6.4	The other side of the internal devaluation fallacy – the approach to the labor market deregulation during 2010–2012	127
6.5	The lack of a strategy to enhance growth – in Greece and in Europe	136
6.6	The private sector death-trap: undermining the financial sector, jeopardizing macroeconomic stability, and questioning the European future of the country	139
6.6.1	The Private Sector Involvement (PSI)	140
6.6.2	Euro area exit	145
 <b>Part III Looking Ahead</b>		
<b>7</b>	<b>Greece: Why Did the Forceful Internal Devaluation Fail to Kick-start an Export-Led Growth?</b>	<b>155</b>
7.1	Introduction	155
7.2	Employment	156
7.3	Wages and earnings	159
7.4	Labor cost indexes and exports	181
7.5	Conclusions and further remarks	192
<b>8</b>	<b>Giving Greece a Chance to Succeed</b>	<b>195</b>
<b>9</b>	<b>How to Design a Closer and More Democratic Union</b>	<b>205</b>
9.1	The compromise of the euro area: common monetary, national fiscal, and structural policies	205
9.2	Evaluating the current structure of powers and democratic mandates	206

9.3	How changes in the structure of the democratic mandates can secure a “closer and more democratic” Union	209
9.4	The role of European parties	215
<b>10</b>	<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>218</b>
	<i>Afterword</i>	225
	<i>The Greek Bail-out Drama: Is This Time Different?</i>	225
	<i>Author Index</i>	228
	<i>Subject Index</i>	230