APPLICATIONS OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY TO AGRICULTURAL LAND USE POLICY

Lessons from the European Union

Rob Fraser
University of Kent, UK
Contents

Foreword xi
Chapter 1. Introduction 1

PART A: SET-ASIDE AS AN AGRICULTURAL LAND USE POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 11

Introduction to Part A 13


PART B: ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP AS AN AGRICULTURAL LAND USE POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 81

Introduction to Part B 83


## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Price Insurance, Moral Hazard and Agri-environmental Policy. <em>Paper Presented to the AES Annual Conference, April 2012, Warwick University</em></td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>To Cheat or Not To Cheat: Moral Hazard and Agri-environmental Policy. <em>Journal of Agricultural Economics</em> 64(3): 527–536 (2013)</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Reflections, Looking Around and Looking Ahead</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>