

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EURO

How to Deal with a Currency Built on Dreams

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CONTENTS

<i>Foreword</i>	v
<i>List of Tables</i>	xvii
<i>List of Figures</i>	xix
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xxiii

INTRODUCTION	1
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CHAPTER 1.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE EU AND THE EURO	5
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1. Europe until the Second World War	5
2. The legacy of the Second World War	7
3. The first steps towards integration in the fifties	8
4. The sixties: between De Gaulle and further integration	10
5. From ‘eurosclerosis’ to ‘europhoria’	11
5.1. Enlargement	12
5.2. The Werner Report and the snake	12
5.3. The own resources question	13
5.4. Institutional adaptations and the single market	13
5.5. The Delors Report	14
6. From Maastricht via Lisbon to the euro crisis	15
6.1. The Maastricht Treaty	15
6.2. Enlargement	16
6.3. The Treaties of Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon	18
6.4. The start of monetary union	20
6.5. The euro crisis	23
References	25

CHAPTER 2.

DECISION-MAKING IN THE EU AND THE EMU	27
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1. The objectives of the European Union	27
2. The EU institutions	29
2.1. The European Parliament	29

2.2.	The European Council	30
2.3.	The Council	31
2.4.	The European Commission	32
2.5.	The Court of Justice of the European Union	33
2.6.	The European Central Bank	34
2.7.	The Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions	35
3.	Policy instruments	35
4.	The decision-making process in the EU	36
4.1.	The power balance between the member states and the European institutions	36
4.2.	The power balance between the member states	37
4.3.	Decision-making procedures in the EU	39
4.3.1.	The community method of decision-making	39
4.3.2.	The intergovernmental method of decision-making	40
4.3.3.	Decision-making in the euro area	41
4.4.	The less visible side of EU decision-making	43
	References	45

CHAPTER 3.

BUDGETARY INSTRUMENTS OF THE EU 49

1.	The EU budget	49
1.1.	The size of the EU budget	49
1.2.	The budgetary principles	50
1.3.	The budgetary procedure	51
1.4.	EU own resources	52
1.5.	EU spending and the multiannual financial framework	55
2.	The European Investment Bank	58
3.	The permanent stability mechanism and its predecessors	59
	References	60

CHAPTER 4.

THE EU SINGLE MARKET 61

1.	The theoretical aspects of the formation of a single market	61
1.1.	The economic effects of the creation of a customs union	61
1.2.	The economic effects of the creation of a single market	65
1.2.1.	Free movement of factors of production	65
1.2.2.	Removal of non-tariff barriers	68
1.2.3.	Long-term effects of bigger markets and more competition	69

2.	The EU single market	70
2.1.	The European customs union	70
2.2.	The European single market.	71
2.2.1.	The legal approach.	72
2.2.2.	The substantive approach.	73
2.2.2.1.	Harmonisation and mutual recognition	74
2.2.2.2.	Goods.	75
2.2.2.3.	Public procurement.	76
2.2.2.4.	Services	77
2.2.2.5.	Labour	78
2.2.2.6.	Capital	79
2.2.2.7.	Specific sectors	80
2.2.2.8.	Other aspects: the European Company and the European Patent.	82
2.2.2.9.	Indirect taxes	83
3.	The economic impact of the European customs union and single market	84
3.1.	The economic effects of the European customs union.	84
3.2.	The economic effects of the European single market.	85
	References	87

CHAPTER 5.

	THE EU COMPETITION POLICY.	91
1.	The economic analysis of competition policy	91
2.	European competition policy.	93
3.	EU competition policy vis-à-vis companies	94
3.1.	The relevant market	95
3.2.	Restrictive practices and abuse of dominant position	95
3.2.1.	‘The modernisation package’	96
3.2.2.	Restrictive practices	96
3.2.2.1.	Legislation.	96
3.2.2.2.	Horizontal agreements	97
3.2.2.3.	Vertical agreements.	100
3.2.3.	Abuse of dominant position	103
3.3.	Concentrations	106
4.	EU competition policy vis-à-vis governments	108
4.1.	State aid policy	108
4.1.1.	The economics of state aid control	108
4.1.2.	EU state aid rules.	110
4.1.3.	The crisis aid.	113

4.2.	Services of general economic interest and network industries	116
4.2.1.	Basic rules	116
4.2.2.	Services of general economic interest	117
4.2.3.	Liberalisation of network industries	119
References	121
CHAPTER 6.		
IS THE EUROZONE AN OPTIMAL CURRENCY AREA? 125		
1.	OCA: The cost–benefit analysis	126
1.1.	Costs	126
1.1.1.	Macroeconomic	126
1.1.2.	Microeconomic	127
1.2.	Benefits	128
1.2.1.	Eliminating transaction costs	128
1.2.2.	Less uncertainty	129
1.2.3.	Benefits of an international currency	129
1.2.4.	Macro-economic stability	130
1.3.	Costs and benefits compared	132
1.4.	Main OCA properties	133
1.4.1.	Flexibility of prices and wages	133
1.4.2.	Factor mobility	135
1.4.3.	Financial market integration or private insurance scheme . . .	137
1.4.4.	Degree of economic openness	138
1.4.5.	Diversification of economic structure	139
1.4.6.	Fiscal integration or public insurance scheme	139
1.5.	Meta-OCA property: similarities in business cycles or economic shocks	140
1.6.	Some critical observations about the traditional OCA theory	141
1.6.1.	Inconclusiveness and inconsistency	141
1.6.2.	Effectiveness of an independent monetary policy	141
1.7.	Conclusion	142
2.	OCA: from ex ante to ex post optimality	143
2.1.	The endogeneity of OCA	143
2.2.	Graphical representation of the endogeneity of OCA	144
2.3.	Endogeneity of OCA and the recent financial and euro area debt crisis	147
References	149

CHAPTER 7.	
THE EURO CRISIS.....	153
1. Introduction.....	153
2. The debt problem.....	153
3. The private savings balance, the credit boom and the real estate bubble.....	154
4. Deteriorating government deficits and debts.....	158
5. The loss of competitiveness and the current account problems.....	160
6. The debt problem.....	164
7. The euro crisis.....	168
8. The vicious circle between banks and sovereigns.....	172
9. The euro crisis was unexpected.....	175
10. The immediate answers to the euro crisis.....	177
10.1. Why we wanted to save the euro.....	178
10.2. The European rescue mechanisms.....	180
10.3. Support to programme countries.....	182
10.3.1. Greece.....	182
10.3.2. Ireland.....	183
10.3.3. Portugal.....	184
10.3.4. Spain.....	184
10.3.5. Cyprus.....	185
11. Are other eurozone countries at risk?.....	185
12. Consequences of the euro crisis for the economies of the EU.....	187
References.....	188
CHAPTER 8.	
THE SINGLE MONETARY POLICY.....	191
1. The design of the single monetary policy.....	191
1.1. The institutional set-up of the single monetary policy.....	191
1.1.1. The European system of central banks and the Eurosystem ..	191
1.1.2. The decision-making bodies.....	192
1.1.2.1. The Governing Council.....	193
1.1.2.2. The Executive Board.....	194
1.1.2.3. Role of technical committees.....	194
1.2. The Eurosystem's mandate to maintain price stability.....	195
1.2.1. Economic rationale for price stability.....	195
1.2.2. Benefits of price stability.....	198
1.2.3. Legal enshrinement of the mandate.....	198

1.2.4.	ECB quantitative definition of price stability	199
1.2.5.	A role for financial stability?	200
1.3.	The two-pillar strategy of the ECB	201
1.4.	Independence and accountability	203
2.	The implementation of monetary policy in the euro area	205
2.1.	Transmission mechanism of monetary policy	206
2.1.1.	The interest rate channel	206
2.1.2.	A more complete view of the transmission mechanism	208
2.2.	The operational framework of the Eurosystem	210
2.2.1.	Set-up of the operational framework	211
2.2.2.	Crisis impact on the operational framework	217
2.2.2.1.	Expansion of the Eurosystem's balance sheet and liquidity surplus	217
2.2.2.2.	Liquidity surplus and interest rate steering.	221
3.	The single monetary policy at work during the crisis	223
3.1.	The separation principle	223
3.2.	The enhanced credit support policy	225
3.2.1.	Fixed rate full allotment.	225
3.2.2.	Extension of collateral	226
3.2.3.	Currency swap agreements	226
3.2.4.	Covered bond purchase programme (CBPP)	227
3.2.5.	Extension of maturity of liquidity provision	227
3.2.6.	Emergency liquidity assistance	227
3.3.	Response to the sovereign debt crisis through the Securities Markets Programme	228
3.4.	Dealing with the sovereign bank 'doom' loop.	230
3.4.1.	Increasing liquidity comfort through longer-term operations.	230
3.4.2.	Outright Monetary Transactions programme	234
3.4.3.	Price stability remains key.	235
3.4.4.	Forward guidance	236
3.4.5.	Large balance sheet and inflation risk.	236
3.5.	Concluding remarks	238
	References and consulted literature	239

CHAPTER 9.

THE NEW ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 243

1.	Introduction	243
2.	Prevention and correction of budgetary imbalances	245

2.1.	Preventive rules of the Stability and Growth Pact	248
2.2.	Corrective rules of the Stability and Growth Pact	249
2.3.	Decision-making and sanctions	250
2.3.1.	Sanctions in the preventive arm	250
2.3.2.	Sanctions in the corrective arm	252
2.4.	National budgetary frameworks	255
2.5.	Budgetary dispositions of the Two-Pack	255
2.6.	Budgetary dispositions of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union	257
3.	Prevention and correction of other macroeconomic imbalances: the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure	258
3.1.	Preventive arm of macroeconomic surveillance	258
3.2.	Corrective arm of macroeconomic surveillance: the excessive imbalance procedure	262
3.3.	Sanctions under the MIP	263
3.4.	The Two-Pack (second regulation)	263
4.	Improving competitiveness and economic growth	263
5.	The European Semester	264
	References	271
CHAPTER 10.		
TOWARDS A BANKING UNION		
		273
1.	Introduction: a bird's eye view on financial regulation	273
2.	Financial supervision and regulation in the EU	275
2.1.	Financial supervision	275
2.1.1.	The European Systemic Risk Board	276
2.1.2.	The three European Supervisory Authorities	277
2.2.	Financial regulations at EU level	278
2.2.1.	Capital Requirements Directive	278
2.2.1.1.	Capital requirements	279
2.2.1.2.	Liquidity requirements	283
2.2.1.3.	Requirements on maximal leverage	284
2.2.1.4.	Corporate governance	284
2.2.1.5.	Remuneration	285
2.2.2.	Common recovery and resolution tools	285
2.2.3.	Deposit Guarantee Scheme	288
2.2.4.	Other financial regulations for the EU-28	288
2.2.4.1.	Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)	288

2.2.4.2.	Investment funds (UCITS).....	290
2.2.4.3.	Stricter rules on hedge funds.....	291
2.2.4.4.	Regulation on Over-the-Counter Derivatives and Market Infrastructures (EMIR).....	292
2.2.4.5.	Regulation on Short Selling and Credit Default Swaps.....	293
2.2.4.6.	Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies.....	294
2.2.4.7.	Reform of the audit sector.....	295
2.2.4.8.	Preventing and sanctioning market abuse.....	295
2.2.4.9.	Regulating shadow banking.....	296
2.2.4.10.	Regulating crowdfunding.....	297
2.2.5.	The Single Rule Book.....	297
2.2.6.	Unfinished business: the Liikanen Report.....	297
3.	A banking union, for the eurozone and the willing.....	300
3.1.	Introduction.....	300
3.2.	The Single Supervisory Mechanism.....	300
3.2.1.	Main elements of the Single Supervisory Mechanism.....	301
3.2.2.	Scope of the Single Supervisory Mechanism.....	301
3.2.3.	Supervisory tasks and powers of the ECB.....	302
3.2.4.	Governance of the Single Supervisory Mechanism.....	303
3.2.5.	The legacy problem.....	304
3.3.	Direct bank recapitalisation.....	304
3.4.	The Single Resolution Mechanism.....	305
3.5.	A Common Deposit Guarantee Scheme.....	306
References	306

CHAPTER 11.

GROWTH AND COMPETITIVENESS.....	309
1. The meaning of competitiveness.....	309
2. Economic growth.....	310
3. EU2020 as a successor to the Lisbon Strategy.....	314
4. EU2020: the instruments.....	317
5. EU2020: realisations.....	318
6. Other conditions for growth and competitiveness.....	322
References.....	324

CHAPTER 12.

THE WAY FORWARD: SAVING THE EURO AND COMPLETING THE EMU . 325

1.	Introduction	325
2.	The debt problem	325
3.	Solve the external debt problem	327
4.	The responsibility of deficit and surplus countries	329
5.	Make the sovereign debt sustainable	331
6.	Debt restructuring	332
7.	Default of a country and breaking up the euro	334
8.	Is it possible to leave the euro in an orderly way?	337
9.	Prevent a new euro crisis	339
9.1.	Improve national economies in order to meet better the OCA criteria	339
9.2.	Strict application of rules to prevent a new debt overhang	341
9.3.	A budget for the eurozone	343
9.4.	Risk sharing via eurobonds	345
9.5.	Risk sharing via alternatives to eurobonds	347
9.6.	Prevent the doom loop between banks and sovereign	349
10.	Do we need a political union?	350
	References	351
	<i>Annex 1. How to assess potential solvency problems of a country</i>	<i>353</i>