CONTENTS

List of Figures ..... x
List of Tables ..... xiii
List of Contributors ..... xvi

Introduction  
NIR VULKAN, ALVIN E. ROTH, AND ZVIKA NEEMAN

PART I GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. What Have We Learned From Market Design?  
ALVIN E. ROTH

GARY E. BOLTON

3. Using and Abusing Auction Theory  
PAUL KLEMPERER

PART II CASES

SECTION II.A MATCHING MARKETS

4. Market Design for Kidney Exchange  
TAYFUN SÖNMEZ AND M. UTKU ÜNVER

5. School Choice  
ATILA ABDULKADIROĞLU

6. Improving Efficiency in School Choice  
AYTEK EREDIL AND HALUK ERGIN

7. Can the Job Market for Economists Be Improved?  
SARBARTHA BANDYOPADHYAY, FEDOR ISKHAMOV, TERENCE JOHNSON,  
SOOYUNG LEE, DAVID McARTHUR, JOHN RUST, JOEL WATSON, AND  
JOHN WATSON

8. Designing Markets for Ideas  
JOSHUA S. GANS AND SCOTT STERN
9. Redesigning Microcredit
   Ashok Rai and Tomas Sjöström

SECTION II.B AUCTIONS

    Paul Klemperer

11. Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions
    Robert Day and Paul Milgrom

12. Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton's Ekati Diamonds
    Peter Cramton, Samuel Dinkin, and Robert Wilson

SECTION II.C E-COMMERCE

13. Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior
    Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth

    Andrew Byde and Nir Vulkan

15. The Design of Online Advertising Markets
    Benjamin Edelman

16. Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting $60 Billion of Sourcing
    Tuomas Sandholm

17. Designing Automated Markets for Communication Bandwidth
    Nir Vulkan and Chris Preist

SECTION II.D LAW DESIGN

18. A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems
    Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman

19. Legislation with Endogenous Preferences
    Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev, and Eric Talley
PART III EXPERIMENTS

   Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Nathaniel Higgins, Erkut Y. Ozbay, and Andrew Stocking
   489

21. Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment
   Martin Dufwenberg and Uri Gneezy
   555

22. Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions
   Elena Katok
   573

23. The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill
   Uri Gneezy, Ernan Haruvy, and Hadas Yafe
   587

PART IV COMPETING DESIGNS

24. Competing Mechanisms
   Michael Peters
   609

25. Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets
   Nir Vulkan and Zvika Neeman
   629

Index
   661