Economic Approaches to Organizations

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Contents

Preface xi
Acknowledgements xv

Part I  Foundations  1

1  Markets and organizations  3
   1.1 The economic problem  3
   1.2 The division of labour  4
   1.3 Specialization  7
   1.4 Coordination  8
   1.5 Markets and organizations  10
   1.6 Information  13
   1.7 The environment and institutions  15
   1.8 Historical perspective  21
   1.9 Summary: the conceptual framework of this book  23
   1.10 Outline of the book
       Questions  26
       Note  26

2  Markets  27
   2.1 Introduction  27
   2.2 Market interaction: analysis of demand and supply  28
   2.3 The theory of demand  31
   2.4 The theory of production  33
   2.5 Market coordination  38
   2.6 The paradox of profits  39
   2.7 Comments on standard microeconomic theory  40
   2.8 Economic Man (homo economicus) and his further development  42
   2.9 Summary: how economic decisions are coordinated by the market
       Questions  45
       Note  46

3  Organizations  47
   3.1 The world of organizations  47
   3.2 Organizational coordination  48
3.3 Types of organizations 53
3.4 Organizational markets 58
3.5 Organized markets 59
3.6 Summary: how organizations achieve coordination 61
Questions 63
Notes 64

4 Information 65
4.1 Coordination and information 65
4.2 Hidden information 70
4.3 Hidden action 76
4.4 The value of information 81
4.5 Summary: information problems for markets and organizations 84
Questions 85
Note 86

5 Game theory 87
5.1 Introduction 87
5.2 The coordination game 88
5.3 The entry game 92
5.4 Auctions 96
5.5 The prisoner's dilemma: single-stage and iterated 101
5.6 Evolutionary game theory 110
5.7 Summary: insights from game theory 115
Questions 117

Part II Economic Approaches 119

6 Behavioural theory of the firm 121
6.1 Introduction 121
6.2 The firm as a coalition of participants 121
6.3 Organizational goals 125
6.4 Organizational expectations 128
6.5 Organizational choice 129
6.6 From bounded rationality to behavioural economics 131
6.7 Summary: goals and decision-making within the firm in behavioural theory 134
Questions 136

7 Agency theory 138
7.1 Introduction 138
7.2 Separation of ownership and control 139
7.3 Managerial behaviour and ownership structure 141
7.4 Entrepreneurial firms and team production
7.5 The firm as a nexus of contracts
7.6 Theory of principal and agent
7.7 Summary: agency relations between owners, managers and employees

Questions
Note

8 Transaction cost economics

8.1 Introduction
8.2 Behavioural assumptions: bounded rationality and opportunism
8.3 Dimensions of transactions
8.4 Peer groups
8.5 Simple hierarchies
8.6 Multistage hierarchies: U-form and M-form enterprises
8.7 Organizational markets
8.8 Markets and organizations: are these all there is?
8.9 Governance in a three-level schema
8.10 Summary: effect of transaction costs on choosing between markets and organizations and organizational forms

Questions

9 Economic contributions to business/competitive strategy

9.1 Introduction
9.2 Industry analysis
9.3 Competitor analysis
9.4 Competitive strategy
9.5 Resource-based view of the firm
9.6 Dynamic capabilities
9.7 Move and counter move
9.8 Summary: how economic analysis can contribute to the formulation of competitive strategies

Questions

10 Economic contributions to corporate strategy

10.1 Introduction
10.2 Unrelated diversification
10.3 Related diversification
10.4 Horizontal multinationalization
10.5 Vertical integration
10.6 Summary

Questions
## 11 Evolutionary approaches to organizations

11.1 Introduction 257  
11.2 Giraffes 257  
11.3 Organizations and giraffes 260  
11.4 Organizational ecology 263  
11.5 An evolutionary theory of economic change 270  
11.6 Comparison 275  
11.7 The evolution of dynamic capabilities 278  
11.8 Further developments 285  
11.9 Summary: the evolutionary perspective 290  
Questions 292  
Notes 293

## 12 All in the family

12.1 Introduction 294  
12.2 The basic conceptual framework 294  
12.3 Family resemblances 295  
12.4 Family differences 299  
12.5 Summary: all in the family? 306  
12.6 New developments: organizations as complex, adaptive systems 308  
Questions 317  
Note 317

## Part III Applications

### 13 Mergers and acquisitions

13.1 Introduction 321  
13.2 The significance of M&A 323  
13.3 Success and failure of M&A transactions 327  
13.4 Strategy, acquisitions and hidden information 329  
13.5 Auctions 331  
13.6 The winner’s curse and hubris 335  
13.7 Adverse selection: remedies for hidden information 339  
13.8 Moral hazard: remedies for hidden action 343  
13.9 Transaction specificity and hold-up 347  
13.10 Alignment of managers and shareholders 349  
13.11 Summary: economic approaches to M&A 353  
Questions 354  
Notes 355

### 14 Hybrid forms

14.1 Introduction 356  
14.2 Long-term relations between buyers and suppliers 358
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>Joint ventures</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>Business groups</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>Informal networks</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>Franchising</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>Comparing several hybrid forms</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>Summary: hybrid forms as governance structures between ideal markets and ideal organizations</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Questions</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>Corporate governance</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>The first public company</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>The use of incentive contracts</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>Internal monitoring</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>External monitoring</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>How markets constrain agency costs</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>Institutional frameworks: market-orientated and network-orientated systems of corporate governance</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>The evolution of different corporate governance systems in the world</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>Summary: how the agency problems of corporate governance can be reduced by organizational and/or market solutions</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Questions</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Note</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bibliography 411
Index 427

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