

HANDBOOK OF SAFEGUARDING GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC THEORIES AND MODELS

Editor-in-Chief

GERARD CAPRIO Jr.
Williams College, Williamstown, MA, USA

Editors

PHILIPPE BACCHETTA
University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland.

JAMES R. BARTH
Auburn University, Auburn, AL, USA
and
Milken Institute, Los Angeles, CA, USA

TAKEO HOSHI
School of International Relations and Pacific Studies
University of California, San Diego, CA, USA

PHILIP R. LANE
Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

DAVID G. MAYES
University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

ATIF R. MIAN
Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley
Berkeley, CA, USA

MICHAEL TAYLOR
Adviser to the Governor, Central Bank of Bahrain, Manama, Bahrain



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