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Information Choice in  
Macroeconomics and Finance

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# Contents

Acknowledgments	ix
PART I PRELIMINARIES	1
Chapter 1 Why Study Information Choice?	3
1.1 Types of Learning Models	4
1.2 Themes That Run through the Book	5
1.3 Organization of the Book	8
Chapter 2 Bayesian Updating	11
2.1 Normal Random Variables	11
2.2 Uniform Random Variables	13
2.3 The Kalman Filter	13
2.4 Bayesian Updating in Continuous Time	15
2.5 Mathematical References	16
2.6 Exercises	16
Chapter 3 Measuring Information Flows	17
3.1 Preliminaries	17
3.2 Entropy and Rational Inattention	18
3.3 Additive Cost in Signal Precision	20
3.4 Diminishing Returns to Learning and Unlearnable Risk	21
3.5 Inattentiveness	22
3.6 Recognition	22
3.7 Information-Processing Frictions	23
3.8 Learning When Outcomes Are Correlated	23
3.9 What Is the Right Learning Technology?	26
3.10 Appendix: Matrix Algebra and Eigen-Decompositions	27
3.11 Exercises	27
Chapter 4 Games with Heterogeneous Information	29
4.1 Preliminary Concepts	29
4.2 Heterogeneous Information Eliminates Multiple Equilibria	30
4.3 Information and Covariance: A Beauty Contest Model	33
4.4 Strategic Motives in Information Acquisition	36

4.5	Example: Information Choice and Real Investment	39
4.6	Public Information Acquisition and Multiple Equilibria	42
4.7	Broader Themes and Related Literature	44
4.8	Exercises	45
PART II INFORMATION CHOICE WITH COMPLEMENTARITY IN ACTIONS		47
Chapter 5	Disclosing Public Information	49
5.1	Payoff Externalities and the Social Value of Information	49
5.1.1	Coordination and Overreaction to Public Information	49
5.1.2	Morris and Shin's Social Cost of Public Information	50
5.1.3	Can Private Information Also Be Socially Costly?	51
5.1.4	A More General Approach	52
5.1.5	The Central Bank Transparency Debate	53
5.2	Public Information Crowds Out Private Information	53
5.2.1	Amador and Weill 2009	53
5.2.2	Complementary Public and Private Information	55
5.2.3	Private Information Makes Public Disclosures More Informative	57
5.3	More Information Increases Price Volatility	58
5.4	Public Information Makes Money Neutral	59
5.5	Broader Themes and Paths for Future Research	59
5.5.1	Speculative Currency Attacks	60
5.5.2	A Coordination-Based Theory of Leadership	61
5.6	Exercises	62
Chapter 6	Informational Inertia and Price-Setting	63
6.1	Lucas-Phelps Model	64
6.2	A Recipe for Inertia	67
6.3	Inattentiveness in Price-Setting	69
6.4	Rational Inattention Models of Price-Setting	72
6.5	Are Prices State Dependent or Time Dependent?	76
6.6	Broader Themes and Paths for Future Research	80
6.7	Exercises	82
PART III INFORMATION CHOICE WITH SUBSTITUTABILITY IN ACTIONS		83
Chapter 7	Information Choice and Investment Choice	85
7.1	A One-Asset Model with Information Choice	86
7.2	Multiple Assets and Exogenous Information	91
7.3	Multiple Assets with Information Choice	94
7.3.1	Gains to Specialization	95
7.3.2	Identical Investors Hold Different Portfolios	96
7.4	Interpreting Information Constraints in Equilibrium	97

7.5	Broader Themes and Paths for Future Research	99
7.6	Appendix: Computing Expected Utility	101
7.7	Appendix: Correlated Assets	104
7.8	Exercises	105
Chapter 8 · Returns to Scale in Information		107
8.1	Returns to Scale in Real Investment (One Asset)	108
8.2	Gains to Specialization ( $N$ Assets)	110
8.2.1	Result: Optimal Portfolio Choice	112
8.2.2	Result: Optimal Information Choice	113
8.2.3	Indifference Results	114
8.2.4	Preference for Early Resolution of Uncertainty	115
8.3	Markets for Information	116
8.4	Broader Themes	119
8.5	Paths for Future Research	120
8.6	Exercises	123
Chapter 9 Information as an Aggregate Shock		124
9.1	News about Future Productivity	125
9.1.1	Model 1: Cross-Industry Complementarity	125
9.1.2	Model 2: Gradual Capital Adjustment	127
9.1.3	Matching Stock Market Fluctuations	128
9.1.4	Empirical Evidence on News Shocks	129
9.2	News about Current Productivity	130
9.2.1	Model 3: Aggregate News Shocks	130
9.2.2	Model 4: Confusing Private and Public News	133
9.3	Broader Themes and Paths for Future Research	137
9.4	Exercises	138
PART IV MEASUREMENT		141
Chapter 10 Testing Information Theories		143
10.1	Measuring Flows of News	143
10.2	Forecast Precision	144
10.3	Using Covariances to Infer Information Sets	145
10.4	Realized Profits as Proxies for Information	146
10.5	Information Choice as a Substitute for Information Data	146
10.6	The Bid-Ask Spread and PIN	149
Chapter 11 Conclusions		152
References		153
Index		165