Political Transformations and Public Finances

Europe, 1650–1913

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Contents

List of Figures and Tables  page ix
Acknowledgments  xi

1. Weak and Strong States in Historical Perspective  1
   1.1. Fiscal Fundamentals  2
   1.2. The Approach  5
   1.3. Overview of Contents  8

2. Gaining Force: From Fragmentation to Centralization  10
   2.1. The Fragmented Old Regime  10
   2.2. Quantitative Analysis  13
   2.3. Centralization after 1789  18
   2.4. Coding Centralization  20

3. Restricting Power: From Absolutism to Limited Government  24
   3.1. Predatory Kings  24
   3.2. The Fiscal Supremacy of Parliament  26
   3.3. Coding Limited Government  28

4. Political Regimes and Credit Risk  32
   4.1. Regimes and Risk: Theory  33
   4.2. The Data  34
   4.3. Regimes and Risk: Case-Study Evidence  35

5. Two Mechanisms  43
   5.1. Regimes, Revenues, and Prudence: Theory  44
   5.2. The Data  47
   5.3. Regimes, Revenues, and Prudence: Case-Study Evidence  49
   5.4. Prussia as an Anomaly  60
Contents

6. Letting the Data Speak for Themselves 64
   6.1. Structural Breaks Basics 64
   6.2. Sovereign Credit Risk: Results 66
   6.3. Two Mechanisms: Results 72

7. Estimating the Fiscal Effects of Political Regimes 82
   7.1. Econometric Basics 83
   7.2. Sovereign Credit Risk: Results 95
   7.3. Two Mechanisms: Results 99

8. The Institutional Balance of Modern Fiscal States 108
   8.1. Assessment of Findings 108
   8.2. The Changing Role of Government 110
   8.3. Historical Lessons for Development 116
   8.4. The Future of Entitlements 119

Appendices 121
   A.1. Database of Fiscal Indicators, 1650–1913 122
   A.2. Fiscal Data Sources 193
   A.3. Descriptions of Control Variables 206

Works Cited 209

Index 223