Transaction Costs and Security Institutions

Unravelling the ESDP

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## Contents

**List of Tables**

**List of Figures**

**List of Acronyms**

**Series Editors' Preface**

**Acknowledgements**

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**Part I  Preferences, Security Institutions and Transaction Costs in World Politics**

1  Introduction

   - Two puzzles in ESDP
   - ESDP and the internationalisation of the use of force
   - The argument: transaction costs and security institutions
   - The main findings: transaction costs and the emergence of the ESDP
   - The research design
   - The plan of the book

2  Theorising Preference Formation for Institution-Building in European Security

   - Realism: anarchy and power
   - Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI): market and domestic interest groups
   - Constructivism: socialisation and culture
   - Theory, practice and the necessity of an innovative approach

3  Transaction Costs and Security Institutions

   - Transaction costs and preference formation in European security: an analytical framework
   - Transaction costs for the provision of European security
   - Transaction costs within the ESDP
   - The causal pathways
   - Transaction costs and preference formation in European security: the empirical link
Part II  Unravelling the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

4  The Demand for a Security Institution: German, British and French Perceptions of the Environment in the 1990s 53
   Germany and the gradual rise of risks in the 1990s 53
   The United Kingdom's adaptation to a new environment in the 1990s 55
   France and the increasing instabilities of the 1990s 56
   A demand for a security institution: German, British and French perceptions in perspective 58

5  Germany – From Defending the Alliance's Territory to Crisis Management for the Union 60
   German preferences on substantive scope 60
   Explaining German preferences on substance: facing more risks, while relying less on the United States 67

6  Great Britain – From Opposing the Union towards a Subordinated ESDP 79
   British preferences on substantive scope 79
   Explaining British preferences on substance: 'It's Time to Repay America the Soldier' 86

7  France – From Gradual WEU Integration to Full-Scale ESDP 97
   French preferences on substantive scope 97
   Explaining French preferences on substance: providing security in a highly uncertain environment 102

8  Germany – An Incrementally Decreasing Willingness to Bind the Country 114
   German preferences on institutional depth 114
   Explaining German preferences on depth: uncertainty, asset specificity and the institutional path of ESDP 120

9  Great Britain – From No EU Security Policy to a Purely Intergovernmental ESDP 135
   British preferences on institutional depth 135
   Explaining British preferences on depth: modest uncertainty and the opportunities of non-specific assets 140

10 France – A Consistently Intergovernmental Approach towards ESDP 152
    French preferences on institutional depth 152
    Explaining French preferences on depth: maintaining residual rights of control 157
Part III  Transaction Costs and Security Institutions:
ESDP Unravelled

11 Alternative Explanations and Theoretical Scope of the
Transaction Costs Framework 173
  Testing the plausibility of a transaction costs framework 173
  Defining the scope of the transaction costs argument 181

12 Conclusion – Theory-Development in the European
Security and Defence Policy 189
  Transaction costs, security institutions and
  unravelling the ESDP 190
  The principal conclusions: filling the gap with a new
  conceptual lens 203
  Transforming Europe's governance of defence without
  replacing the state 206

Notes 211

References 237

Index 263