Voting and Collective Decision-Making

Bargaining and Power

ANICK LARUELLE and FEDERICO VALENCIANO

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Contents

List of figures
Preface

1 Preliminaries
1.1 Basic set-theoretic notation 1
1.2 Some combinatorics 2
1.2.1 Permutations and combinations 2
1.2.2 Some useful approximations 3
1.3 Voting rules 4
1.3.1 Dichotomous voting rules 5
1.3.2 Some particular voting rules 7
1.4 Expected utility theory 10
1.4.1 Players, games and game theory 10
1.4.2 Preferences and utility 10
1.4.3 Lotteries and expected utility 11
1.4.4 Expected utility preferences 13
1.5 Some basic game theory notions 18
1.5.1 Equilibrium 19
1.5.2 Cooperative and non-cooperative game theory 20
1.5.3 Subgame perfect equilibrium 21
1.5.4 Basic cooperative models 24
1.6 Exercises 26

2 Seminal papers, seminal ambiguities 30
2.1 Seminal papers and seminal ambiguities 30
2.1.1 Nash (1950): The bargaining problem 30
2.1.2 Shapley (1953): The value of a TU game 34
2.1.3 Shapley–Shubik (1954): A power index 37
2.1.4 Banzhaf (1965): Power as decisiveness 39
2.1.5 Penrose (1946), Rae (1969) and Coleman (1971) 41
4 Bargaining committees 105
  4.1 The bargaining scenario 106
  4.2 A model of a bargaining committee: voting rule and voters' preferences 107
  4.3 Cooperative game-theoretic approach 109
    4.3.1 Rationality conditions 110
    4.3.2 Axiomatic characterizations 112
    4.3.3 Discussion 116
  4.4 A non-cooperative model of a bargaining committee 117
    4.4.1 Probabilistic protocols 119
    4.4.2 Bargaining protocols under a voting rule 123
    4.4.3 Discussion 127
  4.5 Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in a bargaining committee 128
  4.6 The neutral voting rule in a committee of representatives 130
  4.7 Exercises 134

5 Application to the European Union 136
  5.1 Voting rules in the European Council 136
  5.2 The Council as a take-it-or-leave-it committee 142
    5.2.1 Criteria based on probabilities 143
    5.2.2 Criteria based on utilities 156
  5.3 The Council as a bargaining committee 163
  5.4 Exercises 170

Conclusions 172
References 176
Index 182