Governing for the Long Term

Democracy and the Politics of Investment

ALAN M. JACOBS
University of British Columbia

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Contents

List of Figures and Tables  ix
Acknowledgments xi

PART I. PROBLEM AND THEORY
1 The Politics of When 3
2 Theorizing Intertemporal Policy Choice 28

PART II. PROGRAMMATIC ORIGINS: INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE IN PENSION DESIGN
Introduction 75
3 Investing in the State: The Origins of German Pensions, 1889 78
4 The Politics of Mistrust: The Origins of British Pensions, 1925 97
5 Investment as Political Constraint: The Origins of U.S. Pensions, 1935 110
6 Investing for the Short Term: The Origins of Canadian Pensions, 1965 133

PART III. PROGRAMMATIC CHANGE: INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE IN PENSION REFORM
Introduction 155
7 Investment as Last Resort: Reforming U.S. Pensions, 1977 and 1983 161
8 Shifting the Long-Run Burden: Reforming British Pensions, 1986 179
9 Committing to Investment: Reforming Canadian Pensions, 1998 193
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10   Constrained by Uncertainty: Reforming German Pensions, 1989 and 2001</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART IV. CONCLUSION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11   Understanding the Politics of the Long Term</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Bibliography  
* Index  

 295