Handbook on Experimental Economics and the Environment

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Contents

List of contributors vii
Introduction xi
John A. List and Michael K. Price

PART I ECONOMETRIC APPROACHES FOR EXPERIMENTAL DATA

1 Quasi-experiments and hedonic property value methods 3
  Christopher F. Parmeter and Jaren C. Pope
2 Institutional heterogeneity in social dilemma games: a Bayesian examination 67
  Klaus Moeltner, James J. Murphy, John K. Stranlund and Maria Alejandra Velez
3 Analyzing repeated-game economics experiments: robust standard errors for panel data with serial correlation 89
  Christian A. Vossler

PART II NON-MARKET VALUATION

4 Behavioral foundations of environmental economics and valuation 115
  John K. Horowitz, Kenneth E. McConnell and James J. Murphy
5 Values of gains and losses: reference states and choice of measure 157
  Jack L. Knetsch
6 Value and outcome uncertainty as explanations for the WTA vs WTP disparity 171
  William S. Neilson, Michael McKee and Robert P. Berrens

PART III EMISSIONS TRADING AND AMBIENT TAXES

7 Regulatory instruments for monitoring ambient pollution 193
  Gaston Giordana and Marc Willinger
vi Handbook on experimental economics and the environment

8 Investment decisions and emissions reductions: results from experiments in emissions trading
Lata Gangadharan, Rachel Croson and Alex Farrell 233

9 Imperfect enforcement of emissions trading and industry welfare: a laboratory investigation
John K. Stranlund, James J. Murphy and John M. Spraggon 265

PART IV COMMON POOL RESOURCE GAMES

10 A tale of two carrots: the effectiveness of multiple reward stages in a common pool resource game
Jan T. R. Stoop, Daan P. van Soest and Jana Vyrastekova 291

11 Dynamics of rules and resources: three new field experiments on water, forests and fisheries
Juan-Camilo Cardenas, Marco Janssen and Francois Bousquet 319

12 Does government regulation complement existing community efforts to support cooperation? Evidence from field experiments in Colombia
Maria Claudia Lopez, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon and John K. Stranlund 346

13 Fixed instruments to cope with stock externalities: an experimental evaluation
Gaston Giordana and Marc Willinger 367

PART V VOTING AND PUBLIC GOODS

14 Water managers are selfish like us
David Zetland 407

15 Incentive compatible mechanisms for providing environmental public goods
Katherine Silz Carson 434

16 The prisoner's dilemma as intergroup game: an experimental investigation
Stephan Kroll, John A. List and Charles F. Mason 458

Index 483