

INTERNATIONAL
**FINANCE AND OPEN-ECONOMY
MACROECONOMICS**

Theory, History, and Policy

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 **World Scientific**

NEW JERSEY • LONDON • SINGAPORE • BEIJING • SHANGHAI • HONG KONG • TAIPEI • CHENNAI

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	<i>v</i>
Part I Introduction to International Finance	1
Chapter 1 Introduction	3
1.1 From War to Depression and Back to War	5
1.1.1 The vision of the Bretton Woods delegates	6
1.1.2 1 July 1944	8
1.1.3 The accomplishments of Bretton Woods	11
1.1.4 The legacy of Bretton Woods	13
1.2 The Bigger Picture	14
1.2.1 The gains from dealing with strangers	15
1.2.2 The three benefits of human interaction are intertwined	17
1.2.3 Dependence on strangers is inherently problematic	18
1.2.4 The crucial role of institutions	20
1.2.5 The importance of learning	22
1.3 How Humans Advance Knowledge	22
1.3.1 The scientific method	23
1.3.2 The scientific method and absolute truth	25
1.3.3 Economic models and the scientific method	26
1.3.4 Holism	28

1.3.5	Economics and holism	29
1.3.6	Holism and science	30
1.4	The Field of International Finance	31
1.4.1	Defining the field	31
1.4.2	The topics to be covered	33
1.5	Back to Bretton Woods: Some Additional Introductory Comments	34
1.5.1	Is talking to foreigners treason?	34
1.5.2	Do we need another Bretton Woods conference?	37
1.6	Summary and Conclusions	40
	Appendix	43
	References	47
Chapter 2	The Balance of Payments and the Macroeconomy	49
2.1	Introduction	50
2.1.1	Some observations on macroeconomics	51
2.1.2	The legacy of Keynes	52
2.2	The Circular Flow Diagram	53
2.2.1	The simple circular flow between consumers and producers	53
2.2.2	The financial sector	55
2.2.3	Government	57
2.2.4	The circular flow and economic interdependence	58
2.3	Opening Up the Economy	59
2.3.1	Extending the circular flow across the border	60
2.3.2	Exports and imports	60
2.3.3	Outsourcing, vertical specialization, and international trade	61
2.3.4	International transfers	62
2.3.5	Asset trade	63
2.3.6	Summarizing Foreign Transactions	64

2.4	The BoP	65
2.4.1	History of the BoP accounts	65
2.4.2	The split between the current account and the financial account	67
2.5	The BoP of the United States	68
2.5.1	The current account	70
2.5.2	The financial account	71
2.5.3	The capital account	73
2.5.4	Statistical discrepancies	74
2.6	Evaluating the Recent Trends in the US BoP	76
2.6.1	What happened in the 1980s?	76
2.6.2	How long can the United States run large current account deficits?	78
2.6.3	Updating the BoP	81
2.7	The International Investment Position	81
2.7.1	The international investment position of the United States	81
2.7.2	The BoP and the net investment position	84
2.7.3	The effect of growing foreign debt on the current account	84
2.7.4	Dark matter	85
2.8	Summary and Conclusions	87
	References	91
Part II The Foreign Exchange Market		93
Chapter 3 The Foreign Exchange Market		95
3.1	Overview of Foreign Exchange Markets	96
3.1.1	The basics of exchange rates	97
3.1.2	Why foreign exchange markets matter	100
3.2	The Evolution of the Foreign Exchange Market	102
3.2.1	The early moneychangers	103
3.2.2	The development of banking	104
3.2.3	Fiat money and exchange rates	105

3.3	Foreign Exchange Markets Today	107
3.3.1	The over-the-counter market	108
3.3.2	A 24-h worldwide market	109
3.3.3	Arbitrage	111
3.3.4	Geographic arbitrage in the foreign exchange market	114
3.3.5	The shift to online trading	115
3.4	A Supply and Demand Model of Foreign Exchange	117
3.5	Triangular Arbitrage	119
3.5.1	How many foreign exchange rates are there?	120
3.5.2	Triangular arbitrage	121
3.5.3	Where to find exchange rates	123
3.6	Effective Exchange Rates	123
3.6.1	The effective value of a currency	124
3.6.2	Recent behavior of effective exchange rates	124
3.7	Summary and Conclusions	127
	References	130
Chapter 4 The Interest Parity Condition		131
4.1	Intertemporal Arbitrage	132
4.1.1	A simple example of intertemporal arbitrage	133
4.1.2	The covered interest parity condition	135
4.1.3	A more general form of the interest parity condition	137
4.1.4	A simplified version of the interest parity condition	139
4.1.5	An exercise in interest parity	140
4.2	Extending the Basic Interest Parity Model	143
4.2.1	The risk premium	143
4.2.2	There are many future exchange rates	145
4.2.3	Foreign exchange swaps	148
4.2.4	Exchange rate futures	148
4.3	Predicting Changes in the Exchange Rate	149
4.3.1	The path of expected future exchange rates	149
4.3.2	Rational expectations	151

4.3.3	Expectations as weighted averages of possible outcomes	152
4.3.4	Future changes in exchange rates are unpredictable	153
4.3.5	Testing the “news” model	153
4.3.6	Directly testing the interest parity condition	155
4.3.7	Summarizing the evidence	157
4.4	Reassessing Rational Expectations	159
4.4.1	Risk and uncertainty	159
4.4.2	The tenuous nature of expectations	161
4.4.3	A modern case study of expectations: the carry trade	163
4.5	Conclusions	165
	References	168
Chapter 5	Dealing with Exchange Rate Volatility: Hedging Foreign Exchange Exposure	171
5.1	Exchange Rate Exposure	172
5.1.1	The forms of exchange rate exposure	173
5.1.2	Exchange rate volatility vs. exchange rate exposure	174
5.1.3	Hedging strategies	175
5.2	Hedging in the Forward Market	177
5.2.1	An example	177
5.2.2	Hedging with foreign exchange futures	179
5.3	Hedging in the Money Market	180
5.3.1	An example	180
5.3.2	Comparing the forward and money market hedges	181
5.4	Hedging with Options	183
5.4.1	Options contracts	184
5.4.2	An example	186
5.4.3	The advantages of an option	187
5.4.4	Comparing the three hedges	189
5.5	Currency Swaps	189
5.5.1	A first simple example of a currency swap	190

5.5.2	A more sophisticated example of a currency swap	191
5.5.3	Difficulties associated with currency swaps	195
5.6	Net Exposure Versus Total Exposure	197
5.6.1	Only net exposure needs to be hedged	197
5.6.2	Managing cash flows in different currencies	199
5.7	Hedging and Exchange Rate Pass-Through	199
5.7.1	Exchange rate pass-through is often low	200
5.7.2	Hedging and exchange rate volatility	201
5.8	Summary and Conclusions	202
	References	207
Chapter 6	The Microstructure of Foreign Exchange Markets	209
6.1	Overview of Today's Foreign Exchange Market	210
6.1.1	Geographic concentration is increasing	211
6.1.2	Dominance of the US dollar	212
6.1.3	A 24-h worldwide market	214
6.2	The Evolving Foreign Exchange Market	216
6.2.1	Recent evolution of the market	216
6.2.2	Rankings of dealer institutions	218
6.2.3	Foreign exchange brokers	220
6.3	Electronic Trading	221
6.3.1	The introduction of electronic communications	221
6.3.2	Electronic dealer-to-customer platforms	222
6.3.3	Retail currency exchange	223
6.4	The Changing Microstructure of the Over-the-Counter Market	226
6.4.1	Centralization of the market	226
6.4.2	Do electronic systems imply more transparency and efficiency?	227
6.5	Explaining the \$3 Trillion Per Day Volume	228
6.5.1	Arbitrage	229
6.5.2	Hot potato process	230

6.5.3	Speculation	231
6.5.4	Why is the foreign exchange market volume so large?	232
6.6	Corruption in the Foreign Exchange Market	232
6.6.1	Allied Irish banks lost \$750 million in 2002	233
6.6.2	Fraud in New York in 2003	235
6.7	Technical Analysis vs. Fundamentals	236
6.7.1	How prominent is technical analysis in the foreign exchange market?	237
6.7.2	Some macroeconomic implications of technical analysis	238
6.8	Further Observations on the Efficiency of the Foreign Exchange Market	238
6.8.1	Purchasing power parity	239
6.8.2	The dynamics of financial markets	241
6.9	Summary and Conclusions	244
	References	249
Part III Open-Economy Macroeconomics		251
Chapter 7	The Mundell–Fleming Open-Economy Model	253
7.1	Keynes’ Revolutionary Macroeconomic Model	254
7.1.1	Walras’ general equilibrium model	255
7.1.2	The great depression and Keynes’ more holistic model	256
7.2	The Basic Keynesian Macroeconomic Model	256
7.2.1	Basic elements of the closed economy Keynesian model	257
7.2.2	The consumption function	258
7.2.3	The I and G functions	258
7.3	Opening the Product Market to International Trade	261
7.4	The Mundell–Fleming Open-Economy Keynesian Model	263
7.4.1	The product market and the IS curve	264
7.4.2	The money market and the LM curve	267

7.4.3	The financial account balance	270
7.4.4	The current account balance	272
7.4.5	The BOP curve	273
7.5	The Complete Mundell–Fleming Model	278
7.5.1	The adjustment process	280
7.5.2	Adjustment with pegged exchange rates	281
7.6	Fiscal and Monetary Policies in an Open Economy	283
7.6.1	Foreign exchange market intervention	283
7.6.2	The equivalence of monetary policy and exchange market intervention	286
7.6.3	Monetary policy while pegging the exchange rates	287
7.6.4	Fiscal policy with pegged exchange rates	288
7.6.5	Monetary policy with floating exchange rates	290
7.6.6	Fiscal policy with floating exchange rates	292
7.6.7	Comparing macroeconomic policy in closed and open economies	293
7.7	Does a Depreciation Improve the Trade Balance?	295
7.7.1	The Marshall–Lerner condition	295
7.7.2	Evidence on the Marshall–Lerner condition	296
7.7.3	Why the Marshall–Lerner condition is inaccurate	297
7.8	Summary and Conclusions	299
	The Fatal Equilibrium	303
	References	309
Chapter 8	The Supply Side of the Economy	311
8.1	Introduction to the Supply Side of the Economy	312
8.1.1	The microfoundations of aggregate supply	313
8.1.2	The ‘sticky’ labor market	314
8.1.3	Wage rigidity	315
8.1.4	Economic growth and aggregate supply	317
8.2	The Solow Growth Model	318
8.2.1	Technological progress and factor accumulation	318
8.2.2	Increased investment causes only temporary growth in output	323

8.2.3	How can an economy achieve permanent growth?	324
8.2.4	Technological progress	324
8.3	Technological Progress as Creative Destruction	327
8.3.1	Joseph Schumpeter's creative destruction	328
8.3.2	Generalizing Schumpeter's ideas	330
8.3.3	Recent 'Schumpeterian' models of technological progress	332
8.3.4	The cost of innovation	333
8.3.5	The expected gains from innovation	334
8.3.6	The equilibrium level of innovative activity	336
8.3.7	Summarizing the effects of growth on aggregate supply	337
8.4	Globalization and Economic Growth	338
8.4.1	Economic openness and economic growth	339
8.4.2	The robustness of the trade-growth relationship	340
8.4.3	International trade and the Schumpeter model	342
8.4.4	Immigration and economic growth	345
8.4.5	Globalization, competition, and creative destruction	347
8.4.6	Globalization, economic growth, and international finance	348
8.5	Summary and Conclusions	349
	References	353
Chapter 9	The Aggregate Demand/Aggregate Supply Model	355
9.1	The Critics of the Keynesian Model	358
9.1.1	The dissent of the monetarists	358
9.1.2	Deceptive microfoundations	360
9.1.3	Rational expectations	362
9.1.4	Keynes' deeper understanding of expectations	364
9.2	Generalizing Keynes' Demand Side of the Economy	367
9.2.1	The consumption function	368
9.2.2	Investment demand	370

9.2.3	Government expenditures	371
9.2.4	Net exports	372
9.2.5	Aggregate demand	373
9.3	The Aggregate Demand Curve	375
9.3.1	Prices and aggregate demand	375
9.3.2	The monetary effect	376
9.3.3	The real-balance effect	378
9.3.4	The foreign trade effect	379
9.3.5	Economic policies shift aggregate demand	381
9.4	Combining the Demand and Supply Sides	383
9.4.1	Analyzing policy using the AD/AS model	383
9.4.2	The demand side effects of moving to a or b	384
9.4.3	Supply side policies to achieve full employment	387
9.4.4	Comparing the active and passive approaches	389
9.4.5	Stagflation	390
9.5	Macroeconomic Management in the Long Run	391
9.5.1	The AS curve in a recession	392
9.5.2	Economic growth and macroeconomic management	393
9.5.3	Long-run aggregate demand and supply are related	396
9.6	Summary and Conclusions	399
	References	403
Part IV The History of International Financial Policy		407
Chapter 10 Exchange Rate Crises		409
10.1	International Capital Flows: A Historical Perspective	411
10.1.1	Globalization in the 19th century	412
10.1.2	Between the world wars	415
10.1.3	Defaults on foreign loans were a normal occurrence	416
10.1.4	The characteristics of international lending before W.W.II	417
10.1.5	Case study: Mexico's many debt defaults	417

10.1.6	Capital movements during the 1950–1980 period	420
10.2	The 1982 Debt Crisis	421
10.2.1	Oil prices and international lending	422
10.2.2	The macroeconomics of international investment flows	424
10.2.3	Petrodollar recycling crashes in 1982	426
10.3	Solving the 1982 Debt Crisis	430
10.3.1	Default by sovereign governments	431
10.3.2	Solving the debt crisis	432
10.3.3	The Brady plan	434
10.3.4	The controversial role of the IMF	435
10.3.5	The countries that escaped the 1982 crisis: East Asia	437
10.3.6	Did fixed exchange rates play a role?	438
10.4	The Economics of Currency Crises	439
10.4.1	It is difficult to fix the exchange rates	439
10.4.2	Intervention is not a long-run tool	440
10.4.3	Fixed exchange rates and economic crises	442
10.4.4	If policy independence is the main objective	443
10.4.5	Two dilemmas equal one trilemma	444
10.4.6	Exchange rate stability and domestic political priorities	445
10.5	Summary and Conclusions	446
	References	450
Chapter 11 More Exchange Rate Crises		453
11.1	The Post-1982 Period	454
11.2	Recent Foreign Exchange Crises	457
11.2.1	The Mexican peso crisis of 1994	457
11.2.2	The Asian crisis of 1997	460
11.2.3	The Korean chaebol	462
11.2.4	The lesson that Asia should have learned from Chile's 1982 crisis	464

11.2.5	The collapse of Argentina's currency board in 2001	466
11.2.6	Common threads to the Mexican, Asian, and Argentine crises	470
11.2.7	Why the currency crises were so costly	471
11.2.8	The recoveries	474
11.3	Brazil's 2004 Tightrope Walk	475
11.3.1	A high government debt burden	475
11.3.2	Debt dynamics	476
11.4	The Russian Crisis	479
11.4.1	The Russian economy before 1990	480
11.4.2	Transition	481
11.4.3	Signs of hope in 1997	482
11.4.4	Explaining the Russian crisis	483
11.5	Three Generations of Crisis Models	484
11.5.1	First generation models	485
11.5.2	Second generation models	486
11.5.3	Third generation crisis models	488
11.5.4	Which generation of models is most useful?	489
11.6	To Fix or to Float?	489
11.6.1	Advantages of floating	490
11.6.2	Advantages of fixed exchange rates	491
11.6.3	The advantage goes to...	492
11.7	Can Large Reserves Defeat the Trilemma?	493
11.7.1	Large reserves discourage speculation	493
11.7.2	Reserve accumulation may destabilize the global economy	494
11.8	Summary and Conclusions	495
	References	497
Chapter 12	The International Financial System: The International Gold Standard, 1870–1914	501
12.1	Comparing International Monetary Arrangements	504
12.1.1	The rules of the game	504

12.1.2	A framework for judging the international monetary system	505
12.2	International Finance Before the Gold Standard	506
12.2.1	The origin of money	507
12.2.2	Ancient financial arrangements	508
12.2.3	The growing complexity of international finance	509
12.2.4	Fiat money	511
12.3	The Origins of the Gold Standard	512
12.3.1	Why Britain established a gold standard and not a silver standard	513
12.3.2	The emergence of the International Gold Standard	513
12.4	The International Gold Standard: 1880–1914	515
12.4.1	The order of the Gold Standard	515
12.4.2	The Gold Standard and exchange rates	517
12.4.3	Hume’s specie-flow mechanism	519
12.4.4	How the Gold Standard actually worked	520
12.4.5	In the long term, the rules were followed	523
12.4.6	Evaluating the international Gold Standard	525
12.4.7	International investment in the late 19th century	527
12.4.8	Around the world with British pounds	529
12.5	The United States and the International Gold Standard	530
12.6	The Suspension of the International Gold Standard	535
	References	538
	Appendix	539
Chapter 13	The Tumultuous Interwar Period: 1918–1940	547
13.1	Back to Normal After World War I?	549
13.1.1	The costs of the war	550
13.1.2	Reviving the gold standard under changed circumstances	552

13.1.3	The Treaty of Versailles	554
13.1.4	Isolationism in the United States	557
13.1.5	Senator Reed Smoot, the proud protectionist	559
13.2	The Gold Standard and the Great Depression	560
13.2.1	Economic recovery under the rules of the game	560
13.2.2	The importance of US international lending	562
13.2.3	Spreading the economic misery	562
13.2.4	The consequences of the economics	564
13.2.5	The Gold Standard mentalité as cause of the Great Depression	565
13.2.6	The end of gold	567
13.3	A New Order	568
13.3.1	Brazil's unintended "Keynesian" recovery	569
13.3.2	Reversing the financial chaos	571
13.3.3	Individual country actions to restore order	572
13.3.4	International cooperation: the Tripartite Agreement	574
13.4	Assessing the Gold Standard During the Interwar Period	575
13.4.1	The trilemma between the wars	576
	References	579
Chapter 14 Bretton Woods to the Present		583
14.1	The Extraordinary Bretton Woods Conference	584
14.1.1	The motivation for Bretton Woods	585
14.1.2	Designing the institutions to shape the world economy	586
14.1.3	The details of the Bretton Woods order	588
14.1.4	Capital controls	591
14.2	The Early Years of Bretton Woods	592
14.2.1	The Marshall Plan	593
14.2.2	The Marshall Plan in Germany	594
14.2.3	The US dollar assumes a special role	596

14.2.4	The performance of the Bretton Woods system	597
14.2.5	The world economy outgrows the Bretton Woods system	598
14.2.6	The collapse of the Bretton Woods system	601
14.2.7	Evaluating the Bretton Woods system	603
14.3	After Bretton Woods	604
14.3.1	Meetings, but no agreement	604
14.3.2	Surprising volatility	605
14.3.3	The Plaza and Louvre Accords	606
14.3.4	Do floating exchange rates decrease international trade?	609
14.3.5	Evaluating the post-Bretton Woods period	609
14.4	The Bretton Woods Institutions	612
14.5	Summary and Conclusions	614
	References	620
	Appendix	622
Chapter 15 The Euro and the European Union		627
15.1	Seeking Exchange Rate Stability After Bretton Woods	628
15.1.1	The snake in the tunnel	629
15.1.2	The EMS: a mini-Bretton Woods	629
15.1.3	The incompatibility of economic policies, again	630
15.1.4	Seeking a more durable alternative to the EMS	633
15.1.5	Establishing the monetary union	633
15.2	History of the European Union	635
15.2.1	The early stages of European economic integration	636
15.2.2	The growth and maturization of the EEC	640
15.2.3	Recent expansion	642
15.2.4	A European constitution	644
15.3	Optimum Currency Areas	645
15.3.1	Mundell's examples	646

15.3.2	The costs of multiple currencies	648
15.3.3	The optimum number of currencies	649
15.3.4	The criteria for an optimum currency area (OCA)	652
15.3.5	Is the United States an OCA?	652
15.4	Evaluating the European Union	653
15.4.1	Trade effects of the EMU	655
15.4.2	Are business cycles synchronized with a single currency area?	656
15.4.3	Inflationary or unemployment bias?	657
15.4.4	Factor mobility	658
15.4.5	A first report card for 2001–2007	660
15.4.6	The euro after the 2008 financial crisis	661
15.5	Summary and Conclusions	665
	References	672
Part V International Financial Issues		673
Chapter 16 Foreign Direct Investment and Multinational Enterprises		675
16.1	Foreign Direct Investment	676
16.1.1	Peculiarities of FDI	677
16.1.2	Growth of FDI	678
16.1.3	FDI creates MNEs	678
16.1.4	Vertical and horizontal FDI	681
16.1.5	The history of MNEs	682
16.1.6	MNEs and international trade	686
16.1.7	MNEs and the spread of technology	688
16.1.8	MNEs are controversial	689
16.1.9	A final note on FDI data	690
16.2	The Theory of Multinational Enterprises and FDI	690
16.2.1	Internalizing transactions costs	690
16.2.2	Economies of scale	692
16.2.3	Keeping core competencies in house	693
16.2.4	Exploiting reputations	694
16.2.5	Jumping trade barriers	694
16.2.6	Avoiding taxes and regulations	695

16.2.7	Hedging exchange rate exposure	696
16.2.8	MNE as a diversified portfolio	696
16.2.9	Diversifying business risk	697
16.2.10	Reducing competition	697
16.2.11	Enhancing innovative success	698
16.2.12	Summarizing the reasons for the growth of MNEs	698
16.3	Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?	699
16.3.1	FDI is different	699
16.3.2	What is the role of FDI in transferring technology?	701
16.3.3	What do we really know about technology transfers?	703
16.4	Some Final Comments on Multinational Enterprises	705
16.4.1	Is FDI less volatile than other capital flows?	705
16.4.2	FDI and global economic integration	707
16.4.3	Drucker's hypothesis	707
16.4.4	MNEs and policy independence	709
16.4.5	MNEs and national sovereignty	710
16.4.6	A dramatic example of the impact of foreign direct investment	711
16.5	Summary and Conclusions	713
	References	716
Chapter 17	International Investment, International Banking, and International Financial Markets	719
17.1	The Rapid Growth and Diversification of International Investment	721
17.1.1	Shifts in the ranks of the financial MNEs	721
17.1.2	A financial sector in turmoil	724
17.2	The Eurocurrency Markets	724
17.2.1	Origins of the eurocurrency markets	725
17.2.2	Offshore banking centers	727
17.2.3	Financial innovation	729

17.3	The Economic Role of the Financial Sector	729
17.3.1	Failure is a constant in the financial sector	730
17.3.2	A model of the financial sector	731
17.3.3	Extending the analysis to the whole economy	733
17.4	Market Failures in the Financial Sector	734
17.4.1	Default	735
17.4.2	Case study: contract enforcement in Taiwan	735
17.4.3	Enforceable contracts do not solve all market failures	737
17.4.4	Asymmetric information and adverse selection	738
17.4.5	One more problem: Moral hazard	740
17.4.6	Government regulation to solve the information problem	741
17.4.7	Collateral: another role for government	742
17.4.8	Financial intermediaries also have bad incentives	744
17.5	Portfolio Investment	744
17.5.1	Defining portfolio investment	745
17.5.2	International equity markets	746
17.5.3	ADRs make foreign stock look like a domestic asset	747
17.5.4	The globalization of over-the-counter financial markets	748
17.5.5	Then, in 2008, a global collapse!	749
17.6	Changing Institutions: The Growth of Islamic Finance	751
17.6.1	What is Islamic finance?	751
17.6.2	Sharing risk under sharia law	752
17.6.3	The future of Islamic finance	754
17.7	Summary and Conclusions	755
	References	759
Chapter 18	The 2008 Financial Collapse and Recession: Is It Time for a New Bretton Woods Conference?	761
18.1	A Picture of the 2008 Crisis	762
18.2	Deregulation and Innovation	767

18.2.1	The Glass-Steagall Act	767
18.2.2	Globalization and financial deregulation	769
18.2.3	The great monetary expansion	770
18.2.4	From financial crisis to recession	772
18.2.5	Fiscal stimulus and financial reform	774
18.3	Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis	775
18.3.1	The three categories of finance	775
18.3.2	Minsky's second theorem	777
18.3.3	Keynes' description of long-term expectations	779
18.3.4	The separation of finance and investment	780
18.3.5	Back to the 2008 financial collapse	783
18.3.6	Keynes, Minsky, and rational expectations	784
18.3.7	Some further observations on the 2008 financial crisis	785
18.4	Reforming the International Financial System	788
18.4.1	Dealing with the 2008 recession	788
18.4.2	Restoring financial regulation and oversight	791
18.4.3	Reforming the international financial system	793
18.4.4	Some new proposals	796
18.5	Back to Keynes	798
18.5.1	Why Keynes got it right	800
18.5.2	Social norms	800
18.5.3	Further research in psychology and neuroscience	801
18.6	Summary and Conclusions	804
18.6.1	Summary	804
18.6.2	The legacy of Keynes	806
	References	810
	<i>Index</i>	813