

# CASINO CAPITALISM

HOW THE FINANCIAL CRISIS CAME ABOUT  
AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE NOW

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**OXFORD**  
UNIVERSITY PRESS

# CONTENTS

List of Figures	xxiii
List of Tables	xxvi
<b>1. The World in Crisis</b>	<b>I</b>
A near meltdown	1
Recession or depression?	5
Lags	13
Shock producers and shock absorbers	16
<b>2. Life on Credit</b>	<b>20</b>
America has been living beyond its means	20
The financiers of the world capital markets	23
Depreciation of the dollar	28
Stock price collapse	32
Savings glut or glut of toxic assets?	35
The housing crisis	36
Was monetary policy to blame?	42
<b>3. Bank Failures</b>	<b>46</b>
Record number of failures	46
The German Landesbanken	51
The next victims	54
Lehman Brothers and the collapse of interbank operations	55
And still more victims	59
Nationalization as a last resort	66

<b>4. Why Wall Street Became a Gambling Casino</b>	<b>70</b>
Blind gambling instinct?	70
Limited liability as capitalism's secret of success	71
Undercapitalized investment banks	76
Mark to market	78
Investment bankers as soldiers of fortune:	
the role of the Bloos Rule	79
Why sustainability was lost sight of	84
Puppets on a string	87
Lemon trade	90
<b>5. Main Street also Gambled</b>	<b>94</b>
Non-recourse loans	94
How Mr Jones became a gambler...	96
...and lived beyond his means	98
The banks as gambling partners	102
The right to play the lottery: Clinton's law	103
<b>6. Hot Potatoes</b>	<b>112</b>
The securitization trick	112
Fannie and Freddie	116
The securitization cascade	117
The trick with honorariums and cash-back credits	123
The failure of the rating agencies	126
People's Republic of America	130
<b>7. Policy Failure</b>	<b>133</b>
Henry Paulson and the SEC	133
Madoff, Spitzeder, Ponzi, et al.	135
Basel also failed	137
The trick in calculating the capital ratio	141
The pro-cyclical effects of the mark-to-market method	146
Dynamic company valuation is also pro-cyclical	150
Special purpose vehicles and hedge funds	151
The competition in laxity	157
The selection principle and neoliberalism	161

<b>8. The Extent of the Damage</b>	<b>165</b>
Bank losses to date: US banks at the centre	165
UK, Germany, and France	169
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria	171
How stable are the banks?	173
Hidden write-offs	179
The credit-card problem	184
Graveyard insurance	187
<b>9. Rescue Attempts</b>	<b>191</b>
Bank rescue	191
The US package	194
The Geithner Plan	196
Germany	200
The British way	204
Monetary policy	206
The credit crunch	209
Gaining weight	213
The Keynesian recovery packages	215
Why governments should not bail out GM and Opel	220
Scrapping the scrap premium	224
<b>10. Will the West Retain its Stability?</b>	<b>228</b>
The new top debtors	228
Europe at risk	231
Will Greece and Italy have to be bailed out?	241
Eurobonds	247
Americans may travel to Italy, Europeans to Japan	251
<b>11. Ways to a Better Banking System</b>	<b>260</b>
Fire protection in the jungle	260
Liquidity, solvency, and equity gifts	262
Bad banks and bad ideas	264
The bank hospital	266
Too big to fail, too small for prudence to prevail	268
Building a common supervisory system	270

**xxii** CONTENTS

Basel III and the accounting rules	272
Credible regulation	276
Executive pay	279
Eliminating the pro-cyclicality of the supervisory system	282
Taming the special purpose vehicles and hedge funds	283
Reinstating the Glass–Steagall Act?	284
Banning short sales	287
A new business model for the rating agencies	289
Stop signs for non-recourse claims	290
Burying graveyard insurance	291
<b>Appendix: Chronology of the Financial Crisis</b>	<b>294</b>
Subject Index	360
Person and Company Index	368
Author Index	373