Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond

Edited by

William Thomson

Elmer B. Milliman Professor of Economics
University of Rochester, USA

An Elgar Research Collection
Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA
Acknowledgements

Introduction William Thomson

PART I BASIC PAPERS

A Independence


B Monotonicity


C Axioms Pertaining to Operations Performed on Feasible Sets


D Ordinal Invariance


E Non-convex Problems


PART II  UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THE DISAGREEMENT POINT

A  Monotonocity


B  Axioms Pertaining to Operations Performed on Disagreement Points


PART III  VARIABLE POPULATION OF AGENTS

A  Population Monotonicity


B  Consistency and Its Converse

PART IV  ENRICHING THE MODEL

A  Adding Information About Underlying Set of Physical Alternatives


B  Adding Claims


C  Adding Preferences Over Solutions

PART V STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

A Analyzing Bargaining Problems as Strategic Games

44. John Nash (1953), 'Two-Person Cooperative Games', *Econometrica*, 21 (1), January, 128–40 589

B Manipulation


C Implementation


PART VI EXPERIMENTS