LAW AND ECONOMICS IN EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL

Ulrich Schwalbe
Dr. rer. pol., Professor of Economics, University of Hohenheim

Daniel Zimmer
Dr. iur., LL.M., Professor of Law, University of Bonn
Member of the German Monopolies Commission

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