

HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL MARKETS

Dynamics and Evolution

Edited by

Thorsten Hens

Swiss Banking Institute, University of Zurich

Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppé

The University of Leeds
Business School and School of Mathematics



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Contents

<i>List of Contributors</i>	<i>xiii</i>
<i>Preface</i>	<i>xv</i>
<i>Introduction to the Series</i>	<i>xxi</i>
1 Thought and Behavior Contagion in Capital Markets	1
<i>David Hirshleifer and Siew Hong Teoh</i>	
1.1. Introduction	2
1.2. Sources of Behavioral Convergence	5
1.3. Rational Learning and Information Cascades: Basic Implications	7
1.4. What Is Communicated or Observed?	9
1.4.1. <i>Observation of Past Actions Only</i>	10
1.4.2. <i>Observation of Consequences of Past Actions</i>	15
1.4.3. <i>Conversation, Media, and Advertising</i>	16
1.5. Psychological Bias	17
1.6. Reputation, Contracts, and Herding	18
1.7. Security Analysis	20
1.7.1. <i>Investigative Herding</i>	20
1.7.2. <i>Herd Behavior by Stock Analysts and Other Forecasters</i>	21
1.8. Herd Behavior and Cascades in Security Trading	24
1.8.1. <i>Evidence on Herding in Securities Trades</i>	24
1.8.2. <i>Financial Market Runs and Contagion</i>	27
1.8.3. <i>Exploiting Herding and Cascades</i>	28
1.9. Markets, Equilibrium Prices, and Bubbles	29
1.10. Cascades and Herding in Firm Behavior	36
1.10.1. <i>Investment and Financing Decisions</i>	36
1.10.2. <i>Disclosure and Reporting Decisions</i>	38
1.11. Contagion of Financial Memes	39
1.12. Conclusion	44
<i>References</i>	46

2	How Markets Slowly Digest Changes in Supply and Demand	57
	<i>Jean-Philippe Bouchaud, J. Dooyne Farmer, and Fabrizio Lillo</i>	
2.1.	Introduction	59
2.1.1.	<i>Overview</i>	59
2.1.2.	<i>Organization</i>	60
2.1.3.	<i>Motivation and Scope</i>	61
2.1.4.	<i>Approach to Model Building</i>	63
2.2.	Market Structure	64
2.3.	Information, Liquidity, and Efficiency	65
2.3.1.	<i>Information and Fundamental Values</i>	66
2.3.2.	<i>Market Efficiency</i>	67
2.3.3.	<i>Trading and Information</i>	68
2.3.4.	<i>Different Explanations for Market Impact</i>	69
2.3.5.	<i>Noise Trader Models and Informed vs. Uninformed Trading</i>	70
2.3.6.	<i>A Critique of the Noise Trader Explanation of Market Impact</i>	71
2.3.7.	<i>The Liquidity Paradox: Prices Are Not in Equilibrium</i>	72
2.3.8.	<i>Time Scales and Market Ecology</i>	73
2.3.9.	<i>The Volatility Puzzle</i>	75
2.3.10.	<i>The Kyle Model</i>	76
2.4.	Large Fluctuations and Long Memory of Order Flow	77
2.4.1.	<i>Empirical Evidence for Long Memory of Order Flow</i>	77
2.4.2.	<i>On the Origin of Long Memory of Order Flow</i>	79
2.4.3.	<i>Theory for Long Memory in Order Flow Based on Strategic Order Splitting</i>	80
2.4.4.	<i>Evidence Based on Exchange Membership Codes</i>	82
2.4.5.	<i>Evidence for Heavy Tails in Volume</i>	83
2.5.	Summary of Empirical Results for Diverse Types of Market Impact	84
2.5.1.	<i>Impact of Individual Transactions</i>	86
2.5.2.	<i>Impact of Aggregate Transactions</i>	86
2.5.3.	<i>Hidden Order Impact</i>	88
2.5.4.	<i>Upstairs Market Impact</i>	90
2.6.	Theory of Market Impact	90
2.6.1.	<i>Why Is Individual Transaction Impact Concave?</i>	91
2.6.2.	<i>A Fixed Permanent Impact Model</i>	93
2.6.3.	<i>The MRR Model</i>	94
2.6.4.	<i>A Transient Impact Framework</i>	95
2.6.5.	<i>History Dependent, Permanent Impact</i>	99
2.6.6.	<i>Empirical Results</i>	103
2.6.7.	<i>Impact of a Large Hidden Order</i>	106
2.6.8.	<i>Aggregated Impact</i>	108
2.7.	The Determinants of the Bid–Ask Spread	111
2.7.1.	<i>The Basic Economics of Spread and Impact</i>	111

2.7.2.	<i>Models for the Bid–Ask Spread</i>	114
2.7.3.	<i>Limit vs. Market Orders: The Microstructure Phase Diagram</i>	117
2.7.4.	<i>Spread Dynamics After a Temporary Liquidity Crisis</i>	123
2.8.	Liquidity and Volatility	125
2.8.1.	<i>Liquidity and Large Price Changes</i>	125
2.8.2.	<i>Volume vs. Liquidity Fluctuations as Proximate Causes of Volatility</i>	127
2.8.3.	<i>Spread vs. Volatility</i>	129
2.8.4.	<i>Market Cap Effects</i>	132
2.9.	Order Book Dynamics	133
2.9.1.	<i>Heavy Tails in Order Placement and the Shape of the Order Book</i>	133
2.9.2.	<i>Volume at Best Prices: The Glosten-Sandas Model</i>	135
2.9.3.	<i>Statistical Models of Order Flow and Order Books</i>	137
2.10.	Impact and Optimized Execution Strategies	142
2.11.	Toward an Empirical Characterization of a Market Ecology	144
2.11.1.	<i>Identifying Hidden Orders</i>	145
2.11.2.	<i>Specialization of Strategies</i>	146
2.12.	Conclusion	148
	Appendix 2.1: Mechanical vs. Nonmechanical Impact	150
	A2.1.1. <i>Definition of Mechanical Impact for Order Books</i>	150
	A2.1.2. <i>Empirical Results</i>	152
	Appendix 2.2: Volume Fluctuations	153
	Appendix 2.3: The Bid–Ask Spread in the MRR Model	155
	References	156
3	Stochastic Behavioral Asset-Pricing Models and the Stylized Facts	161
	<i>Thomas Lux</i>	
3.1.	Introduction	162
3.2.	The Stylized Facts of Financial Data	164
3.2.1.	<i>Martingales, Lack of Predictability, and Informational Efficiency</i>	164
3.2.2.	<i>Fat Tails of Asset Returns</i>	167
3.2.3.	<i>Volatility Clustering and Dependency in Higher Moments</i>	173
3.2.4.	<i>Other Stylized Facts</i>	174
3.3.	The Stylized Facts as “Scaling Laws”	175
3.4.	Behavioral Asset-Pricing Models with Interacting Agents	178
3.4.1.	<i>Interaction of Chartists and Fundamentalists and Nonlinear Dynamics of Asset Prices</i>	179
3.4.2.	<i>Kirman’s Model of Opinion Formation and Speculation</i>	185

3.4.3.	<i>Beyond Local Interactions: Socioeconomic Group Dynamics in Financial Markets</i>	191
3.4.4.	<i>Lattice Topologies of Agents' Connections</i>	207
3.5.	Conclusion	210
	<i>References</i>	211
4	Complex Evolutionary Systems in Behavioral Finance	217
	<i>Cars Hommes and Florian Wagener</i>	
4.1.	Introduction	218
4.2.	An Asset-Pricing Model with Heterogeneous Beliefs	221
4.2.1.	<i>The Fundamental Benchmark with Rational Agents</i>	222
4.2.2.	<i>Heterogeneous Beliefs</i>	223
4.2.3.	<i>Evolutionary Dynamics</i>	224
4.2.4.	<i>Forecasting Rules</i>	225
4.3.	Simple Examples	226
4.3.1.	<i>Costly Fundamentalists vs. Trend Followers</i>	227
4.3.2.	<i>Fundamentalists vs. Opposite Biases</i>	229
4.3.3.	<i>Fundamentalists vs. Trend and Bias</i>	230
4.3.4.	<i>Efficiency</i>	230
4.3.5.	<i>Wealth Accumulation</i>	232
4.3.6.	<i>Extensions</i>	236
4.4.	Many Trader Types	236
4.5.	Empirical Validation	241
4.5.1.	<i>The Model in Price-to-Cash Flows</i>	242
4.5.2.	<i>Estimation of a Simple Two-Type Example</i>	246
4.5.3.	<i>Empirical Implications</i>	251
4.6.	Laboratory Experiments	253
4.6.1.	<i>Learning to Forecast Experiments</i>	255
4.6.2.	<i>The Price-Generating Mechanism</i>	256
4.6.3.	<i>Benchmark Expectations Rules</i>	257
4.6.4.	<i>Aggregate Behavior</i>	259
4.6.5.	<i>Individual Prediction Strategies</i>	259
4.6.6.	<i>Profitability</i>	262
4.7.	Conclusion	264
	Appendix 4.1: Bifurcation Theory	266
	A4.1.1. <i>Basic Concepts from Dynamical Systems</i>	266
	Appendix 4.2: Bifurcation Scenarios	268
	A4.2.1. <i>The Saddle-Node Bifurcation</i>	268
	A4.2.2. <i>The Period-Doubling Bifurcation</i>	268
	A4.2.3. <i>The Hopf Bifurcation</i>	269
	A4.2.4. <i>The Pitchfork Bifurcation</i>	270
	<i>References</i>	271

5	Heterogeneity, Market Mechanisms, and Asset Price Dynamics	277
	<i>Carl Chiarella, Roberto Dieci, and Xue-Zhong He</i>	
5.1.	Introduction	279
5.2.	Heterogeneity and Market-Clearing Mechanisms	283
5.2.1.	<i>Portfolio Optimization</i>	283
5.2.2.	<i>Utility Functions</i>	284
5.2.3.	<i>Market-Clearing Mechanisms</i>	285
5.2.4.	<i>Noise</i>	287
5.2.5.	<i>Expectations Feedback</i>	287
5.3.	Price Dynamics Implied by the CARA Utility Function	288
5.3.1.	<i>Fundamental Price and the Optimal Demand</i>	288
5.3.2.	<i>Formation of Heterogeneous Beliefs</i>	289
5.3.3.	<i>Performance Measure and Switching</i>	290
5.3.4.	<i>Price Behavior under the Walrasian Auctioneer Mechanism</i>	291
5.3.5.	<i>Price Behavior under the Market-Maker Mechanism</i>	298
5.4.	Price Behavior and Wealth Dynamics Implied by the CRRA Utility	302
5.4.1.	<i>Optimal Portfolio and Wealth Dynamics</i>	302
5.4.2.	<i>Price and Wealth Behavior with a Walrasian Auctioneer</i>	303
5.4.3.	<i>Price and Wealth Behavior with a Market Maker</i>	306
5.5.	Empirical Behavior	314
5.5.1.	<i>Stylized Facts in the S&P 500</i>	314
5.5.2.	<i>A Market Fraction Model and Its Stylized Behavior</i>	316
5.5.3.	<i>Econometric Characterization of the Power-Law Behavior</i>	319
5.6.	Heterogeneity in a Dynamic Multiasset Framework	321
5.6.1.	<i>Optimization of a Many Risky Asset Portfolio with Heterogeneous Beliefs</i>	322
5.6.2.	<i>An Example of Two Risky Assets and Two Beliefs</i>	326
5.7.	The Continuous Stochastic Dynamics of Speculative Behavior	330
5.7.1.	<i>Stochastic Models with Heterogeneous Beliefs</i>	330
5.7.2.	<i>A Continuous Stochastic Model with Fundamentalists and Chartists</i>	331
5.7.3.	<i>A Random Dynamical System and Stochastic Bifurcations</i>	332
5.8.	Conclusion	338
	<i>References</i>	340
6	Perfect Forecasting, Behavioral Heterogeneities, and Asset Prices	345
	<i>Jan Wenzelburger</i>	
6.1.	Introduction	346
6.2.	The CAPM as a Two-Period Equilibrium Model	349
6.2.1.	<i>Portfolio Selection with One Risk-Free Asset</i>	349
6.2.2.	<i>Two-Fund Separation</i>	351

6.2.3.	<i>Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium</i>	355
6.2.4.	<i>Equilibria with Heterogeneous Beliefs</i>	358
6.3.	Heterogeneous Beliefs and Social Interaction	359
6.3.1.	<i>Temporary Equilibria</i>	359
6.3.2.	<i>Perfect Forecasting Rules</i>	362
6.3.3.	<i>Systematic and Nonsystematic Risk</i>	366
6.3.4.	<i>Selecting Mediators</i>	369
6.3.5.	<i>Dynamic Stability with Rational Expectations</i>	371
6.4.	Multiperiod Planning Horizons	374
6.4.1.	<i>Overlapping Cohorts of Investors</i>	375
6.4.2.	<i>Temporary Equilibria</i>	378
6.4.3.	<i>Perfect Forecasting Rules</i>	379
6.4.4.	<i>Portfolio Holdings</i>	385
6.5.	Nonergodic Asset Prices	387
6.5.1.	<i>Characterization of Long-Run Equilibria</i>	389
6.5.2.	<i>Convergence to Long-Run Equilibria</i>	390
6.5.3.	<i>Performance of Efficient Portfolios</i>	391
6.5.4.	<i>A Boom-and-Bust Scenario</i>	394
6.6.	Conclusion	397
	<i>References</i>	398
7	Market Selection and Asset Pricing	403
	<i>Lawrence Blume and David Easley</i>	
7.1.	Introduction	405
7.1.1.	<i>Evolution in Biology and Economics</i>	405
7.1.2.	<i>A Short History of the Market Selection Hypothesis</i>	407
7.1.3.	<i>Scope of This Chapter</i>	409
7.2.	The Economy	411
7.2.1.	<i>Traders</i>	411
7.2.2.	<i>Beliefs</i>	412
7.3.	Equilibrium Allocations and Prices	413
7.3.1.	<i>Pareto Optimality</i>	413
7.3.2.	<i>Competitive Equilibrium</i>	414
7.4.	Selection	416
7.4.1.	<i>Literature</i>	416
7.4.2.	<i>A Leading Example</i>	416
7.4.3.	<i>Selection in Complete IID Markets</i>	419
7.4.4.	<i>The Basic Equations</i>	420
7.4.5.	<i>Who Survives? Necessity</i>	421
7.4.6.	<i>Selection and Market Equilibrium</i>	421
7.4.7.	<i>More General Stochastic Processes</i>	422
7.5.	Multiple Survivors	423
7.5.1.	<i>Who Survives? Sufficiency</i>	423

7.6.	The Life and Death of Noise Traders	426
7.6.1.	<i>The Importance of Market Structure</i>	426
7.6.2.	<i>Laws of Large Numbers</i>	428
7.7.	Robustness	431
7.7.1.	<i>Unbounded Economies</i>	431
7.7.2.	<i>Incomplete Markets</i>	432
7.7.3.	<i>Differential Information</i>	432
7.7.4.	<i>Selection over Non-EU Traders</i>	432
7.7.5.	<i>Selection over Rules</i>	434
7.8.	Conclusion	435
	<i>References</i>	436
8	Rational Diverse Beliefs and Market Volatility	439
	<i>Mordecai Kurz</i>	
8.1.	Introduction	440
8.2.	Can Market Dynamics Be Explained by Asymmetric Private Information?	445
8.2.1.	<i>A General Model of Asset Pricing under Asymmetric Information</i>	445
8.2.2.	<i>Dynamic Infinite Horizon Models</i>	450
8.2.3.	<i>Is Asymmetric Information a Satisfactory Theory of Market Dynamics?</i>	453
8.3.	Diverse Beliefs with Common Information: The General Theory	454
8.3.1.	<i>A Basic Principle: Rational Diversity Implies Volatility</i>	455
8.3.2.	<i>Stability and Rationality in a General Nonstationary Economy</i>	457
8.3.3.	<i>Belief Rationality and the Conditional Stability Theorem</i>	461
8.3.4.	<i>Describing Individual and Market Beliefs with Markov State Variables</i>	464
8.3.5.	<i>Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Beliefs: An Illustrative Model and Implications</i>	474
8.4.	Explaining Market Dynamics with Simulation Models of Diverse Beliefs	485
8.4.1.	<i>Introduction: On Simulation Methods and the Main Results</i>	485
8.4.2.	<i>Anatomy of Market Volatility</i>	486
8.4.3.	<i>Volatility of Foreign Exchange Rates and the Forward Discount Bias</i>	498
8.4.4.	<i>Macroeconomic Applications</i>	499
8.5.	Conclusion and Open Problems	501
	<i>References</i>	502
9	Evolutionary Finance	507
	<i>Igor V. Evstigneev, Thorsten Hens, and Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppé</i>	
9.1.	Introduction	509
9.1.1.	<i>Motivation and Background</i>	509

9.1.2.	<i>Applications and Real-World Implications</i>	511
9.1.3.	<i>Structure of Chapter</i>	511
9.1.4.	<i>Dynamics and Evolution</i>	512
9.1.5.	<i>Horse Races and the Kelly Rule</i>	515
9.2.	Evolutionary Models of Financial Markets	518
9.2.1.	<i>Components of the Models</i>	519
9.2.2.	<i>Discussion of the Assumptions</i>	521
9.2.3.	<i>Outline of the Dynamics</i>	523
9.3.	An Evolutionary Model with Short-Lived Assets	524
9.3.1.	<i>The Model</i>	524
9.3.2.	<i>Analysis of Local Dynamics</i>	528
9.3.3.	<i>An Example</i>	530
9.3.4.	<i>The Generalized Kelly Rule</i>	532
9.3.5.	<i>Global Dynamics with Adaptive Strategies</i>	534
9.4.	An Evolutionary Stock Market Model	537
9.4.1.	<i>Local Dynamics</i>	540
9.4.2.	<i>Global Dynamics with Constant Strategies</i>	543
9.4.3.	<i>Kelly Rule in General Equilibrium</i>	546
9.5.	Applications	547
9.5.1.	<i>Simulation Studies</i>	548
9.5.2.	<i>Dynamics of Strategies: Genetic Programming</i>	552
9.5.3.	<i>Empirical Tests of Evolutionary Asset Pricing</i>	557
9.6.	Continuous-Time Evolutionary Finance	560
9.7.	Conclusion	563
	<i>References</i>	564
	Author Index	567
	Subject Index	575