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Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	ix
<i>General Introduction</i> Howard R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn	xi
 PART I JOHN C. HARSANYI	
<i>Introduction to Part I: John C. Harsanyi (1920–2000)</i>	3
1. John C. Harsanyi (1967), ‘Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III, Part I. The Basic Model’, <i>Management Science</i> , 14 (3), November, 159–82	7
2. John C. Harsanyi (1968a), ‘Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points’, <i>Management Science</i> , 14 (5), January, 320–34	31
3. John C. Harsanyi (1968b), ‘Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game’, <i>Management Science</i> , 14 (7), March, 486–502	46
 PART II JOHN F. NASH, Jr.	
<i>Introduction to Part II: John F. Nash, Jr. (b. 1928)</i>	65
4. John F. Nash, Jr. (1950a), ‘Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games’, <i>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America</i> , 36 , 48–9	69
5. John F. Nash, Jr. (1950b), ‘The Bargaining Problem’, <i>Econometrica</i> , 18 (2), April, 155–62	71
6. John Nash (1951), ‘Non-Cooperative Games’, <i>Annals of Mathematics</i> , 54 (2), September, 286–95	79
7. John Nash (1953), ‘Two-Person Cooperative Games’, <i>Econometrica</i> , 21 (1), January, 128–40	89
 PART III REINHARD SELTEN	
<i>Introduction to Part III: Reinhard Selten (b. 1930)</i>	105
8. R. Selten (1975), ‘Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games’, <i>International Journal of Game Theory</i> , 4 (1), 25–55	109

9. Reinhard Selten (1983), 'A Model of Oligopolistic Size Structure and Profitability', *European Economic Review*, **22** (1), June, 33–57 140
10. Reinhard Selten and Peter Hammerstein (1984), 'Gaps in Harley's Argument on Evolutionarily Stable Learning Rules and in the Logic of "Tit for Tat"', *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*, **7** (1), March, 115–16, references 165
11. Reinhard Selten (1990), 'Bounded Rationality', *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, **146** (4), December, 649–58 168
12. Reinhard Selten, Michael Mitzkewitz and Gerald R. Uhlich (1997), 'Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players', *Econometrica*, **65** (3), May, 517–55 178

PART IV ROBERT J. AUMANN

- Introduction to Part IV: Robert J. Aumann (b. 1930)* 219
13. Robert J. Aumann (1959), 'Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n -Person Games', in A.W. Tucker and R.D. Luce (eds) *Contributions to the Theory of Games*, Volume IV. Annals of Mathematics Studies 40, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 287–324 225
 14. Robert J. Aumann and Michael B. Maschler ([1966], 1995), 'Game Theoretic Aspects of Gradual Disarmament', in Robert J. Aumann and Michael B. Maschler (1995), *Repeated Games with Incomplete Information*, Chapter 1, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1–41, references [originally published in *Mathematica Report ST-80*] 263
 15. Robert J. Aumann (1974), 'Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies', *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, **1**, March, 67–96 305
 16. Robert J. Aumann (1976), 'Agreeing to Disagree', *Annals of Statistics*, **4** (6), 1236–39 335
 17. Robert J. Aumann and Lloyd S. Shapley (1976), 'Long-Term Competition: A Game-Theoretic Analysis', mimeo. Hebrew University. Reprinted in N. Megiddo (ed.) (1994), *Essays in Game Theory in Honor of Michael Maschler*, Essay 1, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1–15 339
 18. Robert J. Aumann (1987), 'Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality', *Econometrica*, **55** (1), January, 1–18 354

PART V THOMAS C. SCHELLING

<i>Introduction to Part V: Thomas C. Schelling (b. 1921)</i>	375
19. Thomas C. Schelling (1956), 'An Essay on Bargaining', <i>American Economic Review</i> , XLVI (3), June, 281–306	381
20. Thomas C. Schelling (1957), 'Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War', <i>Conflict Resolution</i> , 1 (1), March, 19–36	407
21. Thomas C. Schelling (1971), 'Dynamic Models of Segregation', <i>Journal of Mathematical Sociology</i> , 1 (2), July, 143–86	425
22. Thomas C. Schelling (1980), 'The Intimate Contest for Self-Command', <i>Public Interest</i> , 60 , Summer, 94–118	469
23. Thomas C. Schelling (1983), 'Ethics, Law, and the Exercise of Self-Command', in Sterling M. McMurrin (ed.), <i>The Tanner Lectures on Human Values</i> , Volume IV, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 43–79	494
24. Thomas C. Schelling (1984), 'Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice', <i>American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings</i> , 74 (2), May, 1–11	531
<i>Name Index</i>	543