Consumption Commitments, Risk Preferences, and Optimal Unemployment Insurance

A thesis presented

by

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to

The Department of Economics

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the subject of

Economics

Harvard University

Cambridge, Massachusetts

May 2003
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