

# **Economics, Rational Choice and Normative Philosophy**

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# Contents

<i>List of contributors</i>	xii
<i>Preface</i>	xiii
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>PART I</b>	
<b>Diversity, rights, norms and intentions</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>1 What is diversity?</b>	<b>15</b>
NICOLAS GRAVEL	
<i>Introduction</i>	15
<i>Comparing sets of objects: general principles</i>	18
<i>Diversity as generalized entropy</i>	31
<i>Diversity as aggregate dissimilarity</i>	37
<i>Diversity as the valuation of realized attributes</i>	47
<i>Conclusion</i>	51
<b>2 Intentions, decisions and rationality</b>	<b>56</b>
MARTIN VAN HEES AND OLIVIER ROY	
<i>Introduction</i>	56
<i>Intentions to act</i>	57
<i>Extensive decision models</i>	58
<i>Intentions as plans of action</i>	61
<i>Intentions and counterfactuals</i>	65
<i>The formation of intentions</i>	67
<i>Conclusion</i>	70
<b>3 Waiving and exercising rights in the theory of social situations</b>	<b>73</b>
RUVIN GEKKER	
<i>Introduction</i>	73
<i>Sen's and game form formulations of rights</i>	74

x	<i>Contents</i>	
	<i>Individual rights and the theory of social situations</i>	76
	<i>Concluding remarks</i>	86
4	<b>Consequentialist choice and behavior: a comparison</b>	<b>89</b>
	NICHOLAS BAIGENT	
	<i>Introduction</i>	89
	<i>Choice consequentialism</i>	89
	<i>Examples</i>	90
	<i>Conclusion</i>	92
	<b>PART II</b>	
	<b>Social choice, judgment aggregation and rationality of legal order</b>	<b>93</b>
5	<b>Social choice, fuzzy preferences and manipulations</b>	<b>95</b>
	JUAN PEROTE-PEÑA AND ASHLEY PIGGINS	
	<i>Introduction</i>	95
	<i>Fuzzy set theory</i>	96
	<i>The literature</i>	97
	<i>Preliminaries</i>	97
	<i>The theorem</i>	101
	<i>Conclusion</i>	107
6	<b>Judgment aggregation under constraints</b>	<b>111</b>
	FRANZ DIETRICH AND CHRISTIAN LIST	
	<i>Introduction</i>	111
	<i>The model</i>	112
	<i>Why explicit constraints?</i>	114
	<i>Impossibility results</i>	116
	<i>An application: binary relations</i>	119
7	<b>Rationality and the legal order</b>	<b>124</b>
	GERALD PECH	
	<i>Introduction</i>	124
	<i>The model</i>	127
	<i>Results</i>	130
	<i>Extensions and discussion</i>	135
	<i>Conclusion</i>	137
	<i>Appendix 7A: The household's optimization problem</i>	138
	<i>Appendix 7B: Proof of Proposition 7.1</i>	138

**PART III**

**Philosophical aspects of normative social choice 143**

**8 Distributing causal responsibility in collectivities 145**

MATTHEW BRAHAM AND MANFRED J. HOLLER

<i>Introduction</i>	145
<i>Causal relations</i>	147
<i>Defusing the 'many hands problem'</i>	150
<i>Social power</i>	154
<i>The uses of power</i>	156
<i>Taking stock</i>	158

**9 The logic of valuing 164**

BOUDEWIJN DE BRUIN

<i>Introduction</i>	164
<i>Quantification and beliefs</i>	165
<i>Typology</i>	167
<i>Application to political freedom</i>	169
<i>Conclusion</i>	170

**10 Holistic defences of rational choice theory: a critique of Davidson and Pettit 173**

THOMAS A. BOYLAN AND PASCHAL F. O'GORMAN

<i>Introduction</i>	173
<i>Davidson's defence of Homo economicus</i>	174
<i>An alternative model of rationality</i>	176
<i>Pettit's conciliationist thesis</i>	179
<i>Economic rationality: empirical challenges of the SHLF model</i>	182

<i>Index</i>	185
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