The Marginal Cost of Public Funds

Theory and Applications

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The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
Contents

Preface xi

1 Introduction 1

2 Conceptual Foundations of the MCF 11
  2.1 The Excess Burden of Taxation 13
     2.1.1 Measuring Excess Burden 13
     2.1.2 Measuring the Gain from Tax Reform 18
  2.2 Optimal Taxation and Public Expenditures 22
  2.3 The MCF and the Gain from Tax Reform 24
  2.4 Interpreting the MCF Using Demand and Supply Curves 28
  2.5 The Relationship between the MCF and the MEB 31
  2.6 Application: The MCF for a Tariff and the Gain from Free Trade 33
  2.7 Incorporating Distributional Preferences in the MCF 38
  2.8 Alternative Interpretations of the MCF 42
     Further Reading for Chapter 2 47
     Appendix to Chapter 2 48
     Exercises for Chapter 2 49

3 The MCF for Commodity Taxes 51
  3.1 The MCF and the Laffer Curve 54
  3.2 The MCF with Multiple Tax Bases 55
  3.3 Optimal Commodity Taxation 58
  3.4 The MCF with Externalities 63
     3.4.1 Environmental Externalities 63
     3.4.2 Public Expenditure Externalities 65
  3.5 The MCF with Imperfect Competition in Commodity Markets 66
     3.5.1 The MCF under Monopoly 67
3.5.2 Ad valorem versus Per Unit Taxes on a Monopolist's Product

3.5.3 The MCF under Oligopoly

3.6 Addiction/Self-control Problems

3.7 Smuggling

3.8 Studies of the Marginal Distortionary Cost of Taxing Commodities

Further Reading for Chapter 3

Appendix to Chapter 3

Exercises for Chapter 3

4 The MCFs for Excise Taxes in Thailand and the United Kingdom

4.1 The MCFs for Excise Taxes in Thailand

4.1.1 Parameter Values

4.1.2 Calculations of the MCFs

4.1.3 Calculations of the SMCFs

4.1.4 Summary and Extensions

4.2 The MCFs for Excise Taxes in the United Kingdom

4.2.1 Parameter Values

4.2.2 Computations of the MCFs

5 The MCF from Taxing Labor Income

5.1 The MCF for a Proportional Tax on Labor Income

5.1.1 Elasticity of Labor Supply

5.1.2 Elasticity of Demand for Labor

5.2 The SMCF for a Progressive Wage Tax

5.3 Incorporating Labor Force Participation Effects in the MCF

5.4 Using the Elasticity of Taxable Income to Calculate the MCF

5.5 The MCF in Models of Political Choice

5.5.1 Median Voter Model

5.5.2 Probabilistic Voting Model

5.5.3 Leviathan Model

5.6 Studies of the Marginal Distortionary Cost of Taxing Labor Income

Further Reading for Chapter 5

Exercises for Chapter 5

6 Applications of the MCF from Taxing Labor Income

6.1 Involuntary Unemployment and the MCF for a Payroll Tax

6.2 Cost–Benefit Analysis of the Taxpayer Survey in Thailand
### Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.2.1</td>
<td>A Framework for Evaluating a Tax Enforcement Program</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.2</td>
<td>Key Components of the Analysis</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.3</td>
<td>Net Social Gain and the SMCF for the Taxpayer Survey</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Optimal Flat Tax</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.1</td>
<td>Deriving the Conditions for the Optimal Flat Tax</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.2</td>
<td>Computing the Optimal Flat Tax</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td><strong>The MCF from Taxing the Return to Capital</strong></td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>The MCF from Taxing the Return to Savings in a Small Open Economy</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.1</td>
<td>Optimal Tax Rate on Savings</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.2</td>
<td>Application: Gain from Switching to a Consumption Tax</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>The MCF from Taxing the Return to Capital in a Small Open Economy</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>The MCF for the Corporate Income Tax in a Small Open Economy</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.1</td>
<td>The MCF for the CIT under Alternative Foreign Income Tax Systems</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.2</td>
<td>Application: The Optimal CIT and Wage Tax Rates</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Studies of the Marginal Distortionary Cost from Taxing the Return on Capital</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Further Reading for Chapter 7</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exercises for Chapter 7</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td><strong>The MCF from Public Sector Borrowing</strong></td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Postwar Debates on the Burden of the Public Debt</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>The MCF from Public Debt in an Overlapping Generations Model</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>The MCF from Debt Financed by Distortionary Taxation</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>Tax Smoothing and Optimal Debt Financing of Public Expenditures</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>The MCF from Public Sector Borrowing in an Endogenous Growth Model</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5.1</td>
<td>A Simple Endogenous Growth Model with Public Debt</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5.2</td>
<td>The MCF in an Endogenous Growth Model</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5.3</td>
<td>Effect of the Public Debt on Optimal Public Expenditures</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5.4</td>
<td>Application: The MCF from Public Sector Borrowing in Canada and the United States</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Further Readings for Chapter 8 237
Exercises for Chapter 8 238

9 The MCF in a Federal System of Government 241
9.1 Fiscal Externalities and Fiscal Imbalances 242
9.1.1 Conventional Definition of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance 243
9.1.2 Alternative Definition of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance 245
9.1.3 Horizontal Fiscal Imbalances in a Federation 247
9.2 Horizontal Fiscal Externalities and the MCF of a Subnational Government 248
9.3 Intergovernmental Grants and Subnational Governments' MCF 253
9.3.1 Correcting Horizontal Expenditure Externalities 253
9.3.2 Correcting Horizontal Tax Externalities 254
9.3.3 Optimal Equalization Grants 255
9.4 Vertical Fiscal Externalities in a Federation 257
9.5 Vertical Fiscal Imbalances in a Federation 263
9.5.1 The MCF for a State Government 265
9.5.2 Simulation Model of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance 268
Appendix to Chapter 9 273
Exercises for Chapter 9 274

10 Applications of the MCF in Federations 275
10.1 Evaluating the Canadian Provinces' Tax Incentives for R&D 276
10.2 Incentive Effects of the Australian Equalization Grant System 282
10.3 Equalization Grants and Vertical and Horizontal Fiscal Imbalances 289
10.3.1 A Unitary State 293
10.3.2 Federation without Intergovernmental Transfers 294
10.3.3 Federation with a Net Equalization Grant System 295
10.3.4 Federation with a Gross Equalization Grant System 296
10.3.5 Simulation Model of the Effects of Equalization Grants 297
Notes 303
References 311
Index 325