Designing Financial Supervision Institutions
Independence, Accountability and Governance

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# Contents

*Contributors* | vii  
---|---  
*Foreword* Donato Masciandaro and Marc Quintyn | ix  
*Introduction* Charles Goodhart | xii

## PART I  INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE

1. Robust Regulators and Their Political Masters: Independence and Accountability in Theory | 3  
*Marc Quintyn and Michael W. Taylor*

2. Independence and Accountability in Supervision: General Principles and European Setting | 41  
*Lorenzo Bini Smaghi*

*Marc Quintyn, Silvia Ramirez and Michael W. Taylor*

4. Independence and Accountability: Why Politics Matters | 117  
*Jonathan Westrup*

5. Governance in Banking Supervision: Theory and Practices | 151  
*Marco Arnone, Salim M. Darbar and Alessandro Gambini*

## PART II  THE DESIGN OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CAUSES AND EFFECTS

6. Financial Supervision Architecture and Central Bank Independence | 211  
*Andreas Freytag and Donato Masciandaro*
Contents

7. Architectures of Supervisory Authorities and Banking Supervision 262
   Marco Arnone and Alessandro Gambini

8. Experience with Integrated Supervisors: Governance and Quality of Supervision 309
   Martin Čihák and Richard Podpiera

   Giorgio Di Giorgio and Carmine Di Noia

10. Budgetary Governance of Banking Supervision: A Primer 378
    Donato Masciandaro, Maria Nieto and Henriëtte Prast

PART III IN SEARCH OF THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

11. Bureaucrats or Politicians? 417
    Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini

12. Agency Problems in Banking Supervision 438
    Robert A. Eisenbeis

Index 471