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**Hybrid Governance Structures  
for Quality Farm Products**

**A Transaction Cost Perspective**

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# Table of Contents

List of Figures .....	xvii
List of Tables .....	xix
<b>1 Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Changes in food consumption, agriculture and rural policy .....	1
1.2 The development of quality farm products supply channels.....	3
1.3 A classification of Belgian supply channels for quality farm foods .....	4
1.4 Research questions.....	5
1.5 Methodology .....	7
1.6 Structure of the book.....	8
<b>2 Transaction Costs Economics.....</b>	<b>11</b>
2.1 Introduction.....	11
2.2 New Institutional Economics .....	12
2.3 Transaction Costs Economics .....	13
2.3.1 Coase and the firm as governance structure.....	13
2.3.2 Organisational Failures Framework of Williamson.....	13
2.3.3 Characterising transactions .....	15
2.3.4 Other fields of application and a criticism .....	16
2.3.5 Alignment of transactions with governance structures .....	16
2.3.6 Characterising governance structures .....	17
2.4 The governance of transactions.....	18
2.4.1 Transaction costs.....	18
2.4.2 Characterising transactions .....	19
2.4.2.1 Asset specificity .....	20
2.4.2.2 Uncertainty.....	23
2.4.2.3 Frequency.....	24
2.4.3 Characterising governance structures .....	24
2.4.3.1 Incentive intensity and administrative controls.....	25
2.4.3.2 Adaptation mechanism.....	26

2.4.3.3	Contracts .....	27
2.4.3.4	Governance structures characterised.....	28
2.4.4	Cost minimising alignment between transactions and governance structures .....	29
2.4.4.1	Asset specificity and choice of governance structure .....	29
2.4.4.2	Frequency and uncertainty, and choice of governance structure.....	32
2.5	Empirical applications.....	33
2.6	Critical reflections on TCE .....	36
2.7	Conclusion .....	37
<b>3</b>	<b>Governance Structures of Six Quality Food Supply Channels.....</b>	<b>39</b>
3.1	Introduction.....	39
3.2	Farmers' markets .....	40
3.2.1	Description of the initiative and its objectives .....	40
3.2.2	Characterisation of the transaction: asset specificity .....	42
3.2.2.1	Assets invested by the central authority .....	42
3.2.2.2	Assets invested by the farmers.....	43
3.2.3	Characterisation of the governance structure.....	44
3.2.3.1	The authority and the distribution of decision power.....	44
3.2.3.2	Incentive intensity .....	45
3.2.3.3	Adaptation mechanisms .....	46
3.2.3.4	Contracts .....	46
3.2.4	Appropriateness of the governance structure.....	47
3.2.4.1	Cost economies realised in comparison with market governance .....	47
3.2.4.2	Comparison with other governance structures .....	48
3.2.5	Conclusion .....	49
3.3	Foodteams .....	50
3.3.1	Description of the initiative and its objectives .....	50
3.3.2	Characterisation of the transaction: asset specificity .....	52
3.3.2.1	Assets invested by the local foodteam and the central regional structure.....	52

3.3.2.2 Assets invested by consumers and farmers .....	53
3.3.3 Characterisation of the governance structure .....	54
3.3.3.1 The authority and the distribution of decision power.....	54
3.3.3.2 Incentive intensity .....	56
3.3.3.3 Adaptation mechanism.....	57
3.3.3.4 Contracts .....	57
3.3.4 Appropriateness of the governance structure .....	60
3.3.4.1 Cost economies realised in comparison with market governance .....	60
3.3.4.2 Comparison with other governance structures .....	60
3.3.5 Conclusion .....	63
3.4 Produits de Qualité d'Autrefois .....	64
3.4.1 Description of the initiative and its objectives .....	64
3.4.2 Characterisation of the transaction: asset specificity .....	65
3.4.2.1 Assets invested by the cattle merchant and the co-operative .....	65
3.4.2.2 Assets invested by the farmers and butchers.....	66
3.4.3 Characterisation of the governance structure .....	66
3.4.3.1 The authority and the distribution of decision power.....	67
3.4.3.2 Incentive intensity .....	67
3.4.3.3 Adaptation mechanism.....	68
3.4.3.4 Contracts .....	68
3.4.4 Appropriateness of the governance structure .....	70
3.4.4.1 Cost economies realised in comparison with market governance .....	70
3.4.4.2 Comparison with other governance structures .....	71
3.4.5 Conclusion .....	71
3.5 Fruitnet.....	72
3.5.1 Description of the initiative and its objectives .....	72
3.5.2 Characterisation of the transaction: asset specificity .....	73
3.5.2.1 Assets invested by the organisation <i>Fruitnet</i> .....	73
3.5.2.2 Assets invested by the farmers .....	74
3.5.3 Characterisation of the governance structure .....	74

3.5.3.1	The authority and the distribution of decision power.....	75
3.5.3.2	Incentive intensity .....	75
3.5.3.3	Adaptation mechanisms .....	76
3.5.3.4	Contracts .....	76
3.5.4	Appropriateness of the governance structure .....	77
3.5.4.1	Cost economies realised in comparison with market governance .....	77
3.5.4.2	Comparison with other governance structures .....	78
3.5.5	Conclusion .....	79
3.6	Fermière de Méan .....	80
3.6.1	Description of the initiative and its objectives .....	80
3.6.2	Characterisation of the transaction: asset specificity .....	81
3.6.2.1	Assets invested by the co-operative Fermière de Méan .....	81
3.6.2.2	Assets invested by the farmers .....	82
3.6.3	Characterisation of the governance structure .....	83
3.6.3.1	Authority and the distribution of decision power.....	83
3.6.3.2	Incentive intensity .....	83
3.6.3.3	Adaptation mechanisms .....	84
3.6.3.4	Contracts .....	85
3.6.4	Appropriateness of the governance structure .....	86
3.6.4.1	Cost economies realised in comparison with market governance .....	86
3.6.4.2	Comparison with other governance structures .....	86
3.6.5	Conclusion .....	87
3.7	Coprosain .....	88
3.7.1	Description of the initiative and its objectives .....	88
3.7.2	Characterisation of the transaction: asset specificity .....	90
3.7.2.1	Assets invested by <i>Coprosain</i> .....	90
3.7.2.2	Assets invested by the farmers .....	91
3.7.3	Characterisation of the governance structure .....	91
3.7.3.1	The authority and distribution of decision power .....	91
3.7.3.2	Incentive intensity .....	92

3.7.3.3	Adaptation mechanism.....	93
3.7.3.4	Contracts .....	93
3.7.4	Appropriateness of the governance structure .....	94
3.7.4.1	Cost economies realised in comparison with market governance .....	94
3.7.4.2	Comparison with other governance structures .....	95
3.7.5	Conclusion .....	95
3.8	Conclusions.....	96
<b>4</b>	<b>Classification of Hybrid Governance Structures.....</b>	<b>99</b>
4.1	Introduction.....	99
4.2	Theory and literature about hybrid governance structures.....	100
4.2.1	Defining hybrid governance structures .....	100
4.2.2	Classification of hybrid governance structures .....	101
4.3	The six case studies: three types of hybrid governance structures.....	105
4.4	Testing and further defining the classification system.....	108
4.4.1	Testing of the classification system .....	108
4.4.2	Distinction between market, hybrid and internal governance.....	109
4.4.3	Importance of the quality objectives for the classification .....	110
4.4.4	The characteristics of framework, co-ordinating and participating governance .....	113
4.4.4.1	Framework governance.....	113
4.4.4.2	Co-ordinating governance.....	117
4.4.4.3	Participating governance.....	121
4.5	Classifying governance structures and determining the appropriate governance structure .....	125
4.5.1	Classifying the applied governance structure .....	126
4.5.2	Evaluating the applied governance structure .....	128
4.5.3	Application of this model to the 6 case studies and 12 test initiatives.....	129
4.6	Conclusion .....	133

<b>5</b>	<b>Comparative Cost-benefit Analysis for Farmers Participating in Supply Channels for Quality Farm Products.....</b>	<b>137</b>
5.1	Introduction.....	137
5.2	A theoretical frame for the comparative cost-benefit analysis of supply channels.....	139
5.3	Comparative cost-benefit analysis of six innovative supply channels.....	141
5.3.1	Comparison with the common supply channel.....	141
5.3.1.1	Revenues.....	142
5.3.1.2	Direct costs.....	144
5.3.1.3	Transaction costs.....	145
5.3.1.4	Uncertainty.....	148
5.3.1.5	Global analysis.....	149
5.3.2	Comparison with individual direct sale of farm products.....	150
5.3.2.1	Revenues.....	151
5.3.2.2	Direct costs.....	151
5.3.2.3	Transaction costs.....	152
5.3.2.4	Uncertainty.....	153
5.3.2.5	Global analysis.....	153
5.4	Conclusion.....	154
<b>6</b>	<b>Conclusions.....</b>	<b>157</b>
6.1	Conclusions about Transaction Costs Economics.....	157
6.1.1	Governance structures for production and supply of quality farm products.....	157
6.1.2	Classification of hybrid governance structures.....	158
6.1.3	Application of TCE to analyse governance and profitability of supply channels.....	158
6.1.4	Lessons from the use of the TCE as analysis framework.....	159
6.2	Conclusions about supply channels for quality foods.....	159
6.2.1	Governance of innovative supply channels.....	160
6.2.2	The profitability of such quality assurance systems.....	161
6.2.3	Lessons for the food sector.....	161
6.2.4	Policy implications.....	162

6.2.5 Possible government intervention..... 163

**References..... 167**