Martin Heidegger

THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

Translation, Introduction, and Lexicon by

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## Contents

**TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE**  xi
**TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION**  xv

### Introduction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>§ 1</td>
<td>Exposition and general division of the theme</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 2</td>
<td>The concept of philosophy. Philosophy and world-view</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 3</td>
<td>Philosophy as science of being</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 4</td>
<td>The four theses about being and the basic problems of phenomenology</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 5</td>
<td>The character of ontological method. The three basic components of</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>phenomenological method</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 6</td>
<td>Outline of the course</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### PART ONE

**Critical Phenomenological Discussion of Some Traditional Theses about Being**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter One</td>
<td>Kant's Thesis: Being Is Not a Real Predicate</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 7</td>
<td>The content of the Kantian thesis</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 8</td>
<td>Phenomenological analysis of the explanation of the concept of being</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>or of existence given by Kant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) Being (existence [Dasein, Existenz, Vorhandensein]), absolute</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>position, and perception</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Perceiving, perceived, perceivedness. Distinction between per-</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ceivedness and the extantness of the extant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 9</td>
<td>Demonstration of the need for a more fundamental formulation of the</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>problem of the thesis and of a more radical foundation of this problem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) The inadequacy of psychology as a positive science for the on-</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tological elucidation of perception</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) The ontological constitution of perception. Intentionality and tran-</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>scendence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c) Intentionality and understanding of being. Uncoveredness (perceivedness) of beings and disclosedness of being  67

Chapter Two  The Thesis of Medieval Ontology Derived from Aristotle: To the Constitution of the Being of a Being There Belong Essence and Existence  77

§10. The content of the thesis and its traditional discussion  77
   a) Preview of the traditional context of inquiry for the distinction between essentia and existentia  77
   b) Preliminary outline of esse (ens), essentia, and existentia in the horizon of the ancient and Scholastic understanding of them  83
   c) The distinction between essentia and existentia in Scholasticism (Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Suarez)  88
      α) The Thomistic doctrine of the distinctio realis between essentia and existentia in ente create  91
      β) The Scotistic doctrine of the distinctio modalis (formalis) between essentia and existentia in ente create  93
      γ) Suarez' doctrine of the distinctio sola rationis between essentia and existentia in ente create  94

§11. Phenomenological clarification of the problem underlying the second thesis  99
   a) The question of the origin of essentia and existentia  100
   b) Return to the productive comportment of the Dasein toward beings as implicit horizon of understanding for essentia and existentia  106

§12. Proof of the inadequate foundation of the traditional treatment of the problem  112
   a) Intentional structure and the understanding of being in productive comportment  112
   b) The inner connection between ancient (medieval) and Kantian ontology  117
   c) Necessity for restricting and modifying the second thesis. Basic articulation of being and ontological difference  119

Chapter Three  The Thesis of Modern Ontology: The Basic Ways of Being Are the Being of Nature (Res Extensa) and the Being of Mind (Res Cogitans)  122

§13. Characterization of the ontological distinction between res extensa and res cogitans with the aid of the Kantian formulation of the problem  122
a) The modern orientation toward the subject; its motive as not fundamental-ontological; and its dependence on traditional ontology 123
b) Kant's conception of ego and nature (subject and object) and his definition of the subject's subjectivity 125
   α) Personalitas transcendentalis 125
   β) Personalitas psychologica 129
   γ) Personalitas moralis 131
c) Kant's ontological disjunction of person and thing [Sache]. The ontological constitution of the person as an end-in-itself 137

§14. Phenomenological critique of the Kantian solution and demonstration of the need to pose the question in fundamental principle 140
a) Critical examination of Kant's interpretation of personalitas moralis. Adumbration of the ontological determinations of the moral person but avoidance of the basic problem of its mode of being 140
b) Critical examination of Kant's interpretation of personalitas transcendentalis. His negative demonstration of the impossibility of an ontological interpretation of the I-think 142
c) Being in the sense of being-produced as horizon of understanding for the person as finite mental substance 147

§15. The fundamental problem of the multiplicity of ways of being and of the unity of the concept of being in general 154
a) Initial preview of the existential constitution of the Dasein. Commencement with the subject-object relation (res cogitans—res extensa) as a mistaking of the existential constitution of the being of those beings who understand being 154
b) The Dasein directs itself toward beings in a manner that understands being, and in this self-direction the self is concomitantly unveiled. The Dasein's factual everyday understanding of itself as reflection from the things with which it is concerned 158
c) More radical interpretation of intentionality for elucidating everyday self-understanding. Being-in-the-world as foundation of intentionality 161
   β) The for-the-sake-of-which. Mineness as basis for inauthentic and authentic self-understanding 170
d) Result of the analysis in regard to the principal problem of the multiplicity of ways of being and the unity of the concept of being 173
Chapter Four  The Thesis of Logic: Every Being, Regardless of Its Particular Way of Being, Can Be Addressed and Talked About by Means of the "Is." The Being of the Copula 177

§16. Delineation of the ontological problem of the copula with reference to some characteristic arguments in the course of the history of logic 179
   a) Being in the sense of the "is" of assertion in combinatory thinking in Aristotle 180
   b) The being of the copula in the horizon of whatness (essentia) in Thomas Hobbes 183
   c) The being of the copula in the horizon of whatness (essentia) and actualness (existentia) in John Stuart Mill 192
   d) The being of the copula and the theory of double judgment in Hermann Lotze 198
   e) The different interpretations of the being of the copula and the want of radical inquiry 201

§17. Being as copula and the phenomenological problem of assertion 205
   a) Inadequate assurance and definition of the phenomenon of assertion 205
   b) Phenomenological display of several essential structures of assertion. The intentional comportment of assertion and its foundation in being-in-the-world 207
   c) Assertion as communicatively determinant exhibition and the "is" of the copula. Unveiledness of beings in their being and differentiation of the understanding of being as ontological presupposition for the indifferent "is" of assertion 210

§18. Assertional truth, the idea of truth in general, and its relation to the concept of being 213
   a) The being-true of assertion as unveiling. Uncovering and disclosing as ways of unveiling 213
   b) The intentional structure of unveiling. The existential mode of being of truth. Unveiledness as determination of the being of a being 217
   c) Unveiledness of whatness and actualness in the "is" of assertion. The existential mode of being of truth and the prevention of subjectivistic misinterpretations 218
   d) The existential mode of being of truth and the basic ontological question of the meaning of being in general 222
PART TWO

The Fundamental Ontological Question of the Meaning of Being in General

The Basic Structures and Basic Ways of Being

Chapter One The Problem of the Ontological Difference

§19. Time and temporality

a) Historical orientation regarding the traditional concept of time and a delineation of the common understanding of time that lies at the basis of this concept
   α) Outline of Aristotle’s treatise on time
   β) Interpretative exposition of Aristotle’s concept of time
b) The common understanding of time and the return to original time
   α) The mode of being of clock usage. Now, then, and at-the-time as self-expositions of the comportments of enpresenting, expecting, and retaining
   β) The structural moments of expressed time: significance, datability, spannedness, publicness
   γ) Expressed time and its derivation from existential temporality. The ecstatic and horizonal character of temporality
   δ) The derivation of the structural moments of now-time from ecstatic-horizonal temporality. The mode of being of falling as the reason for the covering up of original time

§20. temporality [Zeitlichkeit] and Temporality [Temporalität]

a) Understanding as a basic determination of being-in-the-world
b) Existentiell understanding, understanding of being, projection of being
c) The temporal interpretation of existentiell understanding, both authentic and inauthentic
d) The temporality of the understanding of functionality and its totality (world)
e) Being-in-the-world, transcendence, and temporality. The horizonal schemata of ecstatic temporality
## Contents

**§21. Temporality [Temporalität] and being**

- a) The Temporal interpretation of being as being handy. Praesens as horizontal schema of the ecstasis of enpresenting  
  
- b) The Kantian interpretation of being and the problematic of Temporality [Temporalität]  

**§22. Being and beings. The ontological difference**

- a) temporality [Zeitlichkeit], Temporality [Temporalität], and ontological difference  
  
- b) temporality [Zeitlichkeit] and the objectification of beings (positive science) and of being (philosophy)  
  
- c) Temporality [Temporalität] and a priori of being. The phenomenological method of ontology  

**EDITOR'S EPILOGUE**  
**TRANSLATOR'S APPENDIX: A Note on the Da and the Dasein**  
**LEXICON**