Stopping Wars and Making Peace:

Studies in International Intervention

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# Table of Contents

## Acknowledgments

## Notes on Contributors

## Introduction

### Chapter 1  War-Stopping Techniques in the Falklands

*Christina Parajon*

I. Introduction

II. History of the Conflict

III. The War

IV. War-Stopping Techniques

A. U.S. Shuttle Diplomacy
   1. London Round One
   2. Buenos Aires Round One
   3. London Round Two
   4. Buenos Aires Round Two

B. The Peruvian Mediation

C. The Secretary-General’s Good Offices

V. Appraisal of War-Stopping Measures

A. Disputants’ Domestic Constraints

B. The Haig Mediation: Problems of Timing, Credibility, Process, and Mixed Messages
   1. Timing: Overcoming Optimism Bias
   2. Credibility and Authority
   3. Process: The Shuttling War-Stopper
   4. Mixing Messages

C. Belaunde’s Mediation: Problems of Interest and Process
   1. Interests of the Mediator
   2. Process: Detachment

D. UN Involvement
   1. Timing: The Inflection Point
   2. Credibility: The Taint of Past Failures
   3. Credibility: The Secretary-General with Only His Good Offices
   4. Process: Mixing Enforcement and Mediation

VI. Conclusion and Lessons Learned
Chapter 2  Nagorno Karabakh: A War without Peace  
Nicholas W. Miller

I. Introduction 43
II. Background 43
III. The History of Nagorno Karabakh 44
   A. The Russian Empire 45
   B. World War I and Caucasian Independence 46
IV. A Century of Conflict 47
   A. The Soviet Period 47
   B. The Road to War 48
   C. Collapse of Soviet Power and the Period of Open Warfare 50
V. Failed War-Stopping (1991-1994) 54
   A. Yeltsin-Nazarbayev Mediation (1991) 54
   B. Turkish and Iranian Mediation Efforts (1992) 56
   C. CSCE/OSCE Mediation Efforts Begin (1992) 58
   D. Competition between Russia and the CSCE (1992-1994) 60
   E. 1993 CSCE/OSCE Peace Plan 62
   F. Renewed Russian Mediation (Summer 1993) 63
VI. War-Stopping without Peace (1994-2008) 64
   A. Competitive Russian and CSCE Mediation Efforts (1994) 65
   B. Cooperation between CSCE/OSCE and Russia (1994-1996) 67
   C. France, Russia, and the United States Take Over Mediation (1997-Present) 68
   D. A Decade without Progress (1998-2008) 69
VII. Analysis and Conclusions 70

Chapter 3  War and Peace in Rwanda  
Tom Dannenbaum

I. Introduction 77
II. A Brief History of Rwanda Prior to the Conflict 78
   A. Rwanda under Colonial Rule 79
   B. Tutsi Exodus and the Rise of a New Leadership in Exile 81
   C. Postcolonial Rwanda 83
III. The War between the RPF and the Government of Rwanda, 1990-1993 86
   A. Early Skirmishes 86
   B. Early Efforts to Stop the War 87
   C. The Inefficacy of the Regional Efforts at War-Stopping 87
# Table of Contents

## D. Explaining the Failure of the Regional War-Stopping Efforts in 1991

### E. Democratization, Political Fragmentation, and Radicalization in Kigali

### F. The Internationally Mediated Arusha Peace Process

## IV. Stalling, Nonimplementation, and Genocide

### A. Stalling and Nonimplementation

### B. The Assassination of Habyarimana, Genocide, and the Withdrawal of Peacekeepers

### C. RPF Victory and the Displacement of the War

## V. Why Did Arusha Fail and What Could Have Been Done Differently?

## VI. Conclusion—Lessons for Peacemakers and War-Stopppers

---

### Chapter 4 War-Stopping and Peacemaking during the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960)

*Colby E. Barrett*

## I. Introduction

## II. Early History and Geography of the Malayan Peninsula (30,000 B.C.-1924)

### A. Geography and Settlement

### B. European Occupation

## III. The Foundations of Communism and World War II (1925-1947)

### A. The Rise of the MCP

### B. British Defeat

### C. Japanese Occupation

### D. Malayan Resistance and Lai Tek

### E. The Postwar Era

## IV. Early British Failures and Innovations (1948-1951)

### A. The World Setting

### B. MCP Strategy and Tactics

### C. British Strategy and Operations

### D. British Tactics

### E. The Briggs Plan

## V. Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Victory (1952-1957)

### A. The Arrival of General Sir Gerald Templer

### B. Politics

### C. Military Doctrine and Operations

### D. Police, Intelligence, and Information Services

### E. Negotiations and Independence

## VI. Aftermath and Evaluation (1958-1963)

## VII. Conclusion
Chapter 5 Separatist Insurgency in Southern Thailand: An Approach to Peacemaking

Jonathan Ross-Harrington

I. Introduction

II. Conflict History
   A. From Annexation to Organized Insurgency (1906-1959)

III. Current Phase: 2004-Present
   A. Critical Events
   B. Key Trends
   C. Insurgent Groups and Violent Actors
      1. Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C)
      2. Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP)
      3. Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and New-PULO
      4. Paramilitaries and Militias
      5. Foreign Elements
   D. Ideology, Objectives, and Strategy of the Insurgents

IV. A Framework for Understanding Violence and Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand
   A. Conflict Drivers: Identity, Behavior, and Structure
      1. Identity
      2. Behavior
      3. Structure
   B. The Evolving Role of Religion as an Independent Conflict Driver
   C. The Dynamic Interaction of Conflict Drivers

V. Past Approaches to War-Stopping and Peacemaking in Southern Thailand
   A. The General Phibun Model
   B. The General Prem Model
   C. The Thaksin Model

VI. Peacemaking Strategies in Southern Thailand
   A. Challenges to a Lasting Peace
   B. Elements of a Comprehensive Peacemaking Strategy in Southern Thailand
      1. Draining the Bathwater: Addressing Long-Standing Grievances of the General Population
# Table of Contents

2. A New Approach to Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations 180
3. Relieving Intercommunal Tensions: Locating Middle-Range and Grassroots Agents of Peace 181
4. Malaysian Cooperation 182

VII. Conclusion 183

Chapter 6 War-Stopping and Peacemaking in Mozambique 185

*Caroline A. Gross*

I. Introduction 185

II. Colonial History and Independence, 1498–1975 185
   A. Portuguese Presence 185
   B. The Struggle for Independence 186

   A. Causes and Parties 187
      1. Frelimo 187
      2. Renamo 189
   B. Cold War Effects 190
   C. War Operations 191
      1. Renamo Tactics and Goals 191
      2. Frelimo's Response: Too Little, Too Late 192

IV. Negotiating an End to War, 1988–1992 194
   A. Failed Negotiations 194
      1. Nkomati Accord 194
      2. Pretoria Declaration 195
   B. The Road to Rome 196
   C. Rome 200

V. From War-Stopping to Peacemaking, 1992 Onward 205
   A. ONUMOZ 205
   B. Postelection Period 206
   C. Factors that Helped Maintain the Peace 206
      1. Lack of Precious Resources 207
      2. Demobilization First, Elections Second 207
      3. Incentives for Renamo to Stay Out of the Bush 208
      4. Remarkable Economic Development and Optimism 208
      5. Lack of an Ethnic Element to the Conflict 208

VI. Conclusion 209

Index 213