BUILT TO LAST: A POLITICAL ARCHITECTURE FOR EUROPE

Monitoring European Integration 12

Erik Berglöf
SITE, Stockholm School of Economics and CEPR

Barry Eichengreen
University of California at Berkeley and CEPR

Gérard Roland
University of California at Berkeley and CEPR

Guido Tabellini
Università Bocconi and CEPR

Charles Wyplosz
Graduate Institute for International Studies and CEPR

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