


BUILT TO LAST: A POLITICAL ARCHITECTURE FOR EUROPE



A 378224

Monitoring European Integration 12

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MEI 12 was funded in part by the Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) at the University of Bonn. ZEI is an independent research institute dedicated to high quality and policy oriented research into issues related to European integration.

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