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THE LIMITS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Genocide in Rwanda

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# Contents

Preface vii  
Acknowledgments xi  

1 The Common Wisdom 1  
2 Roots of the Rwandan Tragedy 5  
3 Mechanics of the Genocide 14  
4 When Did We Know? 23  
5 The Military Scene 38  
6 Transporting Intervention Forces 52  
7 Plausible Interventions 63  
8 Contending Claims 78  
9 Early Warning and Preventive Intervention 100  
10 Lessons 109
APPENDIXES
A  A Model of the Genocide's Progression 120
B  Airlift in Some Previous U.S. Military Interventions 124
C  Theater Airfield Capacity Based on Operation Support Hope 126

Notes 129
Index 157

TABLES
5-1. Relative Manpower, April 1994 40
5-2. Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) Equipment 41
5-3. Statistics for Operation Turquoise 46
6-1. Early Airlift Statistics for Five Previous U.S. Military Interventions 54
7-1. Projected Outcome of Three Plausible Interventions 76
A-1. Tutsi Population by Prefecture on the Eve of Genocide 121
A-2. Estimated Rwandan Tutsi Survivors of Genocide by Prefecture and Week, 1994 122

FIGURES
3-1. Geographic Progression of the Genocide from April 7, 1994 18
3-2. Estimated Quantitative Progression of the Genocide from April 7, 1994 21
5-1. UNAMIR Peacekeepers in Rwanda before the Genocide 42
5-3. Operation Turquoise: Bases and Safe Humanitarian Zone (SHZ) 48
7-1. Zone of Hypothetical Moderate Intervention 72