Sovereign (In)equality in International Organizations
## Table of Contents

### I. INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POWER AND INFLUENCE

#### A. The Structure of the World Community
   1. International Organizations as the New Key Players in the World Community
      a) Decision-Making Processes in International Governmental Organizations
         9
      b) The Nascent Emergence of New States and their Impact on Voting in International Governmental Organizations
         11
   2. The Principle of Sovereign Equality: Problems and Opportunities
      a) The Need to Rethink Sovereign Equality in the Decision-Making Processes of International Governmental Organizations
         15
         19

#### B. Methodology
   1. The Eclectic Route to Decision-Making in International Governmental Organizations
      a) The Choice of Decision-Making Organs and Voting Processes
         21
      b) The Choice of International Governmental Organizations
         22
   2. The Path Leading to Our Destination
      a) The Juridical Scope of the Study
         23
      b) The Path of Inquiry and Presentation
         24

### II. LEGAL THEORIES & CONSTRUCTS: A VIEW FROM SOMEWHERE

#### A. Legal Theories in International Law

28
1. Functionalism and Inter-Related Theories in International Governmental Organizations
   a) The Choice of Functionalism
   b) The Many Faces of Functionalism
      (i) Classic Functionalism: Form Follows Function
      (ii) Sociological Jurisprudence
   c) From International Co-operation to Regional Integration:
      Neo-Functionalism

2. The Theoretical Perspective of Legitimacy in International law
   a) The Choice of Legitimacy
   b) The Meaning of Legitimacy in International Legal Scholarship

B. Legal Constructs of Law: Equality, Sovereignty and Sovereign Equality
1. The Legal Concept of Equality
2. Sovereignty Then and Now
   a) The Origins and Meaning of Sovereignty
   b) The Shrinking of Sovereignty in the Twentieth Century
   c) The Counter Trend for the Future of Sovereignty
      (i) Defending Sovereign Rights and the International Norm of Non-Intervention
      (ii) Aspiring and Acquiring Sovereignty
      (iii) Re-appropriating Sovereign Rights
3. The Birth, Life and Future of Sovereign Equality
   a) The Genesis and Meaning of the Principle of Sovereign Equality
      (i) Hugo Grotius as Founder of Sovereign Equality
      (ii) Challenging Grotius as the Founder of Sovereign Equality
   b) The Evolutive Role of the Principle of Sovereign Equality in the Twentieth Century
   c) The Quixotic Quest for Sovereign Equality in International Governmental Organizations
      (i) International Governmental Organizations' Implicit Reference to Sovereign Equality
      (ii) International Governmental Organizations' Explicit Reference to Sovereign Equality
d) The Role of the Principle of Sovereign Equality in the Decision-Making Organs of International Governmental Organizations 77

4. Sovereign Equality \textit{vis-à-vis} Key International Norms 79
   a) The Inextricable Link Between Sovereign Equality and Voluntarism in International Law 79
   b) Sovereign Equality as \textit{Jus Cogens} 84
   c) Sovereign Equality \textit{vis-à-vis} Democracy in International Governmental Organizations 90

III. DECISION-MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 97

A. The United Nations (UN) 98
   1. The Principle of Sovereign Equality in the United Nations 100
      b) Explaining the Principle of Sovereign Equality in the Declaration on Friendly Relations 105
   2. Seeking Credence in Sovereign Equality in the General Assembly 108
      a) Structuring the United Nations' Plenary Organ on the basis of the Principle of Sovereign Equality 108
         (i) The Classic Voting Rule of 'One state, One Vote' 109
         (ii) Sovereign Equality in the Context of Non-Binding Decision-Making 112
      b) From Unanimity to Majoritarianism 114
         (i) Majoritarianism in the General Assembly 116
         (ii) The Interplay Between Majoritarianism and Sovereign Equality in the General Assembly 118
   3. When They Don't Practice What They Preach: Breaching Sovereign Equality in the Security Council 120
      a) Reflecting on the Inequality of States: The Restrictive Two Tier Composition of the Security Council 120
         (i) The Effects of the Security Council's Binding Decision-Making on the Principle of Sovereign Equality 124
         (ii) The Loss of Meaning of Sovereign Equality in the Security Council's Restrictive Membership 125
(iii) The Further Compromise of Sovereign Equality in the Security Council's Two Tier Membership 126

b) Democratic Majoritarianism: How Much of a Majority and How Much of a Democracy? 127

c) Qualified Majoritarianism in the Security Council 131
   (i) The Controversial Power to Veto 132
   (ii) The Power to Double Veto 137
   (iii) The Doctrine of Implied Powers in Relation to the Principle of Sovereign Equality 139

4. Functional Legitimacy Within the United Nations 141
      (i) The Non-Functional Myth of Sovereign Equality in the General Assembly and in the Security Council 142
      (ii) Measuring the Legitimacy of Sovereign Equality in the General Assembly and in the Security Council 143
      (i) Informal Proposals for Voting Reforms Throughout the United Nations' Existence 147
      (ii) The Role of Sovereign Equality and Democracy in the Newest Proposals for United Nations' Voting-Related Reforms 149

B. The International Labour Organization (ILO) 152
   1. Genesis and Structure 152
      a) Constitutional Foundations: Equality and Democracy but not Sovereign Equality 154
      b) Legal Status as a United Nations' Specialized Agency 156
   2. The International Labour Organization's Unique Composition and Decision-Making Processes 159
      a) Dual, Tripartite and Quadruple Representation 159
         (i) The General Conference 159
         (ii) The Governing Body 163
      b) Binding and Non-Binding Decisions 165
      c) Variation to the Equal Voting Rule: One State, Four Votes 169
   a) Voting by Majority 172
      (i) The General Conference 172
      (ii) The Governing Body 173
   b) Majoritarianism via Reservations: Voting Discrepancies in Treaty-Making 175
      (i) The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 175
      (ii) The Inability to Include Reservations in the International Labour Organization’s Conventions 178

   a) The Non-Functional Role of Sovereign Equality 181
   b) Sovereign Equality’s Lack of Legitimacy 182

IV. DECISION-MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ORGANIZATIONS 185

A. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 186
   1. Genesis and Structure 187
      a) The International Monetary Fund’s Evolving Mission 188
      b) Membership and Institutional Composition 192
   2. The International Monetary Fund’s Constitutional Foundations and Framework 193
      a) The Impact of Sovereign Equality on the International Monetary Fund’s Plenary and Restrictive Organs 194
      b) The Implications of Sovereign Equality on the Legal Value of the International Monetary Fund’s Decisions 196
   3. Decision-Making in the International Monetary Fund 198
      a) The Weighted Voting Rule in the International Monetary Fund’s Decision-Making 199
         (i) The Application of Weighted Voting in the Board of Governors and in the Executive Board 201
         (ii) The Meaning of Weighted Voting in the International Monetary Fund 203
      b) Decision-Making by Majoritarianism and Consensus in the International Monetary Fund 204
         (i) De Facto Veto by High Majority Rule 205
         (ii) From De Facto to De Jure Consensus 206
4. The Level of Sovereign Equality's Functional Legitimacy in the International Monetary Fund
   a) The Breach of the Doctrine of Sovereign Equality in the International Monetary Fund's Decision-Making Structure
      (i) The Non-Functionalism of Sovereign Equality
      (ii) The Illegitimacy of Sovereign Equality
   b) Reforms in the International Monetary Fund's Decision-Making Structure
      (i) Reforming Decision-Making by Imposing Exclusionary Sanctions
      (ii) The Significance of Exclusionary Sanctions and Calls for Further Reforms in the International Monetary Fund's Decision-Making Processes

B. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
   1. Genesis and Structure
      a) Membership Composition
      b) The Legal Value of Decisions
      a) A Majoritarianism Decision-Making Process
      b) The Classic Weighted Voting Rule of Financial Organizations
      a) The Innovation of Weighted Voting Parity
      b) The Challenge of Weighted Voting Parity
   4. The Impact of Sovereign Equality in the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
      a) The Violation of the Doctrine of Sovereign Equality in the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency's Decision-Making
         (i) Sovereign Equality's Lack of Functionalism
         (ii) Sovereign Equality's Want of Legitimacy
      b) Decision-Making Reforms in the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
V. DECISION-MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH ARE IN A LEAGUE OF THEIR OWN

A. The European Union (EU)

1. The Structure of the European Union
   a) The Genesis and Evolution of the European Union
   b) The European Union's Regional Membership and its Distinctive Institutions
      (i) The European Union's Intergovernmental Decision-Making Processes
      (ii) The European Union's Joint-Institutional Community Decision-Making Processes

2. The European Union's Foundational Framework
   a) A Paradigm of a Neo-Functional Institution
   b) Expressions of Supranationalism in the European Union
      (i) The Supremacy Principle
      (ii) The Direct Effect Principle
      (iii) The Subsidiarity Principle
   c) The Ambivalence of the Notions of Democracy and Sovereign Equality in the European Union
      (i) The Role of Democracy in the European Union
      (ii) The Role of Sovereign Equality in the European Union

3. The Council of the European Union
   a) The EU Council's Universal Composition and Weighted Voting Power
   b) Binding and Non-Binding Decision-Making in the European Union
   c) Majoritarianism in the EU Council
   d) Unanimity in the EU Council
      (i) The Luxembourg Compromise
      (ii) Unanimity in the Post EU Treaty Era

4. The European Parliament
   a) The European Parliament's Composition, Voting Rules and Mechanisms
   (i) The Co-operation Procedure 302
   (ii) The Co-decision Procedure 308

   a) Sovereign Equality and Democracy in the European Union 316
      (i) The Mirage of Sovereign Equality in the European Union's Institutions 316
      (ii) The Illusion of Democratic Governance in the European Union's Institutions 317
   b) Decision-Making Reforms Driven by the European Union's Enlargement 320
      (i) The Impact of Enlargement on the EU Council 322
      (ii) The Impact of Enlargement on the European Parliament 328

B. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 331
   1. The Structure of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 331
      a) Origins and Evolution 331
      b) Governmental and Non-Universal Organizational Framework 334
   2. Constitutional Foundations: Sovereign Equality's De Jure Absence but De Facto Presence 337
      a) The Council's Universal Composition 338
      b) Equal Voting Power Within the Council: One State, One Vote 339
      c) Binding and Non-Binding Decision-Making 340
   3. The Role of Unanimity and Consensus in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 342
      a) Innovative and Outmoded Voting Processes: De Jure Consensus and Unanimity 342
      b) Misinterpretation of Consensus and Misuse of Unanimity 343
      c) The Value of Abstentions in Decision-Making Processes 345
(i) The OECD’s Abstention Rule: Contributing to Confusion Between Unanimity and Consensus 346
(ii) The OECD’s Abstention Rule in Relation to Other IGOs 347

4. The Functional Legitimacy of Sovereign Equality in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 349
   a) The Remarkable Function and Cost of Sovereign Equality in the Council’s Decision-Making Processes 349
   b) The Legitimacy of Sovereign Equality in the Council’s Decision-Making Processes 350
   c) Globalization and Enlargement: Challenges and Opportunities for Decision-Making Reforms in the Council 352
      (i) The Promising Future of Universality 354
      (ii) The Doubtful Future of the ‘One State, One Vote’ Rule 355
      (iii) The Prospect for Compulsory Binding Decisions 355
      (iv) Contemplating the Abolition of De Jure and De Facto Unanimity 356

VI. CONCLUDING ON THE PRIMACY OF A FUNCTIONAL AND A LEGITIMATE LEGAL ORDER FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 359

A. Profiling the State of Decision-Making in International Governmental Organizations 360
      a) The Breach of Sovereign Equality in Universal Political and Financial International Governmental Organizations 365
      b) Sovereign Equality’s Relative and/or Haphazard Use in Non-Universal International Governmental Organizations 366
   2. Promoting Democracy Within Nation-States, and Not Within International Governmental Organizations 367
      a) The Dispensability of Global Democratic Governance 368
b) The Pyrrhic Victory of Democratizing International Governmental Organizations 368

B. The Implications of the Abolition of Sovereign Equality from International Governmental Organizations and the Pursuit of Functional and Legitimate Decision-Making in Global Governance 374

1. Assessing the Findings of Incompatible Peremptory Norms and Breaking the Images and Mirages of Sovereign Equality 375
   a) Reflecting on the Erosion of the Doctrine of Sovereign Equality in International Institutional Law 376
   b) Rethinking and Repositioning Sovereign Equality in Global Governance 377

2. A Golden Opportunity for Change in International Governmental Organizations 380
   a) Containing the Idealism of the Doctrine of Sovereign Equality 381
   b) Ushering in the New Millennium by Embracing Functional and Legitimate Norms as Jus Cogens in Global Governance 382

VII. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 385

VIII. ANNEX 453

IX. INDEX 457