THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

Institutional change and credibility in the reform of centrally planned economies

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## Contents

| List of figures and tables                   | page ix |
| List of contributors                        | xi      |
| Series editors' preface                     | xiii    |
| Preface                                    | xv      |

1. The political economy of property rights  
   **David L. Weimer**  
   1

2. Credible commitment and property rights: The role of strategic interaction between political and economic actors  
   **Daniel Diermeier, Joel M. Ericson, Timothy Frye, and Steven Lewis**  
   The political commitment to markets and marketization  
   **Barry R. Weingast**  
   20

3. Political determinants of the success of economic transition  
   **Nikolai Mikhailov**  
   Comment on “Political Determinants of the Success of Economic Transition”  
   **Adam Przeworski**  
   50

4. Russian privatization and the limits of credible commitment  
   **Timothy Frye**  
   Three issues of credible commitment and Russian privatization  
   **John M. Litwack**  
   84

5. Legislative politics and the political economy of property rights in post-communist Russia  
   **Brendan Kiernan and Francis X. Bell**  
   Commitment, coordination, and the demise of the post-communist parliament in Russia  
   **Steven S. Smith**  
   109

   113
Contents

6 Private firms, city government, and arbitration: Enforcing economic legality in St. Petersburg 150
   Joel M. Ericson
   Comment on “Private Firms, City Government, and Arbitration” 179
   Anthony Jones

7 Property rights and institutional change in the Czech and Slovak republics 182
   Mariusz Mark Dobek
   Comment on “Property Rights and Institutional Change in the Czech and Slovak Republics” 205
   Sharon Wolchik

8 Institutional structures, labor interests, and evolving privatization bargains in Poland 208
   Lorene Allio
   Comment on “Institutional Structures, Labor Interests, and Evolving Privatization Bargains in Poland” 232
   Bartłomiej Kaminski

9 Privatization as institutional change in Hungary 239
   László Urbán
   Comment on “Privatization as Institutional Change in Hungary” 256
   Kálmán Mizsei

10 Marketization and government credibility in Shanghai: Federalist and local corporatist explanations 259
    Steven Lewis
    Federalist and local corporatist theories: A comment on an empirical test 288
    Victor Nee

11 Learning about the economy: Property rights and the collapse of the East German industrial economy 294
    Hannes Wittig
    Misinformation, insecure property rights, and the collapse of the East German economy 314
    Susanne Lohmann

12 Post-communist privatization as a test of theories of institutional change 319
    Lorene Allio, Mariusz Mark Dobek, Nikolai Mikhailov, and David L. Weimer
    Explaining the complexity of institutional change 349
    Jack Knight and Douglass C. North

Indexes 355