Standardization under EU Competition Rules and US Antitrust Laws

The Rise and Limits of Self-Regulation

Björn Lundqvist

Associate Professor of Competition Law, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark

Edward Elgar

Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA
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