EMPLOYMENT CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

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Table of Contents

Center for Labor and Employment Law at New York University
School of Law xxxi
Editor’s Preface xxxiii

Chapter 1
The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action
Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects 1
Michael Selmi

1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 The Empirical Study 6
  1.2.1 The Hypothesis 6
  1.2.2 The Data 8
  1.2.3 The Statistical Analysis 13
    1.2.3.1 The Results 15
    1.2.3.2 Explaining the Statistical Analysis 19
1.3 Do the Lawsuits Produce Meaningful Change? 25
  Three Case Studies 25
    1.3.1 Texaco: The Public Relations Model 26
      1.3.1.1 The Lawsuit and the Tapes 26
      1.3.1.2 Texaco’s Progress 34
    1.3.2 Home Depot: The Recalcitrance Model 40
      1.3.2.1 The Case 41
      1.3.2.2 The Aftermath 47
    1.3.3 Denny’s: The Reform Model 51
      1.3.3.1 The Cases 51
      1.3.3.2 Denny’s Reform Efforts 57
1.4 The Benefits and Effects of Class Action Litigation 61
  1.4.1 The Plaintiffs: Do They Come out Ahead? 63
EMPLOYMENT CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

1.4.1.1 Structural Reforms after the Civil Rights Act of 1991 64
1.4.1.2 Monetary Relief 66
1.4.1.3 Diversity Initiatives 71
1.4.2 Corporations and Class Action Litigation 73
1.4.2.1 The Nature of Discrimination and its Reform 74
1.4.2.2 The Deterrence Hypothesis: Do the Lawsuits Deter Discrimination? 80
1.4.2.3 Will the Market Drive out Discrimination? 87
1.4.3 Reforming the Process 91
1.4.3.1 Higher Damages Should Be Available 92
1.4.3.2 Restoring Public Accountability to Class Action Litigation 95

1.5 Conclusion 105

Chapter 2
Measuring the Value of Class and Collective Action Employment Settlements: A Preliminary Assessment 107
Samuel Estreicher and Kristina Yost

2.1 Introduction 107
2.2 Procedure for Settlement 110
2.3 Methodology 111
2.4 Findings 114
2.4.1 General Findings 114
2.4.2 Findings by Type of Claim 122
2.4.2.1 Discrimination Claims 122
2.4.2.2 FLSA and State Wage-Hour Claims 124
2.4.2.3 ERISA Claims 128
2.4.2.4 Other Claims 129
2.4.3 Observations about Attorney Fees 130
2.4.4 Findings by State of Settlement 134
2.4.5 A Brief Comparison of Our Results to Recent Studies of Individual Recoveries in Arbitration 136

2.5 Conclusion 136
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Necessity of Following Class Procedures before Granting Class Relief</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Rule 23 Class Actions</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1</td>
<td>Suitability of the Issues for Class Treatment</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.2</td>
<td>Suitability of the Class Representative</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.3</td>
<td>Discretion to Consider Factors Not Specified in Rule 23</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.4</td>
<td>Numerosity under Rule 23(a)(1)</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.5</td>
<td>Commonality under Rule 23(a)(2)</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.6</td>
<td>Typicality under Rule 23(a)(3)</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.7</td>
<td>Adequacy of Representation under Rule 23(a)(4)</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.8</td>
<td>Acting and Refusing to Act on Common Grounds under Rule 23(b)(2)</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.9</td>
<td>Predominance of Class Questions and Superiority of Class Treatment under Rule 23(b)(3)</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.10</td>
<td>'Hybrid' Class Actions under Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3)</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.11</td>
<td>Adequacy of Notice under Rule 23(e)</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Settlement Classes</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Changes in Class Certification and Definition</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>Individualized Relief for Class Members</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>Class Actions Seeking Common-Law Damages</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Opt-Outs from Rule 23 Class Actions</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>Representative Actions</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>Rule 23(f) Appeals of Decisions Granting or Denying Class Certification</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>Appealability of Class Determination</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>Judicial Approval of Class Settlements</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>Conclusiveness of Class Settlements, Decrees, and Decisions on the Merits</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>Changes in the Class Action Rules</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 4
Fighting to Keep Employment Discrimination Class Actions Alive: How *Allison v. Citgo's* Predomination Requirement Threatens to Undermine Title VII Enforcement
Suzette M. Malveaux

4.1 Introduction

4.2 The Development of the Circuit Conflict over the Interpretation of Rule 23's Predomination Requirement after the Enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991

4.2.1 The Central Role of Rule 23(b)(2) Certification in Civil Rights Enforcement

4.2.2 The Impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1991

4.2.3 *Allison v. Citgo*

4.2.4 *Robinson v. Metro-North*

4.2.5 Hybrid Approaches to Class Certification

4.2.6 The Supreme Court's Due Process Concerns

4.3 The Restrictive Interpretation of the Predomination Requirement Threatens to Undermine Civil Rights Enforcement

4.3.1 Fewer Employment Discrimination Class Actions Will Be Certified

4.3.2 Fewer Monetary Damages Will Be Awarded to Those Who Deserve Them

4.3.3 Plaintiffs Will Have to Meet the More Rigorous and Costly Certification Standards of Rule 23(b)(3)

4.4 The *Robinson* Ad Hoc Balancing Test Is a Superior Predomination Test for the Enforcement of Title VII

4.5 The Impact of Recent Legislation on Preventing Potential Judicial Abuse of Class Certification

4.5.1 Amended Rule 23

4.5.2 The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005

4.6 Conclusion
# Chapter 5
The Uncertain Future of Title VII Class Actions after the Civil Rights Act of 1991

Daniel F. Piar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1991</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>The Rule 23 Requirements for Class Actions</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Title VII Class Actions before the Civil Rights Act of 1991</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Title VII Class Actions after the Civil Rights Act of 1991</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.1</td>
<td>The 23(b)(2) Class: The Problems of Predominance and Opt-Out Rights</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.1.1</td>
<td>Rule 23(b)(2) and Money Damages</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.1.2</td>
<td>The <em>Allison v. Citgo</em> Approach</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.1.3</td>
<td>The Allison Dissent and the Issue of Back Pay</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.1.4</td>
<td>Other Appellate Views: <em>Jefferson v. Ingersoll International, Inc.</em> and <em>Lemon v. International Union of Operating Engineers</em></td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.1.5</td>
<td>Other Post-1991 Cases Restricting 23(b)(2) Certification</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.1.6</td>
<td>Post-1991 Cases Granting 23(b)(2) Certification</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.1.7</td>
<td>Forgoing Money Damages: <em>Zachery v. Texaco</em></td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.1.8</td>
<td>The End of the 23(b)(2) Title VII Class?</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.2</td>
<td>23(b)(3) Classes – Commonality, Manageability, and Negative Value</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.2.1</td>
<td>Commonality</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.2.2</td>
<td>Manageability</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.2.3</td>
<td>Negative Value</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.3</td>
<td>Procedural and Constitutional Problems of Bifurcation and Partial Certification</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.3.1</td>
<td>Procedural Issues</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.3.2</td>
<td>The Integrity of Rule 23</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.3.3</td>
<td>Constitutional Issues</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.3.4</td>
<td>The Allison Denial of Rehearing</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EMPLOYMENT CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

5.5.4  The Problem of the Blackmail Class 281
5.6  For Better or for Worse? 283
5.7  Conclusion 285

Chapter 6
A Classless Act: The Ninth Circuit's Erroneous Class Certification in Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. 287
Aaron B. Lauchheimer

6.1  Introduction 287
6.2  Dukes v. Wal-Mart: An In-Depth Overview 292
6.3  Rule 23 295
   6.3.1  An Overview 295
   6.3.2  Commonality 297
   6.3.3  Typicality 299
6.4  The Court's Decision in Dukes v. Wal-Mart 302
   6.4.1  The Finding of Commonality 302
   6.4.2  The Typicality Finding 309
6.5  The Court's Use of Expert Witnesses and the Lack of a Daubert Analysis 313
6.6  The Court's Decision Regarding Title VII Issues 317
6.7  Blackmail Settlements 320
6.8  A Proposed Guide for Certifying Employment Class Actions 323
6.9  Conclusion 326

Chapter 7
Too Many Riches? Dukes v. Wal-Mart and the Efficacy of Monolithic Class Actions 329
Rachel M. Pickens

7.1  Introduction 329
   7.1.1  Addendum 331
7.2  Class Actions Generally 331
   7.2.1  Rule 23 334
   7.2.2  Class Action Manageability 337
   7.2.3  Certification Decisions 339
7.3  The Case at Bar: Dukes v. Wal-Mart 341
7.4  The Sheer Size of the Proposed Class Is Not Determinative of the Efficacy of the Action 347
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

7.5  *Dukes v. Wal-Mart* Should Be Maintained under Rule 23  
348

7.6  Conclusion  
352

## Chapter 8  
The Possibility of Avoiding Discrimination: Considering Compliance and Liability  
*Melissa Hart*

8.1  Introduction  
353

8.2  Litigation Trends: *Dukes* and Other Challenges to Entrenched Stereotypes  
355
  8.2.1  Statistical Disparities, Centralized Policies, and Stories of Bias at Wal-Mart  
356
  8.2.2  Potential for Challenging Culturally Entrenched Stereotypes  
362

8.3  Avoiding Litigation Liability: What Should Employers Do?  
365
  8.3.1  Quotas and Objective Testing: The Defendants’ Parade of Horribles  
367
  8.3.2  Best Practices?: Workplace Policies that May Reduce the Negative Effects of Stereotype and Bias and Limit the Risk of Liability  
369
    8.3.2.1  Advertising and Posting Positions  
371
    8.3.2.2  Establishing Written Standards  
372
  8.3.3  Establishing Antidiscrimination Policies and Education  
374
    8.3.3.1  Monitoring and Ensuring Accountability  
375

  8.3.4  What if Compliance Does Not Work?  
377

8.4  Conclusion  
381

## Chapter 9  
Preclusion in Class Action Litigation  
*Tobias Barrington Wolff*

9.1  Introduction  
383

9.2  Defining the Problem  
390
  9.2.1  The *Cooper* Case  
391
  9.2.2  Conflicts of Interest  
399

xv
# Table of Contents

Chapter 10  
Opt-In Class Actions: Collective Litigation under the FLSA, ADEA, and EPA  
Mark S. Dichter

10.1 Collective Litigation under the FLSA, ADEA, and EPA  
10.1.1 Similarities and Differences between Class Actions and Collective Actions  
10.1.1.1 Class Actions under Rule 23  
10.1.1.2 Collective Actions under 29 U.S.C. §216(b)  
10.1.1.3 The Applicability of Rule 23 to Collective Actions  
10.1.1.4 The Legal Differences between Rule 23 Class Actions and §216(b) Collective Actions  
10.1.1.4.1 The Need to Opt-In  
10.1.1.4.2 Notice to Class or Collective Action Members of Dismissal of Claims  
10.1.1.4.3 Tolling the Statute of Limitations  
10.1.1.5 The Legal Similarities between Rule 23 Class Actions and §216(b) Collective Actions  
10.1.2 The Three-Step Process through Which Nationwide Collective Actions Are Born  
10.1.2.1 The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Notice in §216(b) Actions  
10.1.2.2 The ‘Similarly Situated’ Requirement of §216(b)  
10.1.2.2.1 Initially Determining ‘Similarly Situated’ Is a Minimal Burden  
10.1.2.2.2 The ‘Two-Tiered’ System of Similarly Situated  
10.1.2.2.3 A Minimal Burden, but a Burden Nonetheless  

xvii
10.1.2.4 District Courts Have Broad Discretion

10.1.2.3 Discovery Permitted to Assist in the Notice Process
10.1.2.3.1 Allowing Plaintiffs to Discover Names, Addresses, and Other Information about Defendant's Current and Former Employees to Support Allegations that Potential Plaintiffs Are Similarly Situated and that Notice Is Warranted

10.1.2.3.2 Types of Information Found to Be Discoverable

10.1.2.3.3 Discovery of Names and Addresses

10.1.2.4 Approaches to Arguing in Favor of Notice
10.1.2.4.1 Notice Permitted Based Solely on Class-Wide Allegations of Illegality

10.1.2.4.2 Notice Permitted Based upon Allegations and Supporting Proof

10.1.2.5 Arguments that Can Be Used to Oppose the Sending of Notice
10.1.2.5.1 Challenges to Allegations Made without Supporting Evidence that a Potential Class Exists

10.1.2.5.2 Challenges Based upon the Argument that a Representative Plaintiff is Not Similarly Situated to Putative Class Members, or because Individualized Facts Would Apply to Each Plaintiff
10.1.2.5.3 Challenges Based on Geographic Factors, Such as No Evidence of Nationwide, Statewide, or Class-Wide Wrongdoing 519

10.1.2.5.4 Challenges Based upon Factual Differences in Pay Status, Job Requirements, Duties, Departments, Etc. 522

10.1.2.5.4.1 Limits Based upon Different Job Requirements or Duties 523

10.1.2.5.4.2 Limits Based upon Different Pay Provisions 524

10.1.2.5.5 Other Bases for Challenges 524

10.1.2.5.6 Temporal Limits (Statute of Limitations) upon the Scope of Discovery or Notice 525

10.1.2.6 Other Miscellaneous Points about Notice 526

10.1.2.6.1 Nondisclosure Agreements and the Attorney-Client Privilege 526

10.1.2.6.2 Potentially Applicable Local Rules of Civil Procedure 527

10.1.3 Communication with Class Plaintiffs 527

10.1.3.1 Generally 527

10.1.3.2 Special Considerations Regarding Communication with Managerial Employees 530

10.1.4 FLSA Statute of Limitations 533

10.1.4.1 Two-Year Statute of Limitations for Non-willful Violations; Three-Year Statute of Limitations for Willful Violations 533

10.1.4.2 When the Statute of Limitations Runs 534

10.1.4.2.1 Generally 534

10.1.4.2.2 No Relation Back 534

xix
### EMPLOYMENT CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.1.4.2.3</td>
<td>Continuing Violations</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.4.3</td>
<td>Tolling the Statute of Limitations</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.4.3.1</td>
<td>Tolling, Generally</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.4.3.1.1</td>
<td>Conduct that May Toll the Statute</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.4.3.1.2</td>
<td>Employer Conduct that Has Been Held Not to Give Rise to Tolling</td>
<td>536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.4.3.2</td>
<td>Plaintiffs' Burden</td>
<td>536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.4.4</td>
<td>Attorneys' Fees</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.4.4.1</td>
<td>The General Rule</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.4.4.2</td>
<td>Method(s) of Calculating Fees Generally; What Is a 'Reasonable' Fee?</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.4.4.2.1</td>
<td>The 'Lodestar' Approach</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.4.4.2.2</td>
<td>The 'Common Fund' Approach</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.4.4.3</td>
<td>What Is Reasonable?</td>
<td>538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.4.4.4</td>
<td>Is a Settlement in an FLSA Collective Action a Common Fund?</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 10.2 Overview of FLSA Cases: An Increasing Favorite of the Plaintiffs' Bar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.2.1</td>
<td>Enterprise Rent-A-Car</td>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2.2</td>
<td>Chapter Albertson's</td>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2.3</td>
<td>Longs Drug Stores</td>
<td>542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2.4</td>
<td>Wal-Mart</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2.5</td>
<td>Prudential</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2.6</td>
<td>Sbarro</td>
<td>544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2.7</td>
<td>Paine Webber</td>
<td>544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2.8</td>
<td>Dean Witter</td>
<td>545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2.9</td>
<td>Saipan Class Action</td>
<td>545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2.10</td>
<td>Hooters Restaurants</td>
<td>546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2.11</td>
<td>Perdue Farms, Inc.</td>
<td>546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2.12</td>
<td>Aetna Services, Inc.</td>
<td>547</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Chapter 11**
**Not without Class: Test Cases in Lieu of Class Certification as a Paradigm for Litigating Multi-plaintiff Harassment Cases**  
*Steven Arenson and Craig J. Ackermann*

11.1 Introduction 549  
11.2 Defining the Terms ‘Test Cases’ and ‘Bellwether Trials’ 553  
11.2.1 Test Case 553  
11.2.2 Bellwether Trial 554  
11.3 Legal Authority Supporting Test Cases 555  
11.4 Putting the Test Case Approach to Work 559  
11.5 Collateral Estoppel and the Test Case Model 569  
11.6 Punitive Damages and the Test Case Model 577  
11.7 Enhanced Settlement Prospects under the Test Case Model 579  
11.8 Conclusion 580

**Chapter 12**
**‘Pattern or Practice’ Discrimination Litigation**  
*Michael Delikat*

12.1 Introduction 581  
12.2 Origins of Pattern or Practice Theory 583  
12.3 Pattern or Practice Litigation by the EEOC and Private Plaintiffs 585  
12.4 Can a Pattern or Practice Theory be Asserted in Discriminatory Harassment Claims? 587

**Chapter 13**
**Disability, Disparate Impact, and Class Actions**  
*Michael Ashley Stein and Michael E. Waterstone*

13.1 Introduction 593  
13.2 Title VII Group-Based Discrimination Theories 598  
13.2.1 Disparate Impact Theory 599  
13.2.2 Panethnicity and Class Actions 601  
13.2.3 Judicial Erosion of Collective Action 606  
13.3 The Ordinary Course of ADA Claims 611  
13.3.1 Failure to Accommodate 612
EMPLOYMENT CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

13.3.2 Missed Potential 619
13.4 The ADA as Group-Based Discrimination 628
  13.4.1 Pandisability Theory 629
  13.4.2 The Class Action Device 638
  13.4.3 Challenging Workplace Norms 647
13.5 Conclusion 660

Chapter 14
Collective and Class Action Issues under the Fair Labor Standards Act and State-Based Wages Statutes 663
Adam T. Klein, Nantiya Ruan, and Sean Farhang

14.1 Litigation Issues 663
  14.1.1 Representational Evidence or Sampling 663
  14.1.2 Administrative Exemption 665
  14.1.3 Class and Collective Action Certification of Wage-Hour Claims 666
    14.1.3.1 FLSA Collective Action Certification 667
    14.1.3.2 State-Law-Based Class Action Certification 667
  14.1.4 Seventh Amendment Considerations 669
14.2 Regulatory Issues 671
  14.2.1 Introduction 671
  14.2.2 Minimum Salary Bar Raised 672
  14.2.3 'Duties' Tests Loosened for White-Collar Exemptions 672
    14.2.3.1 Administrative Employees 673
    14.2.3.2 Professional Employees 674
    14.2.3.3 Executive Employees 674
    14.2.3.4 Outside-Sales People 675
  14.2.4 New USD 65,000 Rule for 'Highly Compensated Employees' 675
  14.2.5 Salary Deductions and the Salary Basis Test 676
  14.2.6 Changes in Size of Covered Populations 677
  14.2.7 Conclusion 677
### Chapter 15
**Working with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission**

*Wayne N. Outten and Piper Hoffman*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15.1 Introduction</td>
<td>679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.2 The EEOC's Case Selection</td>
<td>679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.3 Advantages of Litigating with the EEOC</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.3.1 Avoid Rule 23</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.3.2 Expand the Scope of the Case</td>
<td>681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.3.3 Avoid Confidentiality Provisions</td>
<td>681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.3.4 Increase Credibility</td>
<td>682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.3.5 Invoke Fear of Uncle Sam</td>
<td>682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.3.6 Negotiate Systemic Changes</td>
<td>682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.3.7 Gain Expertise</td>
<td>683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.3.8 Increase Media Interest</td>
<td>683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.3.9 Get More Hands at No Cost</td>
<td>683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.4 Disadvantages of Litigating with the EEOC</td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.4.1 Too Many Chefs in the Kitchen</td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.4.2 Government Bureaucracy</td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.4.3 Culture Clash</td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.4.4 Different Goals and Rewards</td>
<td>685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.4.5 Consensus on Settlement</td>
<td>685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.4.6 Perception of the EEOC</td>
<td>686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.5 Conclusion</td>
<td>686</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapter 16
**Green Tree v. Bazzle in the Supreme Court: 'How to Succeed in Blocking Class Actions in Arbitration without Really Saying So'**

*Daniel B. Edelman*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16.1 Introduction and Summary</td>
<td>687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.2 The Debate over Class Arbitration</td>
<td>690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.3 The State Court Proceedings</td>
<td>694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.4 The South Carolina Supreme Court Decision</td>
<td>697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.5 Does the FAA Preempt Application of State Class Action Procedures to a Silent Arbitration Agreement? Does the FAA Federalize Interpretation of Arbitration Agreements?</td>
<td>699</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EMPLOYMENT CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

16.5.1 Does the FAA Preempt Disapproval of Express Class-Action Bans Based on State Unconscionability Law? 702

16.5.2 Class Action Procedures Are Not Incompatible with Arbitration 703

16.6 Conclusion 710

Chapter 17
Arbitration Agreements, Unconscionability, and Bans on Class Actions: Dueling Magic Wands? The California Experience 713

Henry D. Lederman

17.1 Introduction 713

17.2 Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle 714

17.3 The California Approach: Where the Agreement Is Silent 715

17.4 Where Class Action Arbitrations Are Expressly Forbidden – The Two Discover Bank Cases 718

17.5 The Future 728

Chapter 18
When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment Arbitration 731

Michael H. LeRoy and Peter Feuille

18.1 Introduction 731

18.1.1 Statement of Research Question 732

18.1.2 Organization of This Article 736

18.2 The Growth of Mandatory Employment Arbitration 738

18.2.1 Some Courts Refuse to Enforce Mandatory Arbitration Agreements that Impose Unfair Procedures on Employees 745

18.2.2 Some Courts Reject or Revise Mandatory Agreements that Shift Forum Costs to Employees 747

18.2.3 Some Courts Reject or Revise Mandatory Agreements because They View the ADR System as Flawed by Comparison to Voluntary Labor Arbitration 748
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>The Allocation of Costs in Arbitration</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.3.1</td>
<td>Elements of Cost in Arbitrating Employment Disputes</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.3.2</td>
<td>The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Arbitration Costs</td>
<td>757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>Research Literature and Methods</td>
<td>764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.4.1</td>
<td>Research Literature</td>
<td>764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.4.2</td>
<td>Research Methods</td>
<td>767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>Empirical Results: How Federal Courts Rule on Cost-Allocation</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Challenges to Mandatory Employment Arbitration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>Appellate Decisions Adopt Divergent Theories: Forum Substitution</td>
<td>773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Versus Comparative Cost of Litigation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.6.1</td>
<td>What Is a Cost Case?</td>
<td>773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.6.2</td>
<td>Appeals Courts that Accept Cost Arguments: Forum Substitution Theory</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and Lower-Wage Workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.6.2.1</td>
<td>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit: Cole v. Burns</td>
<td>776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Security Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.6.2.2</td>
<td>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit: Shankle v. B-G</td>
<td>779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance Management of Colorado, Inc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.6.2.3</td>
<td>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit: Perez v. Globe</td>
<td>781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Airport Security Services, Inc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.6.3</td>
<td>Appeals Courts that Reject Cost Arguments: Comparative Cost of</td>
<td>783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Litigation Theory and Higher-Wage Employees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.6.3.1</td>
<td>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit: Rosenberg v. Merrill</td>
<td>783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &amp; Smith, Inc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.6.3.2</td>
<td>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: Koveskie v. SBC</td>
<td>786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capital Markets, Inc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.6.4</td>
<td>Appeals Courts that Use a Case-by-Case Approach to Cost Arguments</td>
<td>787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.6.4.1</td>
<td>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: Bradford v. Rockwell</td>
<td>787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Semiconductor Systems, Inc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18.6.4.2 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit: Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases

18.7 Conclusions

Chapter 19
Arbitration and the Individuation Critique
W. Mark C. Weidemaier

19.1 Introduction
19.2 The Individuation Critique
  19.2.1 Automatic Claims Aggregation and the Presumed Repeat-Player Advantage
  19.2.2 Repeat-Player Lawyers and the Benefits of Aggregation
  19.2.3 Aggregation of Consumer Claims
  19.2.4 The Individuation Critique
    19.2.4.1 Does Arbitration Individuate Claiming?
    19.2.4.2 The Potential Moderating Effect of ADR Provider Rules
      19.2.4.2.1 Reasoned versus Summary Awards
      19.2.4.2.2 Remedies Available in Arbitration
      19.2.4.2.3 Limits on the Right to Bring or Participate in a Class Action
    19.2.4.3 Summary
19.3 Rethinking the Ability to Aggregate Disputes in Arbitration
  19.3.1 Class Arbitration as a Laboratory for Innovation in Formal Aggregation
  19.3.2 Aggregation in Individual Disputes
    19.3.2.1 Reduced Cost
    19.3.2.2 Development of Precedent
    19.3.2.3 Facilitating Award Collection
    19.3.2.4 Punitive Damages and Other Remedies
    19.3.2.5 Summary
19.3.3 The Effect and Evolution of Provider Rules 859
19.4 Conclusion 863

Chapter 20
Building an Internal Defense Against Class
Action Lawsuits: Human Resources Practices Audits 867
G. Roger King, Jeffrey D. Winchester, Lori A. Clary,
and Kimberly J. Potter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>Class Actions and Specific Federal Statutory Claims</td>
<td>868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.2.1</td>
<td>The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII</td>
<td>868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.2.2</td>
<td>The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act</td>
<td>869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.2.3</td>
<td>The Fair Labor Standards Act</td>
<td>869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.2.4</td>
<td>The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967</td>
<td>870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.2.5</td>
<td>The Equal Pay Act</td>
<td>870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.2.6</td>
<td>The Employee Retirement Income Security Act</td>
<td>871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>Avoiding Disparate Impact Class Action Lawsuits</td>
<td>871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.3.1</td>
<td>The Nature and Danger of Disparate Impact Suits</td>
<td>871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.3.1.1</td>
<td>The Under-Utilization Analysis</td>
<td>873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.3.1.2</td>
<td>The 80% Benchmark Rule</td>
<td>873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.3.2</td>
<td>Preventing Disparate Impact Suits: How to Uncover Unseen Potential Disparate Impact Liability in an Organization</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.3.2.1</td>
<td>Restriction of Job Advertising to Local Newspapers</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.3.2.2</td>
<td>Requirement that Applicants Meet Certain Minimum Educational Requirements</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.3.2.3</td>
<td>Reliance upon Subjective Personal or Family Ties as Hiring Criteria</td>
<td>876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.3.2.4</td>
<td>Some Tips on Avoiding Disparate Impact Discrimination Claims</td>
<td>877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>Avoiding Wage and Hour, Sexual Harassment, and ERISA Class Action Liability</td>
<td>877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.4.1</td>
<td>Wage and Hour Claims under the FLSA</td>
<td>877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.4.2</td>
<td>Sexual and Other Workplace Harassment Claims</td>
<td>879</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE OF CONTENTS

22.3.2.2 Horizontal Preemption .............................................. 975
22.3.3 Products Liability .................................................. 977
   22.3.3.1 The Need for National Regulation ......................... 981
   22.3.3.2 Horizontal Preemption ....................................... 986
22.4 Forum Selection and Federalism ...................................... 998
   22.4.1 From *Swift* to *Erie*: Federal Power and the Common Law 1000
   22.4.2 The Expanding Federal Interest .............................. 1010
   22.4.3 The Federal Ingredient in State Law ......................... 1012
22.5 Unstable Hybrids: Partial Federalization .......................... 1017
   22.5.1 The Class Action Fairness Act ............................... 1018
   22.5.2 Punitive Damages .............................................. 1024
   22.5.3 Further Implications .......................................... 1034
22.6 Conclusion: The Risk of Predation .................................. 1038
22.7 Preemption Cases in Sample (chronological listing) ............ 1039

### Chapter 23
From 'Predominance' to 'Resolvability': A New Approach to Regulating Class Actions ................................. 1041
Allan Erbsen

23.1 Introduction .................................................................. 1041
23.2 The Implications of Dissimilarity for the Litigated and Negotiated Valuation of Class Members' Claims 1053
   23.2.1 A Thought Experiment Confirming the Distorting Effect of Dissimilarity 1053
   23.2.2 Trial Distortions: Cherry-Picking, Claim Fusion and Ad Hoc Lawmaking 1056
   23.2.3 The Distorting Effects of Dissimilarity on Valuation of Class Action Settlements 1062
      23.2.3.1 Ineffective Monitoring ................................... 1063
      23.2.3.2 Tainted Bargaining ....................................... 1064
23.3 Principles that Should Shape Rules Governing the Effect of Individualized Issues on Class Certification Decisions 1072
   23.3.1 The Finality Principle: A Certified Class Action Seeking Damages Should Eventually Result in a Judgment Resolving the Claims of All Class Members 1073

xxix
EMPLOYMENT CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

23.3.2 The Fidelity Principle: A Class Member Should Not Receive a Favorable Judgment Unless He or She Can Prove the Substantive Elements for a Cause of Action and Survive Any Applicable Defenses 1085

23.3.3 The Feasibility Principle: Attempts to Adjudicate Class Actions Should Occur within Resource and Management Constraints 1099

23.3.4 Synthesis of the Three Principles 1102

23.4 Inconsistencies between Class Certification Principles and Existing Class Certification Rules and Doctrine 1103

23.4.1 The Origins and Role of the Predominance Test 1104

23.4.2 Defects in the Predominance Concept 1113

23.4.3 The Failure of Additional Rule 23 Certification Criteria to Cure Defects in the Predominance Standard 1126

23.4.3.1 Typicality 1126

23.4.3.2 Manageability 1129

23.4.4 Doctrinal Consequences of Judicial Reliance on Predominance 1130

23.4.4.1 Doctrine De-emphasizing Individualized Damages 1130

23.4.4.2 Doctrine Under-Weighting Individualized Defenses 1133

23.4.4.3 Doctrine Postponing Conflict of Laws Analysis 1136

23.5 Proposed Revision to Rule (23)(B)(3) and Implications 1140

23.5.1 The ‘Resolvability’ Test 1140

23.5.2 Avenues for Further Scholarship 1146