

# BANKS: FRAUD AND CRIME

SECOND EDITION

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# CONTENTS

<i>Preface</i>	<i>page</i>
<i>Contributors</i>	v
<i>Table of cases</i>	xxv
<i>Table of legislation</i>	xxvii
	xxix
	<i>para.</i>
CHAPTER 1. BANKS—FRAUD AND CRIME: A SURVEY OF CRIMINAL OFFENCES UNDER ENGLISH LAW	
Introduction	1.1
Theft	1.5
Deception	1.13
Commercial Offences	1.26
Forgery	1.33
Fraudulent Trading	1.39
Conspiracy	1.42
Conclusions	1.43
CHAPTER 2. SERIOUS FRAUD—A BANKER'S PERSPECTIVE	
Nature and Extent of Fraud	2.2
The offence of fraud	2.2
The development of fraud investigation	2.5
The cost of fraud	2.14
The effect of the new system	2.18
Bank fraud	2.22
Fighting Fraud	2.25
Investigation and trial powers	2.25
Compensation and confiscation	2.30
International enquiries	2.32
Dilemmas for Banks	2.40
Banking confidentiality	2.42
Banks as policemen	2.48
The reporting dilemma	2.50

## CONTENTS

	<i>para.</i>
Practical consequences	2.54
(a) Documents	2.55
(b) Statements	2.57
(c) Staying of proceedings	2.60
Concluding Observations: Improving the Situation	2.68

### CHAPTER 3. BANKS, POLICING AND THE REGULATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING IN ENGLAND AND WALES

Introduction and Historical Background	3.1
Money-Laundering Legislation and its Enforcement in the United Kingdom within its European Context	3.8
The activities covered by the legislation	3.21
The impact of legislation on professionals' responsibilities	3.24
Evaluating the Impact of Money-Laundering Reports to Date	3.38
Conclusions	3.49

### CHAPTER 4. FRAUD AGAINST BANKS: A PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE

Administration	4.2
Documents	4.2
The team	4.3
Solicitors involvement	4.4
Retain accountants	4.5
Fidelity or other insurance cover	4.6
Computerise	4.7
Involve the police	4.8
Personnel	4.9
Freezing Funds	4.10
Mareva injunctions	4.11
Criteria for granting a Mareva	4.15
Worldwide Mareva injunctions	4.16
Injunction in aid of tracing	4.20
Freezing overseas assets	4.23
Interlocutory Discovery Orders	4.27
Writ ne exeat regno	4.30
Settlement with a fraudster	4.31
Making Recoveries	4.32
Tracing	4.33
Constructive trust	4.39
Criminal Proceedings	4.42
Staying civil proceedings	4.45
Limiting Exposure	4.46

## CONTENTS

*para.*

### CHAPTER 5. THE ROLE OF AUDITORS IN PROTECTING AGAINST BANK FRAUD

Introduction	5.1
What is an audit?	5.4
Auditors and Fraud: The Role of the Courts	5.10
The Attitude of the Accountancy Profession: Serving Whose Interests?	5.18
To whom should auditors report a suspected fraud?	5.28
Bank Auditors and Fraud: A New Departure?	5.35
Ad hoc reports to the Bank of England	5.37
Conclusions	5.45

### CHAPTER 6. CROSS-BORDER FRAUDULENT ACTIVITY

Introduction	6.1
Securing the Evidence of the Fraud	6.3
Background	6.4
Extraterritorial subpoenas/court orders	6.12
The jurisdiction issue	6.13
The injunction issue	6.23
Mutual assistance	6.28
Co-operation between investigators/supervisors	6.34
Extradition	6.39
The Schedule 1 scheme	6.42
The foreign state scheme	6.46
The Commonwealth scheme	6.50
The Convention scheme	6.51
The special arrangements scheme	6.63
The Trial	6.64
Regulatory Consequences	6.75

### CHAPTER 7. BCCI AND THE LESSONS FOR BANK SUPERVISORS

Introduction	7.1
Recommendations for Reform	7.4
The Domestic Response	7.5
The Bank of England's response to the TCSC's reports	7.6
(a) The detection and deterrence of complex fraud	7.7
(b) The link between adherence to the "minimum criteria for authorisation" and revocation/restriction of licence	7.9
(c) The merits of local incorporation for overseas bank operations in the UK	7.11
(d) Banking supervision and the structure of banking groups	7.13
(e) International supervisory co-operation and minimum standards	7.15
(f) The role of auditors and reporting accountants in the supervisory process	7.16
The Bank of England's response to the Bingham Report	7.24

## CONTENTS

	<i>para.</i>
The International Response	7.27
The Basel Committee's response to the BCCI débâcle	7.27
The EC response	7.33
An Assessment of the Supervisory Response	7.41
An appraisal of the UK response	7.41
An appraisal of the Basel Committee's response	7.45
An appraisal of the EC response	7.51
Concluding Comments	7.53
Annex 1: Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) Timetable of Events: 1972–1992	
Annex 2: Supervisory Arrangements, Recommendations and Reforms	

### CHAPTER 8. OPERATIONAL RISK IN BANKING INSTITUTIONS

Introduction	8.1
Internal Control Systems and Operational Risk	8.6
Regulatory Guidance on Internal Controls and the Internal Audit Function	8.17
US banking supervision and internal control systems	8.17
The shift to internal control systems and risk-based supervision	8.17
Interagency Statement on the Internal Audit Function and Outsourcing Arrangements	8.20
(a) Sound practices for the internal audit function	8.21
(b) Internal audit outsourcing arrangements	8.22
(c) External auditor independence	8.25
(d) Supervisory guidance	8.31
Basel Committee Framework for Internal Controls	8.34
(a) Background	8.34
(b) Core principles of internal control systems	8.37
(c) External auditors	8.41
(d) Evaluation of internal control systems	8.42
(e) Internal controls and operational risk	8.45
Operational Risk Management	8.46
Operational risk defined	8.46
Operational risk accountability and measurement	8.47
Capital requirements for operational risk	8.53
Risk-Focused Supervision of Global Banking Institutions	8.55
The LCBO supervision programme	8.56
Supervision by public–private partnership	8.57
Conclusions and Perspectives	8.62

### CHAPTER 9. BANKS, MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Introduction	9.1
The Directive Preventing Money Launderers from Using the EC Financial System	9.2

## CONTENTS

The Implementation of the Directive in the Member States	<i>para.</i> 9.52
Problems encountered in the Directive's implementation	9.58
(a) The case of Spain	9.59
(b) The case of Austria	9.62
Other Activities Aiming at Curbing Money Laundering	9.74
The European Police Office (EUROPOL)	9.74
The Extradition Convention	9.84
The Directive's Future	9.87
Conclusions	9.92

### CHAPTER 10. MONEY LAUNDERING AND BANKING INSTITUTIONS: THE US FRAMEWORK

Introduction	10.1
US Influence and International Anti-Money-Laundering Initiatives	10.5
Other Basel documents	10.8
The US Anti-Money-Laundering Framework	10.19
Bank Secrecy Act	10.19
The Currency Transaction Report (CTR)	10.21
The International Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments Report (CMIR)	10.22
Money Laundering Control Act (MLCA)	10.23
MLCA section 1956	10.24
(a) Section 1956(a)(1): The crime of using financial transactions in laundering money	10.25
(b) Section 1956(a)(2): The crime of transporting laundered funds across United States borders	10.33
(c) Section 1956(a)(3): Crime as a product of money-laundering sting operations	10.35
MLCA section 1957	10.36
FATF Recommendations and CICAD Regulations	10.37
MLCA anti-structuring provisions	10.38
MLCA forfeiture provisions	10.41
Anti-money-laundering legislation of 1988	10.46
The "\$3,000 record-keeping requirement"	10.47
Geographical targeting orders	10.48
US Anti-Money-Laundering Framework (Post-BCCI)	10.49
Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money-Laundering Act	10.49
Penalties for violations of money-laundering laws	10.50
Expansion of BSA provisions	10.53
Public-private partnerships with financial institutions	10.55
(a) Suspicious activity reporting requirements	10.56
(b) Know-your-customer programmes	10.62
Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994 (MLSA)	10.65
CTR filing requirements	10.66
Money-transmitting businesses	10.70

## CONTENTS

	<i>para.</i>
Structuring transactions	10.73
Extraterritorial Application of the US Money-Laundering Framework	10.74
Section 1956(f)	10.75
Bank secrecy jurisdictions	10.77
GAO Report on Offshore Private Banking Activities	10.78
US Anti-Money-Laundering Framework: Current Perspectives	10.81
Anti-money-laundering legislative proposals and foreign bank litigation	10.81
US “know your customer” regulations	10.87
Wire transfers and the layering dilemma	10.93
US National Money Laundering Strategy	10.97
Conclusion	10.101
<b>CHAPTER 11. THE UNITED STATES’ PERSPECTIVE ON “BANK FRAUD”</b>	
Introduction	11.1
The Federal Criminal Law Arsenal	11.5
Bank bribery	11.6
Misapplication of funds; embezzlement	11.14
Loans	11.25
Cheques	11.26
Nominee-borrowers	11.29
False entries	11.31
Overvaluation	11.45
Mail fraud and wire fraud	11.52
Bank fraud	11.60
Bank larceny	11.66
Complicity statutes	11.69
Aiding and abetting	11.70
Conspiracy	11.73
RICO	11.75
Money laundering	11.79
Failure to comply with reporting requirements	11.81
Federal forfeiture statutes	11.84
Interplay of Civil and Criminal Statutes	11.88
Overview of formal enforcement process	11.89
(a) Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 (“FISA”)	11.90
(b) Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 (“FIRA”)	11.92
(c) Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”)	11.93
Subject matter embrace	11.94
Sanctions and penalties	11.96
(d) Comprehensive Thrift and Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 1990 (1990 Crime and Control Act)	11.113
Civil dimensions	11.114
Criminal dimensions (including “kingpin” statutes)	11.115

## CONTENTS

	<i>para.</i>
(e) Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991	11.120
Certain interconnections	11.123
(a) Civil proceedings as basis for criminal proceedings	11.124
(b) Institution-affiliated parties charged with a felony	11.125
(c) Persons convicted of a crime involving dishonesty or breach of trust	11.130
(d) Civil penalties for criminal violations	11.133
(e) Civil and criminal forfeiture	11.136
(f) “Double jeopardy”	11.138
(g) “Whistleblower protection” and informant encouragement	11.139
Selected Concluding Observations	11.141
Professionals	11.141
Foreign banks	11.150
Globalisation	11.153

### CHAPTER 12. FINANCIAL FRAUD AND CRIME AND LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN BANK AND THRIFT CRISIS

Financial Fraud and Financial Institution Insolvency in America: Late 1980s and Early 1990s	12.5
Bank Insolvency and Crime—A Brief History	12.23
Currency	12.28
The “Special Relationship” between Government and Banking	12.33
Bank Balance Sheets, Income Statements and Leverage	12.37
Legislation, Bank Deregulation and Asset Value Inflation	12.38
The Turning Point	12.42
Legislation, Bank Reregulation and Asset Value Deflation	12.45
Sharing Losses	12.49
Observations and Lessons	12.55
(a) Financial fraud and crime: a deliberate policy of government misdirection	12.56
(b) Currency instability and debasement is the fundamental problem	12.57
(c) The special relationship between American government and banking is insidious and dangerous to economic stability and sustained growth	12.58
(d) Lack of transparency in the special relationship between American government and banking leads to misdirection in responding to banking crises	12.59
(e) Due to the lack of transparency in the special relationship, government had no incentive to recognise the origins of crises of bank distress and deal with them effectively	12.60
(f) The interconnectedness of acts of government intervention and economic performance affecting bank solvency must be recognised and respected	12.61
(g) In America and other democratic countries the citizens are ultimately responsible for assuring government responsibility and accountability	12.62
(h) Future change is possible	12.63
(i) Change is vital in emerging economies	12.64



## CONTENTS

	<i>para.</i>
(j) Do not be misled by the recent American economic recovery	12.65
The FDIC Report Begs the Question: Fraud and Financial Misconduct as an Aside	12.66
International Financial Institutions and Bank Distress	12.77
Report of the Working Party on Financial Stability in Emerging Market Economies; The Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision	12.77
The IMF and global bail-out policy	12.82
Some Suggestions for Reform	12.89
(a) Eliminate the prime act of government intervention: stabilise currencies	12.89
(b) Decriminalise what is essentially a complex economic and policy mistake	12.91
(c) Let well-debated and predictable loss sharing mechanisms work as intended	12.92
(d) Responsibility	12.94
(e) Summary	12.97
Annex: A Brief Chronology of the American Bank and Thrift Crisis	

### CHAPTER 13. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT FINANCIAL FRAUD AND CRIME

Introduction	13.1
International Initiatives	13.6
International organisations	13.8
(a) World Trade Organisation (WTO)	13.8
(b) Group of Seven/Eight (G-7/8)	13.10
(c) United Nations	13.12
General Assembly	13.12
UNCITRAL	13.15
(d) Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)	13.17
International non-governmental organisations (NGOs)	13.25
(a) International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)	13.26
(b) Transparency International (TI)	13.30
(c) International Bar Association (IBA)	13.33
International financial institutions	13.34
(a) World Bank	13.35
(b) International Finance Corporation (IFC)	13.46
(c) Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)	13.50
(d) International Monetary Fund (IMF)	13.52
International financial organisations	13.56
(a) Basel Committee on Banking Supervision	13.57
(b) International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)	13.58
(c) International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC)	13.61
(d) Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on money laundering	13.62
Regional Initiatives	13.63

## CONTENTS

	<i>para.</i>
Europe	13.64
(a) European Union (EU)	13.64
European Commission (EC)	13.64
Bribery and corruption	13.64
Investment Services Directive (ISD)	13.67
European Parliament	13.71
(b) Council of Europe	13.72
Other regional initiatives	13.75
(a) Organisation of American States (OAS)	13.75
Domestic Initiatives	13.82
United Kingdom	13.85
(a) Corporate governance: Cadbury, Greenbury and Hempel Reports	13.86
(b) Securities and Investment Board (SIB) (now reconstituted as the FSA)	13.90
(c) Financial Services Authority (FSA)	13.93
United States	13.94
(a) Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)	13.95
(b) Legislative proposals	13.100
Fair Trade Practices Act (FTPA Bill)	13.100
“FCPA of 1996”	13.101
(c) Non-legislative activities	13.102
Anti-Corruption Report	13.102
Model Business Principles	13.103
Export–Import Bank (Ex Im Bank)	13.106
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)	13.107
Canada: the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act	13.108
Private Initiatives	13.112
Companies	13.112
(a) General Electric (GE)	13.113
(b) Levi Strauss & Co.	13.118
(c) Reebok	13.120
(d) United Technologies Corporation (UTC)	13.121
(e) W.W. Grainger, Inc.	13.124
(f) Boeing	13.127
Organisations	13.132
(a) American Bar Association (ABA)	13.132
(b) Business for Social Responsibility (BSR)	13.133
(c) International Business Ethics Institute	13.136
The EBRD’s Response to Financial Fraud and Corruption	13.139
The procurement process	13.151
Due diligence and project monitoring, including guarding against money laundering	13.160
(a) Prevention of financial fraud in EBRD operations	13.161
(b) Prevention of money laundering in EBRD operations	13.164
Legal reform activities	13.172
(a) Corporate governance	13.172
(b) Financial markets reform	13.175

## CONTENTS

	<i>para.</i>
(c) Investment climate working group	13.176
Co-operation in international efforts to combat financial fraud and corruption	13.178
Conclusion	13.182
CHAPTER 14. INTERNET PAYMENT SERVICES AND CRIME IN CYBERSPACE	
Introduction	14.1
Internet Payment Services	14.5
Cryptographic Security: "Prevention Being Better ..."	14.12
Computer Crime: Citibank and the St Petersburg Connection	14.19
Criminal Offences	14.24
Jurisdiction	14.30
Enforcement	14.33
Forensic issues	14.34
Evidence	14.39
Conclusions	14.42
	<i>page</i>
APPENDICES	
Appendix 1. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Statement on Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money Laundering	405
Appendix 2. EC Money Laundering Directive	409
Appendix 3. The Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)	417
Appendix 4. Criminal Justice Act 1993: Sections 29–35, Amending Criminal Justice Act 1988, Sections 93A–93F	425
Appendix 5. The Money Laundering Regulations 1993, SI 1993/1933	431
Appendix 6. Extracts from the Financial Services Authority's A Guide to Banking Supervisory Policy, Volume 2	447
<i>Index</i>	455