COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN SINGAPORE

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Contents

Foreword vii
Preface ix
Table of Cases xxi
Table of Legislation xxxi
Other Sources Referred To xxxix

Chapter 1  Competition Policy and Law  1
By Cavinder Bull SC, Lim Chong Kin and Ng Ee Kia

A. Introduction 1
1. Benefits of competition 1
2. Objectives of competition policy and law 3
3. Scope of competition law 3
4. State of development of competition law 4

B. Singapore’s approach towards competition 6

C. Why competition law in Singapore? 7
1. Free trade agreements 7
2. Recommendations by the Economic Review Committee 8

D. Objectives and scope of Competition Act 10

E. Phased implementation of Competition Act 13

F. The Competition Commission of Singapore 14
1. Structure of the Competition Commission of Singapore 14
2. Functions and duties 14
3. Investigator, adjudicator and enforcer 15
4. Government adviser 16
5. Competition advocate 17
6. Administrative priorities 17

G. The Competition Commission of Singapore enforcement philosophy 17
1. Focus on anti-competitive activities with appreciable adverse effect on competition 18
2. Due consideration for net economic benefit/efficiencies 18
Chapter 2  Market Definition  25

By Ng Ee Kia

A.  Introduction 25
   1. Purpose of market definition in competition assessment 26

B.  Basic principles of market definition 30
   1. The hypothetical monopolist test 30
   2. Steps to applying the hypothetical monopolist test 31
   3. Product and geographic dimensions 33
      (a) Product market 34
          (i) Demand-side substitution 34
          (ii) Price discrimination 38
          (iii) Chains of substitution 40
          (iv) Supply-side substitution 41
      (b) Geographic market 43
          (i) Demand-side substitution 44
          (ii) Supply-side substitution 45
          (iii) Imports 46
   4. Temporal markets 47

C.  Other issues when defining market 48
   1. Differentiated products 48
   2. Bundling 50
   3. Indirect substitution 50
   4. Market definition for after markets 52
      (a) After markets 52
   5. Innovation markets 54

D.  Common problems when defining the market 55
   1. Identifying competitive price 55
      (a) The cellophane fallacy 56
      (b) Resolving the cellophane fallacy 57
   2. Narrow market definitions for after markets 58
   3. Reliance on previous cases 60
   4. Defining markets independent of competition issue 60
Chapter 3 Anti-competitive Agreements

By Richard Whish

A. Introduction

B. Plan of this chapter

C. Prohibition of anti-competitive agreements

1. Undertakings
   (a) Basic meaning of undertaking
   (b) Need for “functional approach” to undertaking term
   (c) EC law: Non-economic activities
      (i) Exercise of public powers
      (ii) Solidarity
      (iii) Purchase of goods or services for purpose of carrying out non-economic activity
   (d) The “single economic entity” doctrine

2. Agreements, decisions and concerted practices

   (a) Agreements
      (i) Agreement requires concurrence of wills
      (ii) Concept of “single overall agreement”
      (iii) Risks of attending meetings with competitors
   (b) Decisions by associations of undertakings
   (c) Concerted practices

3. Object or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition

   (a) “Object or effect” to be read disjunctively
   (b) “Object”
   (c) “Effect”
   (d) Comment on “object or effect” distinction
   (e) Appreciable adverse effect on competition
   (f) Exclusions, in particular of vertical agreements

4. “Within Singapore”

5. Section 34(2): Statutory examples of anti-competitive agreements

6. Additional examples of anti-competitive agreements in Section 34 Guidelines

   (a) Directly or indirectly fixing prices
   (b) Bid-rigging
(c) Sharing markets 97
(d) Limiting or controlling production or investment 98
(e) Fixing trading conditions 98
(f) Joint purchasing or selling 98
(g) Sharing information 99
(h) Exchanging price information 99
(i) Exchanging non-price information 100
(j) Restricting advertising 101
(k) Setting technical or design standards 101

7. Licences of intellectual property rights 102
   (a) The Competition Commission of Singapore's
       "General Framework for Assessing Licensing
       Agreements" 102
   (b) Appreciable adverse effect on competition test 104
   (c) Application of the section 34 prohibition to
       particular licensing restraints or arrangements 105
       (i) Autonomy of licensees to engage in
           independent R&D 106
       (ii) Grantbacks 106
       (iii) Territorial and field-of-use restrictions 106
       (iv) Licensing agreements involving exclusivity 106
       (v) Technology pools 107

8. Section 33(2) and other regulatory regimes 107

D. Exclusions 109
1. Exclusions 109
   (a) Services of general economic interest 109
   (b) Compliance with legal requirements 110
   (c) Avoidance of conflict with international
       obligations 110
   (d) Public policy 111
   (e) Goods and services regulated by other
       competition law 111
   (f) Specified activities 112
   (g) Clearing houses 112
   (h) Vertical agreements 112
       (i) "For the purposes of the agreement" 113
       (ii) Licences of intellectual property rights 114
   (i) Agreements with net economic benefit 114
       (i) "Contributes to improving production or
           distribution; or promoting technical or
           economic progress" 115
(ii) "But which does not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of those objectives" 116

(iii) "Afford the undertakings concerned the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the goods or services in question" 116

(iv) Paragraph 9 in practice 117

(j) Agreements directly related and necessary to implementation of mergers 117

(k) Mergers 117

2. Section 2(2) of the Competition Act 117

E. Block exemptions 118

F. Notification for guidance and/or decision 119
   1. Notification for guidance 119
   2. Notification for decision 120

G. The section 34 prohibition in practice 121
   1. Pest control services 121
   2. Singapore Medical Association 123
   3. Fa Gao 123
   4. Singapore School Transport Association 124
   5. The Institute of Estate Agents 124
   6. Qantas & British Airways Restated Joint Services Agreement 125
   7. Qantas & Orangestar Co-operation Agreement 125

Chapter 4 Abuse of a Dominant Position 129

By Richard Whish

A. Introduction 129

B. Plan of this chapter 130

C. Text of section 47 of the Competition Act 131

D. Meaning of "dominant position" 131
   1. Dominance and substantial market power 132
   2. Assessing dominance 133
      (a) Existing competitors 133
      (b) Potential competitors 135
      (c) Other factors 136
   3. Collective dominance 137

E. Abuse 138
   1. Examples of conduct that may amount to abuse 139
      (a) Predatory behaviour 140
(i) Average variable cost 140
(ii) Average total cost 141
(iii) Recoupment 141
(b) Discounts 142
(c) Price discrimination 143
(d) Margin squeeze 143
(e) Vertical restraints 145
(f) Refusals to supply 146
(g) Can excessively high prices be abusive? 147
2. Defences 148
3. Abuse in related markets 149
4. Abuse of dominance and intellectual property rights 149
F. Exclusions 151
G. Notification for guidance and/or decision 151
H. The section 47 prohibition in practice 152

Chapter 5 Mergers 153

By Lim Chong Kin and Yu Ken Li

A. Introduction 153
B. Prohibition of anti-competitive mergers 154
1. Merger 155
   (a) Mergers between previously independent undertakings 155
   (b) Acquisition of control 156
      (i) Legal control 157
      (ii) De facto control 157
      (iii) Exceptions 159
   (c) Joint ventures 160
      (i) Joint control 160
         (A) Equal voting rights or appointment to decision-making bodies 160
         (B) Veto rights 161
         (C) Joint exercise of voting rights 161
      (ii) Performing functions of autonomous economic entity 162
         (iii) Lasting basis 163
2. Substantial lessening of competition test 164
   (a) Introduction to substantial lessening of competition 164
   (b) Test of substantial lessening of competition – The appropriate counterfactual 165
      (i) Market definition 166
      (ii) Merger effects on market power 167
(iii) Merger effects on market concentration and structure 167

(c) Factors in assessing substantial lessening of competition in horizontal mergers 169
   (i) Non-coordinated effects 169
   (ii) Co-ordinated effects 169

(d) Factors in assessing substantial lessening of competition in non-horizontal mergers 170
   (i) Vertical mergers 171
      (A) Foreclosure risks 171
      (B) Other competitive harms associated with vertical mergers 172
   (ii) Substantial lessening of competition in conglomerate mergers 172

(e) Factors which could mitigate substantial lessening of competition of a merger 173
   (i) Ease of entry of new firms and expansion of existing firms 173
   (ii) Countervailing buyer power 174
   (iii) Efficiencies (increased rivalry) 174
   (iv) Failing firm/Division defence 175

C. Exclusions and exemptions 176
   1. Exclusions in the Fourth Schedule 176
   2. Exemption under public interest considerations 179
   3. Notified ancillary restrictions 179

D. Notification of mergers 180
   1. Merger and anticipated mergers 180
   2. Comments on Singapore’s voluntary notification system 181
   3. Global mergers and the need to notify in Singapore 183

E. Notification 184
   1. Merger notification process 184
      (a) Pre-notification discussions 184
      (b) Informal advice on mergers 185
      (c) Submission of completed merger notification application 186
      (d) Competition Commission of Singapore’s request for additional information 188
   2. Competition Commission of Singapore’s decision 188
      (a) Favourable decisions 188
      (b) Unfavourable decisions 189

F. Remedies for dealing with prohibited mergers and anticipated mergers 190
   1. Structural and behavioural remedies 190
   2. Implementing remedies – Directions and commitments 191
Chapter 6 Investigations, Enforcement and Rights of Private Action

By Cavinder Bull SC and Chia Voon jie

A. Introduction 197

B. Investigations 197

1. Investigations distinguished from preliminary inquiries 198

2. Commencement of investigation 200
   (a) Complaints 201
   (b) Whistleblowers 204
   (c) The Competition Commission of Singapore initiated 205
   (d) Overseas competition authorities 205

3. Investigative powers of the Competition Commission of Singapore 206
   (a) Production of documents and information 206
      (i) Documents 207
      (ii) Information 208
      (iii) Written notice 209
   (b) Enter premises without warrant 211
      (i) Entry with prior written notice 212
      (ii) Entry without prior notice 212
      (iii) Powers upon entry 214
   (c) Enter and search premises with warrant 215
      (i) Form of the warrant 216
      (ii) Powers upon entry 217
   (d) Safeguards 217
      (i) Legal professional privilege 218
      (ii) Privilege against self-incrimination 220
      (iii) Confidentiality 221
      (iv) Right to legal representation 222
   (e) Offences 223

4. Interim measures 225
   (a) Conditions 225
   (b) Procedure 227
   (c) Informal assurances 227

5. Leniency application 228
   (a) Procedure 230
   (b) Conditions for leniency 231
      (i) First to come forward with evidence 231
      (ii) Full disclosure and co-operation 234
C. Enforcement

1. Proposed infringement decisions
2. Directions
   (a) Procedure
   (b) Enforcement
3. Penalties
   (a) Procedure
   (b) Intentionally or negligently
      (i) Intention
      (ii) Negligence
   (c) Amount of penalty
      (i) Stage 1: Seriousness of infringement and relevant turnover
      (ii) Stage 2: Duration of infringement
      (iii) Stage 3: Other relevant factors
      (iv) Stage 4: Aggravating and mitigating factors
      (v) Stage 5: Statutory limit not to be exceeded
   (d) Liability for payment

D. Appeals against decisions of the Competition Commission of Singapore

1. Competition Appeal Board
   (a) Appealable decisions
   (b) Procedure
   (c) Effect of an appeal
   (d) Powers of the Competition Appeal Board
   (e) Decisions of the Competition Appeal Board
2. High Court and Court of Appeal
   (a) High Court
      (i) Amount of financial penalty
      (ii) Point of law
   (b) Court of Appeal

E. Rights of private action

1. Parties who have a right of private action
   (a) Indirect loss
   (b) Parties to anti-competitive agreements
2. When right of private action arises
3. Remedies
   (a) Damages
      (i) Restitution
      (ii) Exemplary damages
   (b) Other remedies
4. Breach of statutory duty?
Contents

F. Judicial review
   1. Supervisory jurisdiction of the court in judicial review 275
   2. Grounds of judicial review 276
   3. Standing to apply for judicial review 277
   4. Procedure 280
   5. Remedies 281

Index 283