## The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Foreword	vii
	Authors' preface	xi
	Table of cases	xxv
	Table of legislation	lxiii
1.	INTRODUCTION, SCOPE OF APPLICATION, AND BASIC FRAMEWORK	1
1.1	INTRODUCTION	1
1.2	HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND MODERNISATION OF ARTICLE 82 EC	7
	<ul> <li>1.2.1 The Historical Context Of Article 82 EC.</li> <li>1.2.2 Development Of Article 82 EC.</li> <li>1.2.3 The Modernisation Of Article 82 EC.</li> </ul>	12
1.3	ENTITIES AND ACTIVITIES BOUND BY ARTICLE 82 EC	21
	1.3.1 The Definition Of An Undertaking	21 22
	1.3.1.3 Sporting and cultural activities	28
1.4	RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARTICLE 82 EC AND OTHER LEGAL INSTRUMENTS	36
	<ul> <li>1.4.1 Article 82 EC And General Principles of Community Law</li> <li>1.4.2 The Relationship Between Article 82 EC And Article 81 EC</li> <li>1.4.3 Article 82 EC And Merger Control Laws</li></ul>	38 39 42 45
1.5	THE BASIC PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK	52
	<ul> <li>1.5.1 Cooperation Within The Network Of Competition Authorities</li></ul>	56 57
	1.5.6 Sector Inquiries	

2.	MARKET DEFINITION	63
2.1	INTRODUCTION	63
2.2	PRODUCT MARKET DEFINITION: BASIC CONCEPTS	69
	2.2.1 Demand-Side Substitution	69
	2.2.2 Supply-Side Substitution	
	2.2.3 Chains of Substitution	75
2.3	RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKETS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE	76
	2.3.1 Hypothetical Monopolist Test: Overview	76
	2.3.2 Assessing Demand-Side Substitution Under The HMT	
	2.3.2.1 Quantitative techniques	
	2.3.2.2 Qualitative evidence	
	2.3.2.3 Other sources of evidence	
	2.3.3 Assessing Supply-Side Substitution Under The HMT	89
2.4	GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DEFINITION	91
	2.4.1 Key Concepts	91
	2.4.2 Defining Geographic Markets In Practice	93
2.5	SELECTED ISSUES ON MARKET DEFINITION	98
	2.5.1 Impact Of Price Discrimination On Market Definition	98
	2.5.2 Market Definition In Tying And Bundling Cases	100
	2.5.3 Aftermarkets	
	2.5.4 Market Definition In Two-Sided Industries	105
3.	DOMINANCE	107
3.1	INTRODUCTION	107
3.2	SINGLE FIRM DOMINANCE	108
	3.2.1 Basic Approach	108
	3.2.2 The Starting Point: Market Shares	
	3.2.3 Barriers To Entry And Expansion	116
	3.2.3.1 Definition of barriers to entry	
	3.2.3.2 Characteristics inherent in the relevant market	119
	3.2.3.3 Characteristics specific to the allegedly dominant	104
	firm	
	3.2.3.4 Conduct of the allegedly dominant firm	
	<ul><li>3.2.4 Countervailing Buyer Power</li><li>3.2.5 Evidence Of Actual Competition On The Relevant Market</li></ul>	134
	3.2.6 Conclusion	
3.3	COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE	
	3.3.1 Introduction	
	3.3.2 The Economics Of Collective Dominance	137

	3.3.2.1 Firms have the incentive to avoid competing	139
	3.3.2.2 Reaching and maintaining a tacit agreement	1.41
	is feasible	
	3.3.3 Legal Principles Governing Collective Dominance	
	3.3.3.1 Evolution	
	3.3.3.2 Establishing collective dominance under Article 82 EC	
	3.3.3 Selected Issues On Collective Dominance	151
3.4	DOMINANT BUYERS	165
3.5	"SUPERDOMINANCE"	166
3.6	COMPARING DOMINANCE UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC AND OTHER COMMUNITY LEGISLATION	169
3.7	SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE COMMON MARKET	
4.	THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF AN ABUSE	
4.1	INTRODUCTION	174
4.2	THE ECONOMICS OF ABUSIVE UNILATERAL CONDUCT	178
	4.2.1 Evolution Of Economic Thinking On Unilateral Conduct	178
	4.2.2 Designing Economically Optimal Rules For	
	Unilateral Conduct	
	4.2.3.1 The profit sacrifice test and its close relations	
	4.2.3.2 Equally efficient competitor test	
	4.2.3.3 Consumer welfare test	
4.3	THE CATEGORIES OF ABUSE UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC	194
	4.3.1 Exploitative Abuses (Article 82(a))	195
	4.3.2 Exclusionary Abuses (Article 82(b))	
	4.3.3 Discriminatory Abuses (Article 82(c))	202
	4.3.4 Tying Abuses (Article 82(d))	
	4.3.5 Leveraging Abuses	207
	4.3.6 The List Of Abuses In Article 82 EC: Illustrative Or Exhaustive?	213
4.4	ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC	215
	4.4.1 The Need For Causation Between Dominance And The Ab	use215
	4.4.2 The Standard For Anticompetitive Effects Under Article 82	EC217
	4.4.3 Identifying Actual Or Likely Anticompetitive Effects	
	4.4.4 Harm To Consumers Under The Four Clauses Of Article	
	82 EC	224

xviii

	4.4.5 The Role Of Intent Evidence	225
4.5	OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION	227
_		
5.	PREDATORY PRICING	
5.1	INTRODUCTION	235
5.2	THE ECONOMICS OF PREDATORY PRICING2	236
	5.2.1 Basic Cost Definitions	
5.3	THE BASIC RULES ON BELOW-COST PRICE CUTTING UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC	245
	5.3.1 Pricing Below AVC	246
	5.3.2 Pricing Above AVC/AAC But Below ATC	249
5.4	SPECIFIC ISSUES WITH BELOW-COST PRICING UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC	252
	5.4.1 Recoupment	253
	5.4.2 Dealing With Joint And Common Costs	260
	5.4.3 Cross-Subsidies	
	5.4.4 Situations Involving High Fixed And Low Variable Costs	209
	Losses	272
5.5	EXCLUSIONARY ABOVE-COST PRICE CUTS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC	274
5.6	OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION2	283
•••	5.6.1 Introduction	
	5.6.2 Meeting Competition 2	
	5.6.3 Short-Term Promotional Offers	290
	5.6.4 Market-Expanding Efficiencies	292
	5.6.5 Loss-Leading And "Follow On" Revenues	
	5.6.6 Excess Capacity And Loss-Minimising	
	5.0.7 Miscendicous Defences	,01
6.	MARGIN SQUEEZE	303
6.1	INTRODUCTION	303
6.2	THE ECONOMICS OF MARGIN SQUEEZE	304
	6.2.1 Types Of Margin Squeeze	304
	6.2.2 Basic Economic Conditions For A Margin Squeeze	305
	6.2.3 Anticompetitive Motivation For A Margin Squeeze	
6.3	BASIC LEGAL CONDITIONS FOR A MARGIN SQUEEZE3	309

6.4	THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARGIN SQUEEZE AND OTHER ABUSES321
	6.4.1 Margin Squeeze And Excessive Pricing
6.5	DIFFICULTIES WITH IDENTIFYING AN ANTICOMPETITIVE MARGIN SQUEEZE IN PRACTICE327
6.6	DISCRIMINATORY MARGIN SQUEEZES AND RELATED STRATEGIES
	6.6.1 Problem Stated
6.7	CONFLICTS BETWEEN REGULATION AND COMPETITION LAW IN MARGIN SQUEEZE CASES345
7.	EXCLUSIVE DEALING, LOYALTY DISCOUNTS, AND RELATED PRACTICES
7.1	INTRODUCTION351
7.2	EXCLUSIVE DEALING352
	7.2.1 Economics of Exclusive Dealing
	7.2.2.2 Assessing exclusive dealing under Article 82 EC361
	7.2.3 Practices Falling Short Of Outright Exclusivity
7.3	LOYALTY DISCOUNTS
	7.3.1 Economics of Loyalty Discounts
	loyalty discounts393
	7.3.3 Objective Justification
7.4	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION403
8.	REFUSAL TO DEAL
<b>Q</b> 1	INTRODUCTION 407

8.2	THE ECONOMICS OF REFUSAL TO DEAL	415
	8.2.1 IP Rights	
8.3	THE DUTY TO DEAL WITH COMPETITORS	423
	<ul> <li>8.3.1 Evolution Of The Decisional Practice And Case Law</li> <li>8.3.2 The Legal Conditions For A Duty To Deal With Rivals Under Article 82 EC</li> </ul>	•
	8.3.2.1 First contracts or licences	
	8.3.2.2 How many contracts must be concluded by the dominant firm	
	8.3.2.3 Terminating a course of dealing	
	8.3.2.4 Relevance of the source and perceived value of the property right	462
8.4	DUTY TO DEAL WITH CUSTOMERS UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC	
	8.4.1 The Duty To Supply Inputs To Customers	
	8.4.2 Refusals To Deal Arising At The Level Of Distribution	
	Or Resale	
	8.4.3 Refusal To Deal And Parallel Trade	471
9.	TYING AND BUNDLING	477
9.1.	INTRODUCTION	477
9.2	THE ECONOMICS OF TYING AND BUNDLING	480
	9.2.1 Efficiency Motivations	481
	9.2.2 Possible Anticompetitive Motivations	483
	9.2.3 Empirical Evidence	489
	9.2.4 Conclusions	491
9.3	THE APPROACH TO TYING AND BUNDLING UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC	491
	9.3.1 Contractual Tying	492
	9.3.2 Technological Tying	495
	9.3.3 <i>Microsoft</i>	496
	9.3.4 Mixed Bundling	
	9.3.4.1 Overview	
	9.3.5 Tying In Aftermarkets	508
	9.3.6 Classifying the overall approach to tying under Article 82 EC	
9.4	SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO TYING	
9.5	CONCLUSIONS	517

10.	EXCLUSIONARY NON-PRICE ABUSES	519
10.1	INTRODUCTION	519
10.2	EXAMPLES OF EXCLUSIONARY NON-PRICE ABUSES	522
	10.2.1 Predatory Design Changes/Product Introduction 10.2.2 Vexatious Litigation 10.2.3 Use And Abuse Of Regulatory Or Government Procedures 10.2.4 Abuses In Standard-Setting Organisations 10.2.5 Abusive Acquisition Or Accumulation Of IPRs 10.2.6 Miscellaneous Practices	526 529 535 543
11.	ABUSIVE DISCRIMINATION	552
11.1	INTRODUCTION	552
11.2	THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION	556
	11.2.1 Conditions For Price Discrimination	558
11.3	LEGAL CONDITIONS FOR ABUSIVE DISCRIMINATION	562
	11.3.1 Equivalent Transactions	567
11.4	SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF ABUSIVE DISCRIMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 82(C)	573
	11.4.1 Pure Secondary-Line Discrimination  11.4.2 Nationality Discrimination  11.4.3 Discrimination Intended To Partition National Markets  11.4.4 Most-Favoured Company Clauses  11.4.5 Discriminatory Supplies In Times Of Shortage	578 580 585
11.5	OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION	592
11.6	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION	601
12.	EXCESSIVE PRICES	603
12.1	INTRODUCTION	603
12.2	THE ECONOMICS OF EXCESSIVE PRICES	605
12.3	THE LEGAL TEST(S) FOR EXCESSIVE PRICES	608
12.4	DIFFICULTIES WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH TO EXCESSIVE PRICES UNDER ARTICLE 82 EC	621
12.5	ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO EXCESSIVE PRICING	628

xxii	Table of Contents	<u></u>
12.6	CONCLUSION	637
13.	OTHER EXPLOITATIVE ABUSES	639
13.1	INTRODUCTION	639
13.2	ABUSE OF MONOPSONY PURCHASING POWER	640
	13.2.1 Basic Economics Of Monopsony Power	
13.3	UNFAIR AND EXPLOITATIVE CONTRACT TERMS	646
	13.3.1 Reasons For A Limited Case Law	648
14.	EFFECT ON TRADE	659
14.1	INTRODUCTION	659
14.2	BASIC LEGAL CONDITIONS FOR EFFECT ON TRADE	660
14.3	SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF THE EFFECT ON TRADE CONCEPT	
	14.3.1 Abuses Covering Several Member States	
	14.3.2 Abuses Covering A Single Member State	668
	14.3.3 Abuses Covering Only A Part Of A Member State	671
	14.3.4 Abuses Concerning Trade Outside The EU	0/3
15.	REMEDIES	676
15.1	INTRODUCTION	676
15.2	GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING REMEDIES	677
	15.2.1 Objectives Of Remedies	677
	15.2.2 Remedies Must Be Effective	680
	15.2.3 Remedies Must Be Proportionate	682
15.3	PRINCIPAL TYPES OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS	683
	15.3.1 Interim Measures	683
	15.3.2 Commitment Decisions	690
	15.3.2.1 Overview	690 605
	15.3.2.2 Commitment decision procedure	699 699
	15.3.3 Undertakings	706
	15.3.4 Final Infringement Decisions	708
15.4	PRINICIPAL TYPES OF REMEDIES	
	15.4.1 Fines	

	15.4.2.1 Exclusionary pricing abuses	719
	15.4.2.2 Remedies for excessive pricing	
	15.4.2.3 Remedies in discrimination cases	
	15.4.2.4 Compulsory dealing remedies	
	15.4.2.5 Remedies in tying cases	
	15.4.3 Structural Remedies	
	15.4.3.1 Introduction and overview	
	15.4.3.2 Conditions for ordering a structural remedy	735
	15.4.3.3 Case study: Microsoft	
15.5	PRIVATE LITIGATION AND REMEDIES	739
	15.5.1 Introduction	739
	15.5.2 Goals Of Private Enforcement	
	15.5.3 Legal Basis For Private Enforcement	
	15.5.4 Obstacles To Effective Private Enforcement	
	15.5.5 Conclusion	
	Index	753