## The Morality of Conflict

Reasonable Disagreement and the Law

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OXFORD AND PORTLAND, OREGON 2005

## Contents

Acknowledgements	vi
Introduction	1
I. The issue	1
II. The significance	7
III. The approach	10
IV. The structure	12
PART ONE: THE NATURE OF DISAGREEMENT	17
1. The Notion and Types of Disagreement	19
Introduction	19
I. The notion of disagreement	19
II. The types of disagreement	22
1. Political-moral disagreement	22
2. The scope of political morality	24
a. Rawls' separation of political morality	
from comprehensive moral doctrines	25
i. Rawls' overlapping consensus	25
ii. Rawls' way out	27
iii. A revised Rawlsian model	
of political-moral disagreement	30
b. Habermas' separation of ethical-political discourse	
from moral debates	31
<ol> <li>The early Habermas and the problem</li> </ol>	
of political-moral disagreement	33
<ol><li>The late Habermas and the separation</li></ol>	
of the moral from the ethical	36
III. The fact of disagreement and the ontological challenge	39
1. The challenge	39
2. The challenge's defeasibility	41
3. Learning from the challenge	44
Conclusion	45

2.	The Sources of Disagreement and Legal Indeterminacy	47
	Introduction	47
	I. The sources of disagreement	47
	1. Verbal lack of agreement	48
	2. Conceptual disagreement	48
	a. Borderline disagreement	50
	b. Pivotal disagreement	51
	3. Normative disagreement	52
	a. Epistemic disagreement	53
	b. Metaphysical disagreement	54
	<ol> <li>From value conflict to metaphysical disagreement</li> </ol>	54
	ii. Types of metaphysical disagreement	55
	II. From moral disagreement to legal indeterminacy	57
	1. The debate	57
	2. The notion of indeterminacy	59
	a. Indeterminacy, uncertainty and objectivity	59
	b. From moral to legal indeterminacy	62
	c. Types of legal indeterminacy	64
	3. The relationship between disagreement and legal indeterminacy	65
	Conclusion	66
3.	The Essential Contestability of Normative Concepts	69
	Introduction	69
	I. The concept of 'essentially contestable concept'	72
	II. The sources of essential contestability	74
	Verbal lack of agreement	75
	2. Conceptual disagreement	75
	a. Borderline disagreement	75
	b. Pivotal disagreement	78
	3. Normative disagreement	80
	III. Minimal agreement in understanding and disputable paradigms	81
	Minimal agreement in understanding	82
	2. The disputability of paradigms	84
	3. Shared paradigms and conceptual truth	86
	Conclusion	88
4.	The Reasonableness of Disagreement	91
	Introduction	91
	I. The notion of reasonableness	91
	1. Three caveats	92

			Contents	xi
		2. Four distinctions		93
		a. Reasonableness and rationali	ty	93
		b. Public reasonableness and pri	vate reasonableness	95
		c. Person-based reasonableness		
		and content-based reasonable		96
		i. The distinction in general		96
		ii. The person-based accoun		97
		iii. The content-based accour		98
		d. Actualist reasonableness and	probabilistic reasonableness	99
		3. Three illustrations		101
		a. Rawls' partisan conception of	_	101
		<ul><li>b. Habermas' transcendental co</li><li>c. Gutmann and Thompson's re</li></ul>	-	103
		of public reason	ciprocar conception	104
	TT	<del>-</del>		
	11.	The significance of reason		105
		1. The value of the reasonable		105 106
		<ul><li>a. A pragmatic legitimation: stal</li><li>b. An epistemological legitimation</li></ul>	, .	107
		c. A moral legitimation: mutual		107
		i. Individual justification	,	108
		ii. Public justification		108
		2. The limits of the reasonable		110
	III.	The burdens of reason		111
	IV.	The implications of reasonable disagr	eement	113
	-	1. The challenge of internal scepticis		113
		2. From the inconclusiveness of pub	lic reason	
		to alternative modes of political le	gitimation	115
		3. The benefits of reasonable plurali	sm and the living rule of law	116
	Co	nclusion		118
DA	י ידם	TWO: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DISA	CDEEMENT	121
5.	Th	e State of Nature Fiction		123
		Introduction		123
	I.	The fiction as argument		124
		1. General		124
		2. Setting the scene: the state of natural	<del></del>	126
		a. Hobbes' state of nature		126
		b. Rousseau's state of nature		128 131
		<ul><li>c. Kant's state of nature</li><li>d. Hume's state of nature</li></ul>		131 133
		<ul><li>a. Hume's state of nature</li><li>3. Introducing the problem: the exte</li></ul>		137
		J. Introducing the problem, the exte	in or alpagreement	/

			a. Hobbes' account of the extent of disagreement	137
			b. Rousseau's account of the extent of disagreement	139
			c. Kant's account of the extent of disagreement	141
			d. Hume's account of the extent of disagreement	145
		4.	Judging the situation: the significance of disagreement	147
			a. Hobbes' account of the significance of disagreement	147
			b. Rousseau's account of the significance of disagreement	149
			c. Kant's account of the significance of disagreement	151
			d. Hume's account of the significance of disagreement	152
	II.	So	me non-fictional objections	155
		1.	From the conceptual truth to the fact of disagreement	155
		2.	Some empirical objections	156
	Co	ncl	usion	159
6.	Di	sagı	reement as a Source of Coordination Problems	161
			uction	161
	I.	Co	ordination problems and why we need to solve them	164
		1.	The need for coordination	164
			a. The desirability of coordination	165
			b. The possibility of coordination	167
		2.		168
			a. General considerations of collective action	168
			b. The Prisoner's Dilemma	171
			c. Pure coordination problems	172
			d. Partial conflict coordination problems	173
		3.	The resolution of coordination problems	176
			a. The need to solve coordination problems and	
			the moral case for determinatio	176
			b. From the need to coordinate to the reasons	
			to solve coordination problems	178
			c. Conscious coordination	
			and the reasonableness of the options	179
	II.	La	w as a way of contributing to securing coordination	181
		1.	On legal coordination in general	182
			a. From natural to collective coordination	182
			b. From informal to formal coordination	185
		2.	First-level coordination: the constitution of a legal order	186
			a. The argument	187
			b. The challenges	189
			i. From convergent behaviour to rule	190
			ii. Coordination and pivotal disagreement	192
		3.	Second-level coordination: the constitution	
			of law-making procedures	195

	Contents	xiii
4. Third-level coordination: the constitution of concrete	e laws	195
III. Coordination as law's main function		197
1. The argument		198
2. The challenges		200
a. The absence of all-encompassing concerted action	1	200
b. The absence of all-encompassing need for coopera		201
Conclusion		203
PART THREE: THE RESPONSE TO DISAGREEMENT		205
SECTION ONE: LAW-MAKING PROCEDURES		207
7. Deliberative 'Voting Ethics'		209
Introduction		209
I. The legitimacy of procedural legitimacy		212
1. The issue of legitimacy		212
2. The democratic paradox		213
3. Epistemic populism or soft substantivism		216
4. Substantive proceduralism		220
a. Pure decisionism		220
b. Substantively legitimate proceduralism		221
<ol> <li>The minimal substantive legitimation</li> </ol>		
of procedural legitimacy		221
ii. Substantive cum contingent proceduralism		222
II. The justification of democratic deliberation		223
<ol> <li>The justification of democratic participation</li> </ol>		224
<ol><li>The justification of deliberation</li></ol>		226
III. Deliberation and disagreement		228
1. Actual reasonable agreement qua regulative ideal		
of deliberation		228
2. Deliberative disagreement		229
3. Potential reasonable agreement qua internal logic		
of deliberation		232
IV. The inescapability of voting		233
1. The need for closure		233
2. Various proposals of modes of closure		236
a. Non-institutional modes of collective choice		236
b. From institutional deliberation,	,	225
through accommodation, to vote		237
V. Voting after deliberating		240
1. A deliberative justification of voting	2	240
2. The misgivings of the deliberative opposition		• • •
to aggregative procedures	2	243

	VI. Deliberative 'voting ethics'	245
	1. Voting ethics from within	245
	2. The deliberative ethics of voting: minimal decisiveness	246
	3. The deliberative ethics of majority rule: maximal decisiveness	248
	a. From unanimity, through minority rule, to majority rule	248
	b. The argument of maximal decisiveness	250
	Conclusion	254
8.	Four Arguments against Compromising Justice Internally	257
	Introduction	257
	I. The concept of compromise	259
	1. A few distinctions	259
	2. A caveat: the disagreeable nature of compromise	262
	II. The justification of compromise	263
	1. Compromise of interests	264
	2. Compromise of principles	265
	a. General	265
	b. Multiprinciple compromise	269
	c. Single-principle compromise	270
	III. The limitations of compromise	271
	1. Inefficiency	272
	2. Potential injustice	272
	3. Concept attribution	275
	4. Political integrity	277
	IV. Democracy as a fair compromise	280
	1. Democracy as compromise qua process	280
	2. Democracy and further compromises qua outcome	281
	Conclusion	282
SE	ction Two: Law-Making Institutions	285
9.	Constitutional Rights Qua Legislative Precommitment	287
	Introduction	287
	I. A few definitions	290
	II. The precommitment model of constitutional constraints	292
	1. Elster's model of individual precommitment	293
	2. The constitutional analogy	294
	a. The principle of analogy	295
	b. The analogy applied	296
	III. The limitations of the precommitment conception	
	of constitutional constraints	298
	1. General	298

	2.	The precommitting subject: Ulysses versus a majority	
		of the voting population	299
		a. Ulysses versus a complex collective entity, the people	299
		b. Ulysses versus the intergenerational people	301
	3.	The object of the precommitment: the charm	
		of the sirens versus rights misconceptions	302
	4.	The target of precommitment: individual weakness	
		of will versus reasonable disagreement	303
		a. Political akrasia as precommitment main target	304
		b. A few limitations:	
		reasonable disagreement versus collective akrasia	305
		i. The limitations	305
		ii. Assessing the risks	306
		iii. The paradox of constitutional precommitment	309
	5.	The implementation of the precommitment:	
		Ulysses' crew qua external enforcer versus the people	310
	6.	The operation of the precommitment:	
		keeping someone tied versus judging rights-violations	313
	7.	Implications for the precommitment model	
		of constitutional rights	315
	IV. A	counterobjection: the constitutionalisation of democracy	316
		Democracy-enabling	
		and democracy-constitutive precommitment	317
	2.	A few limitations: constitutive predecision versus	
		constitutional precommitment	319
	3.		
		of constitutional rights	322
	V. Ti	ne precommitment model revisited	323
	1.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	324
		a. The different rights entrenched	324
		b. The different tiers of entrenchment	325
		i. Fundamental civil and non-political rights	326
		ii. Constitutive procedural rules and democratic rights	326
	2.	A few built-in correctives	328
		a. General	328
		b. Flexible amendability	329
		c. Essentially contestable concepts	330
		d. The people's last word in constitutional interpretation	333
	Concl	usion	336
10	Dartic	ipation and the Paradox of Democratic	
10.		sentation	339
	_		
	mtrod	uction	339

	I.	The contours of democratic representation	343
		1. Notion and scope	343
		2. Five constitutive elements	346
		a. Who is represented	346
		b. Who the representatives are	347
		c. How the representatives are chosen	348
		d. What the representatives represent	349
		e. How the representatives represent	352
	II.	The challenge of disagreement	353
		1. The challenge	353
		a. Why disagreement should be represented	353
		b. How disagreement should be represented	355
		2. A common response: descriptive group representation	356
		a. From disagreement representation to descriptive representation	356
		b. The implementation of descriptive disagreement	330
		representation	358
	111	The counterchallenge	360
	111.	The counterchange     The paradox of democratic representation	360
		2. The counterchallenge of diversity	361
	TT 7	The state of the s	
	IV.	The representation of disagreement reconceptualised	362
		1. The paradoxical relationship between disagreement and representation	363
		2. The revised model of disagreement representation	364
		a. A balance of descriptive and substantive representation	365
		b. A balance of trusteeship and delegation	367
	17	Some implications: the democratic legitimacy of representation	368
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	Co	nclusion	370
SEC	TIO	n Three: The Content Of Law	373
11.	Int	tegrity: Should the Law Speak With One Voice?	375
	Int	roduction	375
	I.	The concept of integrity	378
	II.	The constitutive elements of integrity	382
	III.	. The circumstances of integrity	386
		1. From utopia to ordinary politics: the necessity of integrity	386
		2. From dystopia to ordinary politics: the plausibility of integrity	387
		3. Back to ordinary politics: the practicability of integrity	391
		a. The object-related limitations of integrity	391
		b. The process-related limitations of integrity	392
	IV.	. The value of integrity	392

		1.	The independence of integrity:	
			the service conception of integrity	393
		2.	Three arguments for an independent principle of integrity	396
			a. The argument of public morality	396
			<ol> <li>The public duty of integrity</li> </ol>	396
			ii. From integrity to political judgement	399
			iii. The relationship between integrity and	
			justice in public morality	401
			b. The argument of communal responsibility	403
			i. The personal duty of integrity	404
			ii. The community personified	405
			iii. The communal responsibility of integrity	406
			c. The argument of authority <i>qua</i> authorship	410
			i. General	410
			ii. Razian authority and integrity	411
			iii. Raz's counterargument	415
	Co	nclu	sion	416
12.	Co	nflio	ets of Constitutional Rights: Nature, Typology and Resolution	419
	Int	rodı	action	419
	I.	The	nature of rights	421
			Moral rights or rights in general	421
			a. The modified interest theory of rights	422
			b. From interests to duties	423
		2.	Legal rights	424
	II.	The	nature of conflicts of rights	425
			Conflicts of moral rights or rights in general	425
			a. The inescapability of conflicts of rights	425
			b. Some responses to sceptical arguments	427
		2.	Conflicts of legal rights	430
			a. The inescapability of conflicts of legal rights	430
			b. Some responses to sceptical arguments	430
	III.	The	typology of conflicts of rights	431
			Conflicts of moral rights or rights in general	431
			Conflicts of legal rights	435
	IV.	The	resolution of conflicts of rights	436
			Conflicts of moral rights or rights in general	436
			a. General	436
		i	b. The qualitative priority of rights	437
			c. The quantitative weighing of rights	439
			i. The relative importance of the interests protected	440
			ii. Some correctives	440

		d. Conciliation or prioritisation	442
		i. The case of rights of different stringencies	442
		ii. The case of rights of equal stringency	443
	2.	Conflicts of legal rights	443
		a. Internal resolution	444
		i. Hierarchy of rights	444
		ii. Rules of conflict	445
		b. External resolution	448
		i. Weighing	448
		ii. Conciliation or prioritisation	449
		iii. Criteria of conciliation	451
Co	ncl	usion	453
SECTIO	n F	our: The Authority Of Law	457
13. Co	ord	lination-based Obligations to Obey the Law	459
In	trod	uction	459
I.	De	efinitions and delimitations	461
	1.	The concept of authority	461
	2.	The types of authority	463
II.	Th	ne mixed pedigree of coordination-based duties to obey the law	465
	1.		466
		a. Root duties to coordinate	466
		i. The scope of natural duties	467
		ii. The background of natural duties	469
		iii. The stringency of natural duties	470
		b. Auxiliary duties to abide by the coordination outcome	472
	2.	Acquired duties to coordinate	473
		a. Consent-based duties to coordinate	<b>47</b> 3
		b. Semi-voluntarily acquired duties to coordinate	<b>47</b> 4
	3.	Mixed duties to coordinate	475
III	i. Co	pordination-based obligations qua obligations of fair play	477
	1.	The main regime of fair play obligations	478
		a. The basic definition	478
		b. Two additional elements	479
	2.	A general challenge: law as a cooperative scheme	481
	3.	An additional condition	483
		a. The condition: the positive acceptance of benefits	483
		b. A general challenge: the idea of acceptance of benefits	484
		c. A specific challenge: the acceptance	
		of legally procured benefits	486
		<ol> <li>The willing acceptance of benefits</li> </ol>	487
		ii The knowing acceptance of benefits	489

Contents	XI.
IV. Raz's three conditions for authority	490
1. General	490
2. Legal reasons to coordinate	492
3. Conformity to the three theses	493
a. The pre-emption thesis	493
b. The dependence thesis	495
c. The normal justification thesis	496
i. A first challenge: the need for public identification	497
ii. A second challenge: the need	
for collective decision-making	498
Conclusion	499
14. Democracy, Disagreement and Disobedience	503
Introduction	503
I. The authority of democratic law	505
II. Disobedience to democratic law	506
1. Large-scale resistance: revolutionary resistance	506
2. Small-scale resistance and civil disobedience in particular	507
a. General	508
b. Some constitutive elements	508
i. Illegality	509
ii. Publicity	510
iii. Political and moral motivation	510
iv. Non-violence	512
v. The exhaustion of legal means: ultima ratio	512
vi. The acceptance of the consequences of one's actions and in particular one's punishment	513
III. The justification of civil disobedience	514
Legal justification	514
a. A priori justification	514
b. A posteriori justification	515
2. Moral justification	516
a. General	516
b. Civil disobedience qua democratic test of legitimacy	518
c. A few limitations to the justification of civil disobedience	519
3. The <i>right</i> to civil disobedience	522
Conclusion	524
Conclusions	527
I. Taking reasonable disagreement seriously	527
1. From disagreement to law and back again	527
2. The rule of law as response to disagreement	528

## xx Contents

3. Disagreement as response to the rule of law	530
4. Means to keep a balance	532
II. Towards global legal pluralism	534
1. The idea	534
2. Three illustrations	535
Bibliography	539
Index	591