The Morality of Conflict
Reasonable Disagreement and the Law

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Contents

Acknowledgements vii

Introduction 1

I. The issue 1
II. The significance 7
III. The approach 10
IV. The structure 12

PART ONE: THE NATURE OF DISAGREEMENT 17

1. The Notion and Types of Disagreement 19

Introduction 19
I. The notion of disagreement 19
II. The types of disagreement 22
1. Political-moral disagreement 22
2. The scope of political morality 24
   a. Rawls' separation of political morality from comprehensive moral doctrines 25
      i. Rawls' overlapping consensus 25
   ii. Rawls' way out 27
   iii. A revised Rawlsian model of political-moral disagreement 30
b. Habermas' separation of ethical-political discourse from moral debates 31
   i. The early Habermas and the problem of political-moral disagreement 33
   ii. The late Habermas and the separation of the moral from the ethical 36
II. The fact of disagreement and the ontological challenge 39
   1. The challenge 39
   2. The challenge's defeasibility 41
   3. Learning from the challenge 44

Conclusion 45
2. **The Sources of Disagreement and Legal Indeterminacy**

   Introduction
   
   I. The sources of disagreement
      1. Verbal lack of agreement
      2. Conceptual disagreement
         a. Borderline disagreement
         b. Pivotal disagreement
      3. Normative disagreement
         a. Epistemic disagreement
         b. Metaphysical disagreement
            i. From value conflict to metaphysical disagreement
            ii. Types of metaphysical disagreement
   II. From moral disagreement to legal indeterminacy
      1. The debate
      2. The notion of indeterminacy
         a. Indeterminacy, uncertainty and objectivity
         b. From moral to legal indeterminacy
         c. Types of legal indeterminacy
      3. The relationship between disagreement and legal indeterminacy
   Conclusion

3. **The Essential Contestability of Normative Concepts**

   Introduction
   
   I. The concept of ‘essentially contestable concept’
   II. The sources of essential contestability
      1. Verbal lack of agreement
      2. Conceptual disagreement
         a. Borderline disagreement
         b. Pivotal disagreement
      3. Normative disagreement
   III. Minimal agreement in understanding and disputable paradigms
      1. Minimal agreement in understanding
      2. The disputability of paradigms
      3. Shared paradigms and conceptual truth
   Conclusion

4. **The Reasonableness of Disagreement**

   Introduction
   
   I. The notion of reasonableness
      1. Three caveats
2. Four distinctions
   a. Reasonableness and rationality 93
   b. Public reasonableness and private reasonableness 95
   c. Person-based reasonableness and content-based reasonableness
      i. The distinction in general 96
      ii. The person-based account of reasonableness 97
      iii. The content-based account of reasonableness 98
   d. Actualist reasonableness and probabilistic reasonableness 99
3. Three illustrations
   a. Rawls' partisan conception of public reason 101
   b. Habermas' transcendental conception of reasonableness 103
   c. Gutmann and Thompson's reciprocal conception of public reason 104

II. The significance of reason 105
   1. The value of the reasonable 105
      a. A pragmatic legitimation: stability and cooperation 106
      b. An epistemological legitimation: the search for truth 107
      c. A moral legitimation: mutual justification
         i. Individual justification 108
         ii. Public justification 108
   2. The limits of the reasonable 110

III. The burdens of reason 111

IV. The implications of reasonable disagreement 113
   1. The challenge of internal scepticism 113
   2. From the inconclusiveness of public reason to alternative modes of political legitimation 115
   3. The benefits of reasonable pluralism and the living rule of law 116

Conclusion 118

PART TWO: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DISAGREEMENT 121

5. The State of Nature Fiction 123
   Introduction 123
   I. The fiction as argument 124
      1. General 124
      2. Setting the scene: the state of nature
         a. Hobbes' state of nature 126
         b. Rousseau's state of nature 128
         c. Kant's state of nature 131
         d. Hume's state of nature 133
      3. Introducing the problem: the extent of disagreement 137
Contents

I. Coordination problems and why we need to solve them

1. The need for coordination
   a. The desirability of coordination
   b. The possibility of coordination

2. Coordination problems
   a. General considerations of collective action
   b. The Prisoner's Dilemma
   c. Pure coordination problems
   d. Partial conflict coordination problems

3. The resolution of coordination problems
   a. The need to solve coordination problems and the moral case for determinatio
   b. From the need to coordinate to the reasons to solve coordination problems
   c. Conscious coordination and the reasonableness of the options

II. Law as a way of contributing to securing coordination

1. On legal coordination in general
   a. From natural to collective coordination
   b. From informal to formal coordination

2. First-level coordination: the constitution of a legal order
   a. The argument
   b. The challenges
      i. From convergent behaviour to rule
      ii. Coordination and pivotal disagreement

3. Second-level coordination: the constitution of law-making procedures

6. Disagreement as a Source of Coordination Problems

Introduction

I. Coordination problems and why we need to solve them

1. The need for coordination
   a. The desirability of coordination
   b. The possibility of coordination

2. Coordination problems
   a. General considerations of collective action
   b. The Prisoner's Dilemma
   c. Pure coordination problems
   d. Partial conflict coordination problems

3. The resolution of coordination problems
   a. The need to solve coordination problems and the moral case for determinatio
   b. From the need to coordinate to the reasons to solve coordination problems
   c. Conscious coordination and the reasonableness of the options

II. Law as a way of contributing to securing coordination

1. On legal coordination in general
   a. From natural to collective coordination
   b. From informal to formal coordination

2. First-level coordination: the constitution of a legal order
   a. The argument
   b. The challenges
      i. From convergent behaviour to rule
      ii. Coordination and pivotal disagreement

3. Second-level coordination: the constitution of law-making procedures
4. Third-level coordination: the constitution of concrete laws 195

III. Coordination as law’s main function 197
1. The argument 198
2. The challenges 200
   a. The absence of all-encompassing concerted action 200
   b. The absence of all-encompassing need for cooperation 201

Conclusion 203

PART THREE: THE RESPONSE TO DISAGREEMENT 205

SECTION ONE: LAW-MAKING PROCEDURES 207

7. Deliberative ‘Voting Ethics’ 209

Introduction 209

I. The legitimacy of procedural legitimacy 212
   1. The issue of legitimacy 212
   2. The democratic paradox 213
   3. Epistemic populism or soft substantivism 216
   4. Substantive proceduralism 220
      a. Pure decisionism 220
      b. Substantively legitimate proceduralism 221
         i. The minimal substantive legitimation of procedural legitimacy 221
         ii. Substantive _cum_ contingent proceduralism 222

II. The justification of democratic deliberation 223
   1. The justification of democratic participation 224
   2. The justification of deliberation 226

III. Deliberation and disagreement 228
   1. Actual reasonable agreement _qua_ regulative ideal of deliberation 228
   2. Deliberative disagreement 229
   3. Potential reasonable agreement _qua_ internal logic of deliberation 232

IV. The inescapability of voting 233
   1. The need for closure 233
   2. Various proposals of modes of closure 236
      a. Non-institutional modes of collective choice 236
      b. From institutional deliberation, through accommodation, to vote 237

V. Voting _after_ deliberating 240
   1. A _deliberative_ justification of voting 240
   2. The misgivings of the deliberative opposition to aggregative procedures 243
VI. Deliberative 'voting ethics' 245
   1. Voting ethics from within 245
   2. The deliberative ethics of voting: minimal decisiveness 246
   3. The deliberative ethics of majority rule: maximal decisiveness 248
      a. From unanimity, through minority rule, to majority rule 248
      b. The argument of maximal decisiveness 250

Conclusion 254

8. Four Arguments against Compromising Justice Internally 257

Introduction 257
I. The concept of compromise 259
   1. A few distinctions 259
   2. A caveat: the disagreeable nature of compromise 262
II. The justification of compromise 263
    1. Compromise of interests 264
    2. Compromise of principles 265
       a. General 265
       b. Multiprinciple compromise 269
       c. Single-principle compromise 270
III. The limitations of compromise 271
     1. Inefficiency 272
     2. Potential injustice 272
     3. Concept attribution 275
     4. Political integrity 277
IV. Democracy as a fair compromise 280
    1. Democracy as compromise qua process 280
    2. Democracy and further compromises qua outcome 281

Conclusion 282

SECTION TWO: LAW-MAKING INSTITUTIONS 285

9. Constitutional Rights Qua Legislative Precommitment 287

Introduction 287
I. A few definitions 290
II. The precommitment model of constitutional constraints 292
    1. Elster's model of individual precommitment 293
    2. The constitutional analogy 294
       a. The principle of analogy 295
       b. The analogy applied 296
III. The limitations of the precommitment conception of constitutional constraints 298
     1. General 298
2. The precommitting subject: Ulysses versus a majority of the voting population
   a. Ulysses versus a complex collective entity, the people 299
   b. Ulysses versus the intergenerational people 301
3. The object of the precommitment: the charm of the sirens versus rights misconceptions 302
4. The target of precommitment: individual weakness of will versus reasonable disagreement
   a. Political akraasia as precommitment main target 304
   b. A few limitations:
      reasonable disagreement versus collective akraasia 305
      i. The limitations 305
      ii. Assessing the risks 306
      iii. The paradox of constitutional precommitment 309
5. The implementation of the precommitment:
   Ulysses' crew qua external enforcer versus the people 310
6. The operation of the precommitment:
   keeping someone tied versus judging rights-violations 313
7. Implications for the precommitment model of constitutional rights 315

IV. A counterobjection: the constitutionalisation of democracy 316
   1. Democracy-enabling and democracy-constitutive precommitment 317
   2. A few limitations: constitutive predecision versus constitutional precommitment 319
   3. Implications for the precommitment model of constitutional rights 322

V. The precommitment model revisited 323
   1. The different levels of entrenchment model
      a. The different rights entrenched 324
      b. The different tiers of entrenchment 325
         i. Fundamental civil and non-political rights 326
         ii. Constitutive procedural rules and democratic rights 326
   2. A few built-in correctives
      a. General 328
      b. Flexible amendability 329
      c. Essentially contestable concepts 330
      d. The people's last word in constitutional interpretation 333

Conclusion 336

10. Participation and the Paradox of Democratic Representation 339
    Introduction 339
I. The contours of democratic representation 343
   1. Notion and scope 343
   2. Five constitutive elements 346
      a. Who is represented 346
      b. Who the representatives are 347
      c. How the representatives are chosen 348
      d. What the representatives represent 349
      e. How the representatives represent 352
II. The challenge of disagreement 353
   1. The challenge 353
      a. Why disagreement should be represented 353
      b. How disagreement should be represented 355
   2. A common response: descriptive group representation 356
      a. From disagreement representation to descriptive representation 356
      b. The implementation of descriptive disagreement representation 358
III. The counterchallenge 360
   1. The paradox of democratic representation 360
   2. The counterchallenge of diversity 361
IV. The representation of disagreement reconceptualised 362
   1. The paradoxical relationship between disagreement and representation 363
   2. The revised model of disagreement representation 364
      a. A balance of descriptive and substantive representation 365
      b. A balance of trusteeship and delegation 367
V. Some implications: the democratic legitimacy of representation 368
Conclusion 370

SECTION THREE: THE CONTENT OF LAW 373
11. Integrity: Should the Law Speak With One Voice? 375

Introduction 375
I. The concept of integrity 378
II. The constitutive elements of integrity 382
III. The circumstances of integrity 386
   1. From utopia to ordinary politics: the necessity of integrity 386
   2. From dystopia to ordinary politics: the plausibility of integrity 387
   3. Back to ordinary politics: the practicability of integrity 391
      a. The object-related limitations of integrity 391
      b. The process-related limitations of integrity 392
IV. The value of integrity 392
1. The independence of integrity: the service conception of integrity 393
2. Three arguments for an independent principle of integrity 396
   a. The argument of public morality 396
      i. The public duty of integrity 396
      ii. From integrity to political judgement 399
      iii. The relationship between integrity and justice in public morality 401
   b. The argument of communal responsibility 403
      i. The personal duty of integrity 404
      ii. The community personified 405
      iii. The communal responsibility of integrity 406
   c. The argument of authority qua authorship 410
      i. General 410
      ii. Razian authority and integrity 411
      iii. Raz's counterargument 415

Conclusion 416


Introduction 419
I. The nature of rights 421
   1. Moral rights or rights in general 421
      a. The modified interest theory of rights 422
      b. From interests to duties 423
   2. Legal rights 424
II. The nature of conflicts of rights 425
   1. Conflicts of moral rights or rights in general 425
      a. The inescapability of conflicts of rights 425
      b. Some responses to sceptical arguments 427
   2. Conflicts of legal rights 430
      a. The inescapability of conflicts of legal rights 430
      b. Some responses to sceptical arguments 430
III. The typology of conflicts of rights 431
   1. Conflicts of moral rights or rights in general 431
   2. Conflicts of legal rights 435
IV. The resolution of conflicts of rights 436
   1. Conflicts of moral rights or rights in general 436
      a. General 436
      b. The qualitative priority of rights 437
      c. The quantitative weighing of rights 439
         i. The relative importance of the interests protected 440
         ii. Some correctives 440
d. Conciliation or prioritisation
   i. The case of rights of different stringencies 442
   ii. The case of rights of equal stringency 443
2. Conflicts of legal rights
   a. Internal resolution 444
      i. Hierarchy of rights 444
      ii. Rules of conflict 445
   b. External resolution 448
      i. Weighing 448
      ii. Conciliation or prioritisation 449
      iii. Criteria of conciliation 451
Conclusion 453

SECTION FOUR: THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 457

13. Coordination-based Obligations to Obey the Law 459

Introduction 459
I. Definitions and delimitations 461
   1. The concept of authority 461
   2. The types of authority 463
II. The mixed pedigree of coordination-based duties to obey the law 465
   1. Natural duties to coordinate 466
      a. Root duties to coordinate 466
         i. The scope of natural duties 467
         ii. The background of natural duties 469
         iii. The stringency of natural duties 470
      b. Auxiliary duties to abide by the coordination outcome 472
   2. Acquired duties to coordinate 473
      a. Consent-based duties to coordinate 473
      b. Semi-voluntarily acquired duties to coordinate 474
   3. Mixed duties to coordinate 475
III. Coordination-based obligations qua obligations of fair play 477
   1. The main regime of fair play obligations 478
      a. The basic definition 478
      b. Two additional elements 479
   2. A general challenge: law as a cooperative scheme 481
   3. An additional condition 483
      a. The condition: the positive acceptance of benefits 483
      b. A general challenge: the idea of acceptance of benefits 484
      c. A specific challenge: the acceptance of legally procured benefits 486
         i. The willing acceptance of benefits 487
         ii. The knowing acceptance of benefits 489
IV. Raz's three conditions for authority 490
1. General 490
2. Legal reasons to coordinate 492
3. Conformity to the three theses 493
   a. The pre-emption thesis 493
   b. The dependence thesis 495
   c. The normal justification thesis 496
      i. A first challenge: the need for public identification 497
      ii. A second challenge: the need for collective decision-making 498

Conclusion 499

14. Democracy, Disagreement and Disobedience 503

Introduction 503
I. The authority of democratic law 505
II. Disobedience to democratic law 506
   1. Large-scale resistance: revolutionary resistance 506
   2. Small-scale resistance and civil disobedience in particular 507
      a. General 508
      b. Some constitutive elements 508
         i. Illegality 509
         ii. Publicity 510
         iii. Political and moral motivation 510
         iv. Non-violence 512
         v. The exhaustion of legal means: ultima ratio 512
         vi. The acceptance of the consequences of one's actions and in particular one's punishment 513

III. The justification of civil disobedience 514
   1. Legal justification 514
      a. A priori justification 514
      b. A posteriori justification 515
   2. Moral justification 516
      a. General 516
      b. Civil disobedience qua democratic test of legitimacy 518
      c. A few limitations to the justification of civil disobedience 519
   3. The right to civil disobedience 522

Conclusion 524

Conclusions 527
I. Taking reasonable disagreement seriously 527
   1. From disagreement to law and back again 527
   2. The rule of law as response to disagreement 528