Arbitrating Antitrust and Merger Control Issues

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Featuring:

- An Inventory of Salient Issues in Antitrust Arbitrations
- Flash-lights on the New EC Regulation 1/2003
- The Current 2002/2003 Reform of the EC Merger Regulation in the Light of the Most Recent Cases
- Critical Analysis of Solutions Adopted so Far
- Reflection on Best Practices and Draft Standard Models for the Commitment to Arbitrate Behavioural Undertakings as well as for the Arbitrator’s Mandate
- Improving the Process: The MTF and the Arbitrator Working as a Unique and Complementary Tandem
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