

International Banking Regulation Law, Policy and Practice

By

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>Forword—Peter Cooke</i>	xix
<i>Preface</i>	xxi
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xxv
<i>Biographical Note</i>	xxvii
Introduction	1

PART I THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION

1. International Banking Supervision—Financial Instability and the Establishment of the Basel Committee	17
1 International Bank Expansion and the Eurodollar Market	18
2 Financial Instability and the Collapse of Bretton Woods	24
3 The Closure of Franklin National Bank and Collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt	26
4 Financial Crisis and G10 Central Bank Support	30
5 Financial Market Supervision and the Establishment of the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices	35
6 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision—Nature, Structure and Method of Operation	39
6.1 Proper Designation	40
6.2 Committee Status	41
6.3 Committee Membership and Structure	42
6.4 Committee Meetings and Method of Operation	45
6.5 Committee Documents	48
6.6 Committee Secretariat	49
6.7 BIS Base	50
6.8 Original Operating Mandate	51
6.9 Early Policy Development and Programme Construction	51
6.10 Extended Support, Consultation and Implementation Mechanisms	56

6.10.1	Working Groups	56
6.10.2	International Technical Committee Relations	57
6.10.3	International Conference of Bank Supervisors	59
6.10.4	Regional Supervisory Associations	60
6.10.4.1	The Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors	60
6.10.4.2	Commission of Latin American and Caribbean Supervisors	61
6.10.4.3	The SEANZA Forum of Banking Supervisors	61
6.10.4.4	The GCC Committee of Banking Supervisors	62
6.10.4.5	The Arab Committee on Banking Supervision	63
6.10.4.6	The Caribbean Group of Banking Supervisors	64
6.10.4.7	Group of Banking Supervisors from Central and Eastern European Countries	64
6.10.4.8	East and Southern Africa Banking Supervisors Group	65
6.10.4.9	West and Central African Group of Banking Supervisors	66
6.10.4.10	Transcaucasia and Central Asia Regional Group	67
6.10.5	The Liaison Group and Consultation Group	67
7	The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision—Structural and Operational Comment	68
7.1	Historical Precedent	68
7.2	Operational Efficiency	70
7.3	Continuing Policy Development and Programme Construction	72
7.4	Technical Relevance	73
7.5	Democratic Inclusion	75
7.6	Extended Consultation Processes	76
7.7	Decision Transparency and Market Support	76
7.8	Policy Revision	77
7.9	Programme Flexibility	77
7.10	Implementation Review and Enforcement Procedures	78
7.11	Sectoral and Membership Expansions	79
7.12	Integrated Technical Committee Structures	80
8	The Basel Banking Supervision Committee—Historical Necessity and Operational Flexibility	80
2.	International Banking Supervision and the Basel Committee Framework	83
1	International Banking Supervision	84
1.1	The 1975 Concordat	86

1.1.1	Original Supervisory Provisions	88
1.1.2	Supervisory Purpose and Component Analysis	92
1.1.3	Policy Basis	94
1.1.4	Subsequent Supervisory Comment and Confirmation	97
1.1.5	Policy and Programme Limitations	100
1.2	The 1983 Revised Concordat	100
1.2.1	General Supervisory Principles	102
1.2.2	Supervision of Foreign Establishments	106
1.2.2.1	Solvency	106
1.2.2.2	Liquidity	107
1.2.2.3	Foreign Exchange Operations and Positions	108
1.2.3	Policy Development and Effect	108
1.3	Implementation of the Revised Concordat and the 1990 Information Supplement	109
1.3.1	The 1986 Implementation Report	110
1.3.2	Programme Development and the 1990 Supplement	112
1.3.2.1	Authorisation	113
1.3.2.2	Parent Authority Information	114
1.3.2.3	Host Authority Information	115
1.3.2.4	Secrecy Constraints	116
1.3.2.5	External Audits	117
1.3.3	Operational Effect	118
1.4	The 1992 Minimum Standards and the 1996 Implementation Report	118
1.4.1	The 1992 Supervisory Policy Restatement	119
1.4.1.1	Home Country Consolidated Supervision	120
1.4.1.2	Joint Consent for Establishment	121
1.4.1.3	Information Collection	122
1.4.1.4	Host Country Corrective Action	122
1.4.2	National Implementation and Effect	123
1.4.3	The 1996 Cross-Border Supervision Report	127
1.5	The 1997 Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision	131
2	The Core Basel Supervisory Framework	136
2.1	Supervisory Policy Development	136
2.2	Effective Consolidation and Significant Business Unit Supervision	139
2.3	Information Collection, Verification and Exchange	141
2.4	Transfer Obstructions and Secrecy Constraints	143
2.5	Supervisory Co-operation	145
2.6	Regulatory Omission and Policy Coherence	145
2.7	Operational Risk Control	148
2.8	Rules Restatement	150
2.9	Scope of Application	151
2.10	Dual Key and Corrective Action	152
2.11	Currency Controls and Herstatt Risk	155

2.12	Market Support Operations	156
3	International Banking Supervision—Closing Comment	161

PART II FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES

3.	Conglomerate Law and International Financial Market Control	165
1	Conglomerate Structures	167
2	Conglomerate Development	167
3	Conglomerate Advantage	176
4	Conglomerate Risk	176
4.1	Banking Markets	177
4.2	Securities Markets	180
4.3	Insurance Markets	182
5	Structural Regulation	184
6	International Response	185
6.1	The Basel Committee—Principles for the Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, September 1992	187
6.1.1	Conglomerate Supervision Difficulties	188
6.1.1.1	Contagion	188
6.1.1.2	Double-Gearing	188
6.1.1.3	Risk Mixing	188
6.1.1.4	Intra-Group Exposures	189
6.1.1.5	Conflicts of Interest	189
6.1.1.6	Management Authority	189
6.1.1.7	Dispersion of Control	189
6.1.1.8	Transparency	189
6.1.2	Principles of Supervision	189
6.1.2.1	Ambit of Supervision	190
6.1.2.2	Information and Consolidation	190
6.1.2.3	Capital Strength	190
6.1.2.4	Organisation	191
6.1.2.5	Ownership	191
6.1.2.6	Risk Control	191
6.1.2.7	Connected Transactions	191
6.1.2.8	Management	192
6.1.2.9	External Audit	192
6.1.3	Methods of Supervision	192
6.1.3.1	Co-operation	192
6.1.3.2	Lead Supervisors or Regulators	192
6.1.3.3	Individual Supervisor	192
6.2	IOSCO Technical Committee—Principles for the Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, November 1992	193
6.3	The Tripartite Group—Progress Report on the Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, April 1994	194
6.4	The Tripartite Group—Report on the Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, July 1995	195
6.4.1	Financial Conglomerates and Conglomerate Structure	195

6.4.2	Supervisory Issues	196
6.4.2.1	Overall Approach to Supervision	196
6.4.2.2	Assessment of Capital Adequacy	196
6.4.2.3	Contagion	198
6.4.2.4	Intra-Group Exposures	199
6.4.2.5	Large Exposures at Group Level	199
6.4.2.6	Conflicts of Interest	200
6.4.2.7	Fit and Proper Tests for Managers	200
6.4.2.8	Transparency of Legal and Managerial Structures	200
6.4.2.9	Management Autonomy	201
6.4.2.10	Suitability of Shareholders	201
6.4.2.11	Rights of Access to Prudential Information	201
6.4.2.12	Supervisory Arbitrage	202
6.4.2.13	Moral Hazard	203
6.4.2.14	Mixed Conglomerates	203
6.5	The Joint Forum—Progress Report, April 1997	203
6.5.1	Exchange of Information	204
6.5.2	Task Force on Mapping	205
6.5.3	Co-ordinator	208
6.5.4	Principles of Supervision	208
6.5.5	Capital Consultation	209
6.6	The Joint Forum—Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, December 1999	210
6.6.1	Capital Adequacy Principles	211
6.6.2	Fit and Proper Principles	211
6.6.3	Framework for Supervisory Information Sharing	212
6.6.4	Principles for Supervisory Information Sharing	212
6.6.5	Co-ordinator	213
6.6.6	Supervisory Questionnaire	214
6.6.7	Intra-Group Transactions and Exposures	214
6.6.8	Risk Concentrations	215
7	Conglomerate Law—A Provisional Response	216
7.1	Conglomerate Supervision	216
7.2	Information Transfer	218
7.3	Suitability	219
7.4	Capital Regulation	219
7.5	Concentrations and Exposures	220
7.6	Internal Risk Management	220
7.7	Conflicts of Interest	221
7.8	Supervisory Equivalence	222
7.9	Core Principles and Conglomerate Control	223
7.10	Institutional Support	224
7.11	Loss Transfer—Structural Regulation or Capital Adjustment	225
7.12	Crisis Management and Market Support	226
8	Conglomerate Law—Provisional Conclusions and Comment	226

4. Lead Regulation and International Financial Market Supervision	231
1 Conglomerate Law and Lead Regulation	233
2 Supervisory Integration and Co-operation Models	237
2.1 Exclusive National Bank or Securities Firm Supervision	237
2.2 Informal Bilateral and Multilateral Contacts	238
2.3 Formal Bilateral and Multilateral Arrangements	239
2.4 College Supervision	242
2.5 Lead Regulation	243
3 Historical Precedent and Domestic Reforms	244
3.1 United Kingdom Financial Services and the Financial Services and Markets Act	244
3.2 BCCI and Barings	247
3.3 European Community Home Country Control and Conglomerate Supervision	250
3.4 United States Umbrella Supervision and Financial Services Reform	250
3.5 The Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates	254
4 Appointment or Identification Options	255
4.1 Parent Undertaking's Consolidated Supervisor	255
4.2 Consolidated Supervisor of the Group	255
4.3 Solo Plus Supervisor of the Dominant Securities Operations	256
4.4 Supervisor of the Dominant Insurance Undertaking	257
4.5 Most Experienced Supervisor of Core Group Activities	257
5 Functions or Responsibilities of the Lead Regulator	258
5.1 Information Collection and Dissemination	258
5.2 Group Risk Assessment	259
5.3 Group Risk Control Analysis	260
5.4 Crisis Management	260
5.5 Additional or Ancillary Functions	261
6 Supervisory or Systems Value and Advantage and Operational Difficulties and Objections	262
6.1 Structural and Initial Support Issues	262
6.2 Operational and Procedural Limitations	263
6.3 Funding and Liability Difficulties	264
6.4 Systems Review and Continuing Revision	264
6.5 Wider Adoption and Co-operation Difficulties	265
7 Interim Supervisory Response	265
8 Lead Regulation—Conclusions and Comment	267

PART III FINANCIAL STABILITY

5. International Financial Crisis and the Financial Stability Forum	271
1 Financial Crises	275
2 Policy Response	282

2.1	G7 Financial Stability Reports	282
2.2	G10 Communiqués and Working Parties	286
2.3	G22 Working Groups	289
2.3.1	Enhancing Transparency and Accountability	289
2.3.2	Strengthening Financial Systems	291
2.3.3	Managing International Financial Crises	294
2.4	IMF Framework for Financial Stability	296
2.5	Government and Private Initiatives	302
3	International Financial Stability	303
4	The Financial Stability Forum (FSF)	307
4.1	Membership Structure and Operation	308
4.2	Mandate	309
4.3	Working Groups and Task Forces	310
4.3.1	Highly Leveraged Institutions (HLI)	311
4.3.2	Capital Flows (CF)	312
4.3.3	Offshore Financial Centres (OFC)	312
4.3.4	Implementation Task Force	314
4.3.5	Deposit Insurance Study Group	315
5	General Activities	316
5.1	Disclosure	316
5.2	Standards	317
5.3	Training	317
6	Financial Stability Standards	317
6.1	Transparency	318
6.2	Banking	319
6.3	Securities	322
6.4	Insurance	324
6.5	Governance	325
6.6	Payment and Settlement	326
7	Stability Response—Comment and Conclusions	327
7.1	Global Crises	327
7.2	Control Gap	327
7.3	Political Direction	328
7.4	New Control Architecture	329
7.5	Substantive Programme Revision	330
7.6	Single Global Rule Book	331
7.7	Market and Institutional Transparency	332
7.8	International Standards	332
7.9	Implementation Review and Enforcement	333
7.10	Private Sector Support	334
7.11	Systemic Protection	335
7.12	Construction of an Integrated Financial Control Framework	336
8	Closing Comment—Policy and Operational Integration and the Construction of a New Global Control Framework	337
6.	Observations on the Continued Development of International Banking and Financial Market Supervision and Control	339
1	International Financial Markets and the Basic Basel Response	339
2	The Basel Committee	341

2.1	Structure and Operation	341
2.2	The Basel Supervisory and Regulatory Framework	343
2.2.1	International Bank Supervision	343
2.2.1.1	Effective Banking Policy and Programme Construction	343
2.2.1.2	International Inter-Sector Supervisory Co-operation	346
2.2.2	International Bank Regulation	349
2.2.2.1	Common Control Rules	349
2.2.2.2	Inter-Sector Control Options	350
2.2.3	Integrated Supervisory and Regulatory Programme Adoption	351
3	Effective Implementation Review and Enforcement	352
3.1	Implementation Review	353
3.2	Enforcement and Compliance	354
4	A New Integrated Control Framework	355
4.1	Global Authority or Committee Revision	356
4.2	Separate Co-ordinating Committee, Agency or Unit	358
4.3	Committee Development Programme	360
5	Closing Comment—Financial Stability and a New Global Response	362
	Bibliography	365

PART IV INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

Annexes

1	Financial Stability Forum	385
1.1	Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems	
1.2	Compendium of Standards	
2	Code of Good Practices in Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies (IMF)	389
3	Code of Good Practices in Fiscal Transparency (IMF)	403
4	Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD)	409
5	Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems (CPSS)	429
6	The Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)	431
7	Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCBS)	445
8	Core Principles Methodology (BCBS)	483
9	Securities Regulation: Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (IOSCO)	525
10	Insurance Supervisory Principles (IAIS)	529
11	Minimum Standards for the Supervision of International Banking Groups and their Cross-Border Establishments (July 1992)	537
12	The Supervision of Cross-Border Banking (October 1996)	543

PART V POSTSCRIPT

1. Capital Supplement—The New Capital Accord	569
1 Capital Policy	571
2 Relative Advantage and Disadvantage	572
3 Capital Revision	573
4 Total Capital	575
5 The Three Pillars	576
5.1 Revised Minimum Capital Requirement	576
5.1.1 Standardised Approach	577
5.1.2 Internal Ratings Based Approach	580
5.1.3 Operational Risk	582
5.1.4 Market Risk	584
5.2 Supervisory Review	585
5.2.1 Capital Assessment	586
5.2.1 Capital Review and Intervention	587
5.2.3 Supplementary Capital Ratios	587
5.2.4 Supervisory Intervention	588
5.3 Market Discipline	590
6 Capital Comment	592
7 Capital Consultation	595
8 Capital Close	596
Tables	598
2 International Standards and Standards Implementation	605
1 Substantive Policy Construction	606
2 Institutional Reform	608
3 Implementation and Implementation Review	609
4 Technological Integration	612
5 Close	614
Index	615