Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract

The Competitive Transformation of Network Industries in the United States

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Contents

Preface xiii
About the Authors xix

1 The Nature of the Controversy 1
   The Takings Landscape 2
   Regulation and Contract 4
   The Scope of Analysis 10

2 Deregulation and Network Pricing 19
   Natural Monopoly and Network Industries 20
   Sunk Costs, Barriers to Entry, and Stranded Costs 25
   Incumbent Burdens 30
   Open Access and Mandatory Unbundling 47
   Conclusion 53

3 Quarantines and Quagmires 55
   The Structure of the Quarantine Argument 60
   The Natural Monopoly Argument 64
   The Barriers to Entry Argument 77
   The Leverage Argument 85
   The Cross-Subsidization Argument 90
   Conclusion 96
Contents

Incumbent Regulated Firm 219
Physical Invasion of Network Facilities 226
Just Compensation and the Regulation of Public Utility Rates 240
Unconstitutional Conditions on the Lifting of Incumbent Burdens 255
The Inapplicability of Market Street Railway 256
Northern Pacific Railway and the Regulator’s Redefinition of the Intended Use of Dedicated Property 262
The Misinterpretation of Judge Starr’s Concurrence in Jersey Central 268
Conclusion 272

7
Just Compensation for Deregulatory Takings 273
Just Compensation and Voluntary Exchange 274
Investment-Backed Expectations, Opportunity Costs, and Deregulatory Takings 276
Deregulatory Givings and the Quid pro Quo Defense 278
Conclusion 281

8
The Efficient Component-Pricing Rule 283
Economic Analysis of the Efficient Component-Pricing Rule 286
The Basic Framework 289
A Benchmark Case 290
The Contestable-Market Case 292
Capacity Competition 295
Product Differentiation 300
Conclusion 304

9
The Market-Determined Efficient Component-Pricing Rule 307
Pricing Unbundled Network Elements 312
The FCC’s First Report and Order and Recovery of the Incumbent LEC’s Total Costs 338
Conclusion 342
Contents

14 Limiting Principles for Stranded Cost Recovery 449
   Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
   for the Recovery of Stranded Costs 450
   Regulatory Contracts, Statutory Gratuities,
   and State-Managed Cartels 455
   The Deregulatory Experience in Other
   Network Industries 461
   Cable Television Franchises and Military
   Base Closings 483
   Retroactive Prudency Reviews as a Condition
   for Recovery of Stranded Costs 487
   Conclusion 493

15 Deregulation and Managed Competition
   in Network Industries 495
   The Economic Incentive Principle 497
   The Equal Opportunity Principle 503
   The Impartiality Principle 517
   Conclusion 533

16 The Tragedy of the Telecommons 535
   Four Epigrams for Protecting Private
   Property in Network Industries 535
   Ownership and Stranded Costs 540
   The Telecommons 545
   Regulatory Divestiture 551
   The Eighth Circuit’s 1997 Decision in
   Iowa Utilities Board 557
   Conclusion 565

References 565
Case Index 591
Name Index 609
Subject Index 617