Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions

edited by
Kenneth A. Shepsle and
Barry R. Weingast

Ann Arbor
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS
Contents

Foreword ix

John A. Ferejohn

Introduction 1

Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast

Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions 5

Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast

The Gains from Exchange Hypothesis of Legislative Organization 37

Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel

A Sequential Choice Theory Perspective on Legislative Organization 71

David P. Baron


Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins

Parties and Committees in the House: Member Motivations, Issues, and Institutional Arrangements 119

David W. Rohde

Comparing Committee and Floor Preferences 139

John Londregan and James M. Snyder, Jr.

A Model of a Legislature with Two Parties and a Committee System 173

John H. Aldrich

Who Controls? Information and the Structure of Legislative Decision Making 201

Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House Special Rules and the Institutional Design Controversy</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Barbara Sinclair</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals, Goals, Dimensionality, and Congressional Committees</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Forrest Maltzman and Steven S. Smith</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empiricism and Progress in Positive Theories of Legislative Institutions</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Richard L. Hall</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afterword (But Undoubtedly Not the Last Word)</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Morris P. Fiorina</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributors</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>